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Abstract
One important connection for all human beings is that we have a shared need for health care and
are at some risk of experiencing medical error. Errors documented in the field of radiation
therapy have included tragic levels of suffering and even death from preventable mistakes.
Efforts to improve patient safety include an approach called incident learning that makes use of
information about known errors to inform safety improvement strategy. The complexity of
human contributing factors challenges those safety improvements. The problem addressed by
this dissertation study is that radiation therapy puts patients at risk, and the incident learning
systems designed to inform safety improvements have yet to be optimized through a human
factors framework. The Human Factors Analysis Classification System, a validated system
utilized to categorize human contributing factors to error, was utilized in conjunction with a
radiotherapy-specific list of distinct error types, such as treatment planning and quality assurance
to classify a diverse international sample of radiotherapy safety events. The goal of this research
was to discover predictive patterns of human factors contributing to radiotherapy incidents.
Associations were uncovered between human contributing factors to error. Supervisory failures
are linked to erroneous decision making and to unsafe environmental preconditions. Predictive
associations between human factors and radiation therapy error types were discovered as well.
Treatment-planning errors are associated with a specific kind of skill-based error that involves a
lack of mindfulness. Quality assurance events are associated with certain supervisory and
decision-type errors. Image-guidance errors are associated with perception failures and to
failures at the human-computer interface. These associations incorporate a human factors
framework and have direction for effective risk mitigation strategies.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction to the Chapter
Cancer patients undergoing radiation therapy should not have to worry about preventable
harm, yet accidents happen and improvement strategies have not been optimized with proven
tactics from other industries. A series of particularly horrific accidents were highlighted by the
New York Times in 2010 (Bogdanich, 2010a). Those stories inspired an increased commitment
to safety within the field of radiation oncology, including an increased use of knowledge-sharing
following erroneous events. This practice, known as incident learning, is not unique to radiation
oncology or to the health care field. In fact, using errors as opportunities to develop mitigation
strategies and to communicate about risk has had well documented successes in other industries,
such as aviation (Mahajan, 2010).
Those successes from incident learning have yet to be fully realized in radiation
oncology. One notable difference in how incident learning has been utilized relates to the
recognized role of human factors; human factors have been intimately involved in aviation safety
strategy but have not been nearly as integral to health care or radiation oncology. Human factors
account for the complexity of human interactions, relationships, and communication patterns.
Without a purposeful consideration of human factors as contributors to error, the focus of error
analysis tends is more on the action taken rather than why it happened (Diller et al., 2014). With
an evaluation of human factors contributing to radiotherapy safety events, this dissertation study
describes and predicts patterns of specific human behaviors as they relate to error. Study results
have fallen short of explaining why radiotherapy safety incidents occur, yet the predictive
patterns shown can contribute greatly to efficient and effective safety improvements. A human
factors analysis classification system (HFACS) was proposed in 2000 to give structure to a
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means of incorporating human factors into error investigation and analysis. With separate
categories for unsafe acts, environmental preconditions, supervisory factors, and organizational
factors (and an additional multitude of subcategories), radiotherapy errors can be associated with
specific human factors. Through this approach, associations between which errors have taken
place and the human factors involved (from the HFACS) show predictive patterns useful to error
mitigation and safety improvement.
Background to the Problem
Harm as Part of Medicine
The most basic principles of medical ethics include nonmaleficence, which is the
obligation of medical providers to refrain from intentionally harming their patients. They also
include beneficence or the requirement that providers act in the best interests of their patients’
health and well-being (Emanuel et al., 2008). Despite these basic priorities and intentions,
patients are still being harmed. Medical error is considered the third leading cause of death in the
United States today. This understanding was based on prior studies, such as the one done by the
Institute of Medicine in 1999, one by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality in 2004,
and a recognition that human and systems errors are not able to be recognized as official causes
of death on United States (U.S.) death certificates. Official causes of death are selected from the
International Classification of Disease system, which does not include options for human or
systems-based factors (Makary & Daniel, 2016). Without the ability to formally recognize
medical errors as a cause of death, underrepresentation seems inevitable. Detail about the nature
and magnitude of harm in medicine and specifically radiation therapy is explained in Chapter 2.
With the explicitly stated and presumed intention of providers not to inflict harm and the
recognition that patient harm remains a prevalent issue, it is logical to focus some attention on
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the fact that an abundance of harm is brought about unintentionally. The Institute of Medicine’s
(IOM) landmark publication, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, indicated that
human beings are naturally prone to making mistakes. These mistakes lead to preventable errors
that rival some of the more widely recognized diseases as threats to human health and wellness
(Donaldson et al., 2000).
Response to a Call to Action
The IOM’s publication was effectively a call to action regarding human error in
medicine. Part of the response to this call was the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act
(PSQIA) of 2005. Under this act, federal protections were offered for voluntarily reported patient
safety information; medical errors could be shared as learning opportunities with protected
confidentiality. The intent of this legislation was to encourage the reporting of medical errors so
that safety and quality issues could be addressed (Office for Civil Rights Headquarters, 2017).
The potential for shared information about error to enhance safety and quality improvement
efforts was duly recognized.
In order to support the PSQIA’s offered protections, the act authorized the creation of
patient safety organizations (PSOs). These organizations offer a protected space for health care
providers to submit information about errors and unsafe conditions. Within this space, data can
be aggregated, analyzed, and reported in order to reduce the risk of harm to patients (Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2018).
Harm Specific to Radiation Therapy
One small portion of the vast field of medicine is radiation therapy. Radiation therapy or
radiotherapy is a type of cancer treatment that uses high doses of radiation to break down the
DNA of cancer cells, effectively killing them or at least slowing their growth. These treatments
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can elongate life for cancer patients and in some case even offer cure (National Cancer Institute,
2019). Much like all fields of medicine, however, history has shown that radiation therapy can
also result in patient harm.
In 2010, the New York Times published a series of articles describing horrific pain,
suffering, and death brought about by radiation therapy errors. One such story was the journey of
a man named Scott Jerome-Parks who had been treated for a head and neck cancer. When a
computer error had gone unnoticed, his brainstem and neck were treated with much higher levels
of radiation than were intended. The result of this exposure included intense pain, deafness, near
blindness, loss of his teeth, and a progression that eventually took his life at the age of 43
(Bogdanich, 2010a). The personal stories and tragic detail offered in this case and in others
presented significant change in how radiation therapy caregivers approached the subject of
patient safety. More information about the history of harm in radiation therapy is detailed in
Chapter 2.
Why people act and behave in the ways that they do is explained by motivation theory,
and a renewed awareness of safety risk and potential disaster had an effect on oncology staff
following the New York Times publications. The need for personal safety is a fundamental
human motivator (Maslow, 1943). It follows reason, then that as caregivers are directly
responsible for other people’s safety, ensuring that safety would also be a powerful motivator.
When drive and commitment to patient safety supersede shame or concern about punitive
responses to error, dialog about mistakes and safety improvement becomes possible.
Incident Learning as Part of Radiation Therapy
The safety culture in radiation therapy had new life after 2010, and in 2011, the American
Society for Radiation Oncology (ASTRO) partnered with the American Association of Physicists
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in Medicine (AAPM) to develop the Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System, or RO-ILS.
Clarity PSO, a federally listed patient safety organization provides the PSO services for RO-ILS,
and the program was officially launched in 2014 (American Society for Radiation Oncology,
2019a). An incident is defined as “an unwanted or unexpected change from a normal system
behavior which causes or has the potential to cause an adverse effect to persons or equipment”
(Ford et al., 2012 p. 7281). This definition contains some amount of subjectivity, which provides
a relatively easy way for those less motivated by patient safety and more motivated by selfprotection (from association with error) to hide mistakes. Incident learning is a means by which
medical errors and narrowly avoided errors can be utilized to better understand the underlying
contributing factors, to develop effective mitigation strategies, and to provide opportunity for
shared knowledge and widespread safety improvements. The very nature of this safety
improvement mechanism is heavily influenced by human motivation. Still, the information
exchanged through incident learning can provide invaluable insight for risk mitigation. When
utilizing information reported through incident learning it is critical to consider the human
drivers for the information reported and for the incidents themselves.
While the RO-ILS system was new for the US-based field of radiation therapy, it was
predated by the Radiation Oncology Safety Information System (ROSIS). ROSIS was launched
in 2001 with similar goals to those of RO-ILS. This system was an international system through
which information about incidents and near-incidents could be voluntarily reported (Cunningham
et al., 2010).
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) currently offers the Safety in Radiation
Oncology (SAFRON) incident learning system for the same purpose of providing learning
opportunities from voluntarily reported errors and nearly missed errors. Errors reported into this
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system are confidential and are protected under federal legislation (IAEA, 2019). SAFRON was
launched in 2012 and was authorized to incorporate the more historic ROSIS submissions at that
time (IAEA, 2019). The culture of shared learning from radiotherapy errors, therefore, predated
the New York Times articles from 2010, but the inspiration from those articles fueled the RO-ILS
and SAFRON incident learning systems that are significant contributors to the patient safety
landscape today.
Information contained in today’s SAFRON database provides a wealth of information
about radiotherapy errors and the precipitating factors that contributed to them. Those factors
include more obvious contributors, such as mechanical failures and more subtle contributors
rooted in human interaction. The human component of error affects not only the unsafe acts
themselves but also the environmental and supervisory influences that envelop them.
Understanding the role that these factors play in radiotherapy safety is critical to safety
improvement strategy, yet it is often overlooked.
The role of human motivation within this SAFRON data may present itself with bias. As
these data are a quantitative predictive study of error types and human contributing factors, bias
is important to acknowledge and understand. Bias and other threats to this study were addressed
at length in Chapter 3. The use of SAFRON data as opposed to incident learning data from a
single institution or even country does have the advantage of including information from a
diverse array of cultures and perspectives. In that regard, this study has benefitted from a
potentially minimized bias from any specific source of contributors. That potential aside,
geographic information regarding the source of incident submissions has not been provided by
the IAEA, so the degree to which this type of bias has been mitigated is unknown.
Incident Learning Systems and Safety Improvement

7
While the potential for marked safety improvement comes with the opportunity to learn
from the aggregation and analysis of reported errors, solid outcome-based data are somewhat
limited. Reports of success that do exist take varied forms. Some institutions have cited a
reduction in the number of errors that actually reach patients (Chao et al., 2014; Clark et al.,
2010). It is important not to equate a reduced number of report submissions to improved safety
as reporting for incident learning is voluntary and may increase or decrease for a number of
reasons. Other publications have pointed to either the reduced severity of reported incidents or
reductions in specific kinds of errors as indications of improvement (Clark et al., 2013; Deufel et
al., 2017). The challenges of incident learning in radiation therapy have also been noted in the
literature. A lack of communication, feedback, and actionable follow-up have been pointed to as
potential limiting factors (Richardson & Thomasden, 2018; Sujan, 2015). There has also been a
lack of understanding with regard to why incidents happen as the tendency is to focus more on
that which happened and who was involved (Diller et al., 2013). Chapter 2 of this dissertation
study includes a robust presentation of incident learning successes and shortcomings, both within
and beyond radiation therapy. Alternatives to incident learning were compared and contrasted in
terms of their historic effectiveness.
Consideration of Human Factors
In order to optimize the use of information offered through incident learning, it is
necessary to take a step back to consider an approach to thinking about error. In 2010, Dekker
proposed that people tend to attribute errors and failures to a singular system component. Instead
of considering the system itself, blame is assigned to a specific person or thing. This vision
aligns with the Swiss cheese model of error propagation proposed by James Reason. Through
this model, a single error source may pass through multiple layers of safety barriers before
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ultimately reaching a patient (Reason, 1990a). This model was discussed further in Chapter 2.
Dekker went on to hypothesize that errors are more so the result of interactions within complex
systems involving people, relationships, computer systems, and additional influences (Dekker,
2010). Environmental influences and human interaction, such as between supervisors and staff
are included within these complex systems. Dekker’s views have been echoed throughout the
literature when errors are discussed in relation to human factors. Human factors are defined as
“the study of the interrelationships between individuals, the tools they use, and the environment
in which they live and work” (Ford et al., 2012, p. 7281).
The limited success has been realized through incident learning and the overall
prevalence of medical errors lend themselves to further work in this area, and this need has been
recognized in published literature. This need was also reviewed in greater detail in Chapter 2. It
has been suggested that health care organizations depend on high-reliability science or the
science for safe, effective, standardized processes. Industries, such as aviation, have earned
recognition as high-reliability organizations (HROs) when they are recognized as being complex,
hazardous, and have achieved safety levels that prevent serious or catastrophic events over long
periods of time (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2019). The health care industry is
also complex and hazardous. The theories and strategies for HRO safety improvements are,
therefore, of great interest within health care (Chassin & Loeb, 2011).
The pursuit of safety improvement by HROs has historically included a recognition that
errors are brought about by systems and complex human interactions. Landmark fundamentals of
factors associated with error were incorporated into a Human Factors Analysis Classification
System so that these factors could be mapped to a human factors-based schema. With this
system, factors contributing to error could be better understood, and safety improvement efforts
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could be more efficient and effective. The system was originally designed to help analyze the
causes of aviation accidents but has also been successfully utilized in other HROs and in health
care (Diller et al., 2014). To date, the HFACS system has not been applied to error analysis in
radiation therapy, and while the importance of human factors have been recognized in this area, a
human factors-based aggregate error analysis has yet to be performed. The historic use of
HFACS in aviation, rail, and in health care environments outside of radiation therapy were
described in the next chapter of this study. For this work, the use of a quantitative approach to
evaluating reported radiotherapy errors allowed predictive patterns between radiotherapy errors
and human factors to be established.
Statement of the Problem
While complex and hazardous, health care has yet to earn consideration as a highreliability organization. Other industries that have earned this recognition incorporated a human
factors-based analysis into their safety improvement and risk mitigation work. In the health care
field patients continue to be harmed by medical errors, which is a leading cause of death in the
US (Makary & Daniel, 2016). Radiation therapy is the medical practice of treating cancer
patients with high doses of radiation and is no exception to putting patients at risk of harm
(Bogdanich, 2010 a or b; Sands, 2017). Efforts to improve patient safety in radiation therapy
involve voluntarily reporting information about errors. Information learned from the mistakes of
others can inform effective improvement strategies, but error analysis has often focused more on
“what” and “who” rather than “why.” Historic analysis has also lacked a focus on the complex
patterns of human and human-computer interactions that contribute to errors (Diller et al., 2014).
Human factors have been shown to exceed others as contributors to certain safety failures in
radiotherapy (Huq et al., 2016). By oversimplifying assumptions with regard to the causation of
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an incident, mitigation strategies developed from that analysis may be suboptimal. The problem
being addressed by this dissertation study is that radiation therapy puts patients at risk, and the
incident learning systems designed to inform safety improvements have yet to be optimized
through a human factors framework.
The goal of this research is to discover predictive patterns of human factors contributing
to radiotherapy incidents. In order to accomplish this goal, a large international database of
reported safety events were analyzed with respect to both radiotherapy-specific error categories
and human contributing factors. Tests for predictive associations werr run between human
factors from a four-tier human factors classification system (tier one unsafe acts, tier two
preconditions for unsafe acts, tier three supervision, and tier four organizational influences) and
between those factors and the radiotherapy error types. Results yielded predictive patterns for
reported errors and is valuable for prospective safety planning.
Relevance of Incident Learning to Improving Safety
There has been well-documented clinical harm within the field of radiation oncology.
Pain, suffering, and even death have resulted over the years from multiple adverse events
(Bogdanich, 2010a). Information sharing about errors and narrowly avoided errors can be of
great help to safety improvement efforts, and incident learning systems have been put in place to
facilitate such sharing (Clark et al., 2013). Reducing the risk of error in complex and hazardous
environments through incident learning is not a unique goal for radiation therapy or for the
health care environment in general. Significant work and marked success has been well
documented in other areas, such as in aviation. Much of that work has centered on analyses of
human factors or complex interactions involving people, their relationships, their tools, and their
communications (Diller et al., 2014). The purpose of this dissertation study was to explore
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reported incident learning data for predictive patterns of factors contributing to unsafe
radiotherapy events.
The complexity of involved human factors has challenged this type of analysis in the past
and has been underrepresented in published work (Diller et al., 2014). This investigator used a
systematic approach to analyze a radiotherapy incident report database through a human factors
classification system. Findings may contribute to safety improvement methodology by providing
insight into the human contributing factors for an aggregate database of historic errors. The
relevance of this dissertation is bolstered by the importance of patient safety and by the need for
improvement. It is, however, somewhat threatened by human bias and construct validity
involved with incident learning. The voluntary nature of report submission causes human
motivation and other biases to affect the data and subsequent analysis. It is also understood that
reported events reported make up only a small portion of that which actually takes place. The
incident submission process is also somewhat restrictive and could influence that data that is
ultimately included.
The event’s clinical significance is described in one data field (clinical severity) in the
SAFRON report. The majority of submitted incidents were considered minor, yet it is the
moderate to severe events that were likely most critical to safety. The focus of the study was
only on the reports classified as either moderate or severe so that the more critical events
remained a focus. This selection process may influence the results of the data analysis. The
incorporation of a diverse data set and required inclusion criteria were utilized to minimize bias
and to maximize the quality of the analysis. All threats to this dissertation study were discussed
at length in Chapter 3.
Theoretical Framework and Research Question
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Theories
Unsafe acts and their contributing factors in the health care setting can be discussed
within a number of contexts and theories. The social-ecological model is useful to understand
these issues as it provides a four-level framework in addressing some of the involved
complexities. Human factors contributing to error are complex and that complexity is part of
why they have not been well-studies or well-understood. Their importance to safety
improvement successes in high reliability organizations have, however, shown them to be of
great value. Social ecological theory describes contributions and influences from individuals,
individuals within relationships, from the community at large, and within society as a whole.
These four levels of interaction influence one another and ultimately contribute to reality and the
human experience (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2020).
Individual health care workers, patients, and others involved can influence medical care.
All involved parties contribute by making decisions, reacting to problems, and by
communicating positivity and displeasure. With these influences, they affect relationships with
their families, their friends, and their caregivers. Communities are affected by the successes and
failures of their local health care environment, and in turn, society is affected by community
practices. The tragedies depicted by the New York Times in 2010 exemplify these four levels of
influence. Each radiation therapy error described caused pain, suffering, and loss for the patients
and their families (Bogdanich, 2010a). Involved caregivers were also affected in significant
ways. These individuals affected relationships within their personal lives and in their hospital.
These events had profound effects on the involved hospitals and their communities.
Social ecological theory also helps explain influences from the community level back
down to the individual (CDC, 2020). Using the same example of the accidents from 2010, the
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resultant changes to society affected widespread patient safety efforts, especially within the
radiotherapy community. New incident learning systems were launched and many practice
leaders prioritized safety within their health care systems. Individual providers were affected in
different ways, some dedicating their careers to improving radiotherapy safety. Patients were
also affected by the increased focus on error prevention.
This dissertation study was focused on human factors as contributors to error in radiation
therapy. Social ecological theory helped the investigator to understand how safety issues may
propagate from the organization level down through supervisory levels to first line caregivers
and to patients themselves. Conversely, it was important to understand how patients and
caregivers may influence their departmental environments and their organizational environment.
Motivation and behavior theory is also fundamental to understanding human factor
associations with unsafe acts in radiotherapy. Maslow (1943) discussed the motivation of people
through a hierarchy of needs in his landmark publication. Maslow explained that in order for
people to be motivated by something, the more basic fundamental human needs must first be
fulfilled. Physiological needs form the base of this hierarchy followed by safety needs, by love
and belonging, by self-esteem, and lastly one can be motived by self-actualization (Maslow,
1943). The philosophy of human motivation was particularly important for this investigation
because safety events in this study were voluntarily reported; the presence or absence of event
reports is partially based on human motivation to report. For example, health care workers may
be motivated to report safety events by their personal patient safety priorities. Similarly, they
may be motivated not to report safety events by their fear of negative repercussions.
According to Maslow, personal safety is one of the more fundamental human motivators.
In consideration of the safety of others, humans may first consider their own personal safety in
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terms of their job security and their reputation. Reporting one’s own errors may be hindered by
fear of negative repercussions. One of the higher needs on the hierarchy is esteem. If reporting
error or taking other steps to ensure the safety of others hurts one’s own esteem may be a
limiting factor to safety. On the more positive side of motivation and behavior theory, people
may be positively motivated by doing good work that protects patients and improves their quality
of care. By upholding and improving upon effective safety practices, the risk of harm to patients
is reduced. One of the higher needs on the hierarchy is esteem. If reporting error were to
ultimately hurt one’s own esteem, heath care workers may be reluctant to do so. Workers may be
positively motivated to report error if they feel that it would protect patients and improve the
quality of care.
Research Question
How are human factors associated with each other and with error types in radiation
therapy?
Hypothesis
Human factors contributing to error exist at multiple tiers of proximity to the unsafe act
itself. Contributing factors more remote to the unsafe acts will likely have a predictive
association to contributing factors closer to the unsafe acts themselves.
The investigator also tested for predictive patterns of human contributing factors as they
relate 14 types of radiotherapy errors. Nineteen unique contributing factors exist as
subcategories within four tiers of the HFACS. Multiple predictors are expected from this work.
Contributing factors at the HFACS tier three supervision level are likely to be related to quality
assurance-type errors as quality assurance tasks often performed by a physicist or staff member
working alone and often after hours. The physics staff in a radiation oncology department may
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also be limited to a single or very few physicists. This environment may lend itself to
insufficient supervision and tier three supervision contributors. Environmental factors under the
HFACS Tier 2 preconditions for unsafe acts are likely to relate to image guidance errors. These
errors depend greatly on imaging software and the human-computer interface, which are integral
parts of the technological environment. Lastly, personnel factors under HFACS Tier 2
preconditions for unsafe acts are likely to relate to documentation-type errors. Personnel factors
include communication, coordination, and planning issues, which may be predictably related to
erroneous documentation.
Definition of Terms
1. Contributing factor. “A circumstance, action or influence which is thought to have
played a part in the origin or development of an incident or to increase the risk of an
incident” (Ford et al., 2012, p. 7281).
2. Error. “Failure to complete a planned action as intended or the use of an incorrect
plan of action to achieve a given aim” (Ford et al., 2012, p. 7281).
3. Human factors. “The study of the interrelationships between individuals, the tools
they use, and the environment in which they live and work” (Ford et al., 2012, p.
7281).
4. Human factors engineering. “The study of human behavior, abilities, and limitations,
and the application of this knowledge to design systems for safe and effective human
use” (Chan et al., 2010, p. 2).
5. Incident. “An unwanted or unexpected change from a normal system behavior which
causes or has the potential to cause an adverse effect to persons or equipment” (Ford
et al., 2012, p. 7281).
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6. Near miss. “An event or situation that could have resulted in an accident, injury, or
illness but did not either by chance or through timely intervention. Also known as a
close call, good catch or near hit” (Ford et al., 2012, p. 7281).
7. Quality of care. “Degree to which health services for individuals and populations
increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current
professional knowledge” (Ford et al., 2012, p. 7281).
8. Quality management. “Framework to guide an organization towards improved
performance. Quality management includes quality planning, quality control, quality
assurance, and quality improvement. Resources are acquired and administered to
achieve the desired level of quality” (Ford et al., 2012, p. 7281).
9. Radiation therapy. The field of medicine that utilizes high doses of radiation to treat
health conditions, most typically cancer.
10. Radiotherapy. This term is another term for radiation therapy.
11. Safety barrier. “Any process step whose primary function is to prevent an error or
mistake from occurring or propagating through the radiotherapy workflow” (Ford et
al., 2012, p. 7281).
12. Severity. “The extent to which an action causes harm” (Ford et al., 2012, p. 7281).
13. Treatment delivery. “The process of administering radiation to the patient in
accordance with a radiation oncologist’s prescription” (Ford et al., 2012, p. 7281).
14. Treatment planning. “In the context of radiation oncology, treatment planning refers
to the process of translating the physician’s prescription into instructions for the
treatment delivery device” (Ford et al., 2012).
15. Unsafe act. This term is another term for an incident.
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Description of Variables
The dependent variables for this dissertation study are radiotherapy errors. These
variables are different categories of reported incidents or deviations from routine and planned
behaviors that either cause harm or put people or equipment at an atypically high risk of
incurring harm (Ford et al., 2012). These errors have been voluntarily reported into the SAFRON
database by an international group of radiotherapy health care workers. The error categories can
be found in Table 2.
Independent variables for the study include 15 human factor subcategories all derived
from four tiers of the Human Factors Analysis Classification System (HFACS). This system is
based on James Reason’s four levels of error causation (Diller et al., 2014). The levels are
arranged such that influence from one level likely transcends the next one down, and the higher
tiers are more progressively remote to the lowest tier. The base tier of HFACS is Tier 1 (unsafe
acts), which contains variations of accidental errors and purposeful violations. The next level up
is Tier 2 preconditions for unsafe acts and includes preconditions to error or environmental
influences. The next tier of human factors is Tier 3 (supervision), and the highest (most remotely
influencial) level is Tier 4 (organizational influences; Figure 1). Some modifications have been
made from the originally published HFACS. Descriptions of each tier and the sublevels of
human factors beneath them can be found in Figures 1 and 3 in Chapter 3.
Rationale for Human Factors Approach to Radiotherapy Safety
Health care is a human need, yet it is an unfortunate reality that patients are sometimes
harmed during their course of treatment. Pain, suffering, and even death have been reported as a
result of medical error in the field of radiation therapy (Bogdanich, 2010a). The importance of
patient safety is, therefore, a widely recognized concept, and one meaningful way to address
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safety is to report and learn from mistakes. In order to make optimal use of information about
reported radiotherapy errors, the information must be analyzed and communicated effectively.
Incident learning systems have a protected environment for such work to be done.
While databases of reported errors exist, safety gains from the incident learning process
have been suboptimal (Sujan, 2015; Richardson & Thomasden, 2018). One hindrance to progress
may be a disproportional focus on that which happened and who was involved as opposed to
contributing factors for why the errors took place. Other industries like health care are both
complex and hazardous and have achieved high reliability and successful safety improvement
through human factors-based analyses of their errors (Diller, 2014). By analyzing errors in
radiotherapy with a human factors-based approach, predictive patterns of factors contributing to
error were uncovered. As an understanding of factors contributing to error becomes apparent and
predictable, an understanding of why errors occur begins to develop. Radiotherapy errors
associated with the human components of unsafe acts or with precipitating human interactions
can shed light on and present instructive information about patient safety in radiation oncology.
The formality and structure of the HFACS makes this possible. The data uncovered in this study
can then be used to inform effective safety improvement efforts and error mitigation strategies.
Study Assumptions
This dissertation study was performed under the assumption that incident reports
included within the SAFRON database were submitted truthfully from the perspective of the
submitter. It was also assumed that the database supplied by the owner of SAFRON, the IAEA,
was inclusive of all reports, complete, and unedited.
Summary of the Chapter
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The dissertation study was introduced that related human contributing factors to radiation
therapy errors. Patient harm is an unfortunate but ever-present aspect of medical care today, and
some of the error is due to human mistakes. The Institute of Medicine’s publication in 2000
resulted in federally-backed regulations that allowed health care workers to report errors in a
protected environment. The need for such legislation was recognized in 2010 when a series of
serious radiotherapy accidents were published in the New York Times. In response to these
tragedies, the international incident learning system SAFRON was launched in 2012. SAFRON
presented an appropriate environment for voluntary error report submissions and also
incorporated reported events dating back to 2001 from a legacy system called ROSIS.
Incident learning is used for health care workers to gain insight from unsafe acts and
adverse events that have been voluntarily reported. The theory of human motivation has a great
contribution as to whether errors are reported and to the factors contributing to those errors.
While some quality and safety improvements have been attributed to incident learning, gains
have been limited, and the potential for safety improvements has not yet been reached. One
theory for this limitation is that the focus of the analysis of errors tends to be more on that which
happened and who was involved rather than on the cause of the error and either directly or
indirectly help bring it to fruition. Other more highly reliable industries with similar hazards and
complexities have had more marked success with safety improvements. Efforts in these other
industries have involved more of a focus on human factors. Human factors are the interactions,
relationships, and communications between people involved in complex processes. A human
factors-based classification system has been utilized for some of that improvement work and has
now been utilized within the health care industry as well. The problem being addressed by this
study was that radiation therapy involves an inherent risk to patients, and the systems designed to
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collect information about error and inform safety improvements have never been analyzed within
a human factors classification system. The goal, then, was to perform a study of radiotherapy
errors and uncover the human factors that may predictably contribute to them. Error types, such
as treatment planning and quality assurance, were identified for each of the included events.
Each event was then associated with all reported human contributing factor subcategories from
the HFACS. Predictive patterns were developed between contributing factors and between
contributing factors and error types. The four tiers of the HFACS are as follows: Tier 1 (unsafe
acts), Tier 2 (preconditions for unsafe acts), Tier 3 (supervision), and Tier 4 (organizational
influences). This study was relevant to safety improvement work in the field of radiotherapy by
clarifying the predictability of human factors as they relate to risk and error.
One theory for safety in radiation therapy and reported error analysis is social-ecological
theory. This theory is used to explain how individuals, relationships, communities, and society
all affect one another and are affected by one another. Patients, caregivers, health care
environments, communities, and society as a whole are all affected by medical errors and by how
they are handled. Conversely, the safety practices shaped by the broader societal levels also
transcend down to the individual affecting his/her care and experience. Motivation and behavior
theory as discussed is also helpful to understand how human factors relate to radiation therapy
and to unsafe acts. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs depicts how humans are motivated first by more
fundamental needs, such as safety, and later by less fundamental needs, such as esteem. These
motivations affect human behavior and contribute to if, when, and how errors are voluntarily
reported. Motivations and behaviors also drive the human factors for incidents. These theories
were utilized in the analysis for this dissertation study.
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The research question proposed is as follows: How are human factors associated with
error in radiation therapy? It was hypothesized that higher tier human factors from the HFACS
were predictably associated with lower tier contributing factors. It was also hypothesized that
supervisory factors are associated with quality assurance errors, environmental preconditions for
unsafe acts are associated with image guidance errors, and personnel factors are associated with
documentation errors. The rationale for the study stemmed from the existence and prevalence of
patient harm and the need to make optimal use of reported safety errors. The successful human
factors-based error analysis that has been used in other highly reliable industries like the aviation
industry has not yet been used with reported errors in radiation therapy. This study used a human
factors approach to uncover predictive patterns within human contributing factors to error and
between those factors and radiotherapy-specific error types. That information can then inform
effective safety improvements.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
Introduction to the Chapter
In order to understand how human factors are associated with error in radiation therapy
and that which may predictably contribute to them, it is critical to understand relevant
information in this area that predates this study. From a historical perspective, information about
harm in medicine lays the groundwork for why this kind of work is needed. Harm from radiation
therapy is even more specifically relevant. The history of safety improvement efforts includes
incident learning, an approach that allows many to learn from the mistakes of few. This chapter
addresses the strengths and weaknesses of incident learning along with other historic efforts to
improve patient safety. It also addresses the safety issues and strategic improvements that have
taken place in other industries, such as aviation. Successes in aviation, rail, and other highreliability industries have earned the attention of safety improvement specialists in health care as
they may offer solutions relevant to health care as well. Lastly, this chapter addresses the history
and relationship between human factors and health care.
Aside from history, this dissertation study is grounded by relevant theory pertaining to
human factors and patient safety. Human behavior is largely driven by motivation, and the
landmark theories of A. H. Maslow are reviewed as a presentation of core human drivers. In
order to understand human behaviors around error in health care, James Reason’s basic theories
of human error are discussed. Taking a step beyond baseline human error, the complexities of
this error are reviewed with a presentation of Sidney Dekker’s views on systems thinking. With
all of this historical and theoretical history, a research methodology can be crafted to optimize
the value of this study.
Historical Overview
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Harm in Medicine
As introduced in Chapter 1, the presence of harm within health care is an unfortunate
reality that predicates the need for this study, but determining its prevalence and scope is an
exceptionally challenged goal. Harm may have different meanings to different people, and aside
from lacking a universally accepted definition, communication and data abstraction methods
leave much to be desired. One prominent publication that attempted to quantify the problem and
put medical error in the spotlight was the Institute of Medicine’s report To Err is Human from
1999. Authors quantified the prevalence of medical error by estimating the number of deaths that
could be attributed to these preventable mistakes. Their annual estimation within U.S. hospitals
was between 44,000 and 98,000 (Institute of Medicine Committee on Quality of Health Care in
America, 1999). These numbers were shocking and served as a call to action. Authors
encouraged a focused and systematic approach to reducing error, and those recommendations
were widely accepted, discussed, and implemented.
The IOM report was based on its lower and upper estimates of error-related hospital
deaths from two prominent studies from earlier in the 1990s that utilized similar methodologies.
The two-fold difference in their estimates was one indicator of the lack of true understanding and
limited accuracy. Another fundamental flaw was that both studies were observational and failed
to show true causality with their findings (McDonald et al., 2000).
In 2016, there was another landmark publication in which medical errors were claimed to
be responsible for an even larger number of hospital deaths; they estimate was that there were
251,454 annual deaths in U.S. hospitals caused by these mistakes. With that understanding,
preventable errors in hospitals would be the third leading cause of death within the US (Makary
& Daniel, 2016). It should be noted, however, the researchers offered no discussion of its
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limitations, and there is cause to question the validity of the claims. While it may be accurate that
some level of error did take place with the number of patients suggested, the researchers again
fell short of demonstrating causality. One year later, Shojania and Dixon-Woods (2017) pointed
out that hospital deaths cannot be analyzed the same way as deaths from car accidents can; while
it is reasonable to assume that lives lost from a car accident would not had been lost without the
car accident, one cannot make the same assumption about hospital patients. Patients go into
hospitals with illnesses and injuries that leave them at some risk of death whether or not medical
errors take place. This fact was not adequately accounted for in the Makary publication (Shojania
& Dixon-Woods, 2017).
The prevalence of medical error is important to this dissertation study as it shows the
underlying importance for the need for safety improvement. Whether the number of hospitalrelated deaths in the US are 50,000 per year or 250,000 per year, any preventable death should be
avoided, and all of these numbers are high. Contradictions within the published data demonstrate
the need for improved and systematic reporting mechanisms. Makary pointed out that coding
used to indicate a patient’s cause of death on his or her death certificate does not include a
selection to indicate unplanned error, which led to a systematic underrepresentation of medical
error within officially recognized causes of death (Makary & Daniel, 2016). In order to improve
safety in the health care environment, an improved system of understanding the prevalence of
harm is greatly needed.
One more important consideration in understanding preventable harm and the need for
safety improvement is the fact that prevalence estimations should not be limited to error-related
death alone. Safety event reporting regarding non-fatal errors is now required from multiple
organizations, such as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the Joint
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Commission. While these requirements may ultimately be helpful to establishing a database of
errors, it may also be detrimental to safety improvement efforts. Reporting requirements have a
resource burden on health care settings and may cause health care workers to narrowly focus on
key areas that require data submissions (Thomas & Classen, 2014). Still, the need for a better
understanding of health care safety is apparent, and some level of systematic reporting is,
therefore, necessary. For the purpose of this dissertation study, the published information
available to date is sufficient to demonstrate the need for patient safety improvements.
Harm in Radiation Therapy
Given the ambiguity involved determining the prevalence of general medical harm, it is
at least as challenging to determine the prevalence of harm in one specific area of medicine,
namely radiation therapy. Radiation therapy or radiotherapy is a cancer treatment method that
utilizes radiation to damage the DNA of cancer cells. This damage slows down tumor growth
and subsequently either shrinks or destroys them. Tumors within the body are often in close
proximity to healthy organs and tissues and while the destructive aspects of radiation are helpful
to damage cancer cells, they can also be harmful to those healthy tissues. Planned courses of
radiotherapy strike a balance between maximizing the amount of radiation given to tumors and
minimizing that given to healthy structures (National Cancer Institute, 2019). Radiation errors
could upset this balance and inflict harm when exposure was unplanned and unintended. They
could also inflict harm by underexposing intended targets.
As introduced in Chapter 1, there have been several well-documented tragedies regarding
patients harmed during radiation therapy, but to date, there have not been many published
assessments of aggregate harm. Some of the earlier publications from the 1990s were dedicated
to more general medical errors. The corresponding focus in radiation oncology came about after
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2010, following a series of troubling articles in the New York Times. Interest in radiotherapy
safety improvements were fueled and invigorated by these articles and brought about a
realization that radiation oncology is a particularly hazardous area of medicine. Treating patients
with radiation has been recognized as a complex process fueled by a great deal of human
interaction and technical sophistication (Hendee & Herman, 2011).
The authors of the New York Times publications each focused on singular or small groups
of medical errors and depicted the personal tragedies that resulted. The very first publication
contained a powerful description of the pain, suffering, and ultimate death of a 43-year-old man
who was harmed by a preventable radiotherapy error (Bogdanich, 2010b). Subsequent articles
featured additional individual victims and groups of victims, such as 36 who were overexposed
at a New Jersey-based cancer center (Bogdanich, 2010a). The author focused on individual
stories as a means of personalizing the tragedies. This strategy was ultimately a motivating
strategy as the radiation therapy community reacted with a strengthened resolve to improve
radiotherapy safety (Hendee & Herman, 2011).
While documentation about patient harm caused by radiotherapy is sparsely understood
and published in a seemingly haphazard way, that which does exist is revealing. It has been
hypothesized that radiotherapy errors are grossly underreported (Bogdanich, 2010a). Given that
which is known about underreported harm in general medicine, it is likely to be the case. It was
also pointed out that in order to close the information gap and to learn about errors in a
systematic way, heterogeneity within radiotherapy workflows and taxonomy must be
significantly reduced. Further, the data that have been reported have yet to be optimally
aggregated and studied (Potters et al., 2016). Improvements in communication, data analysis, and
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error prevention strategies would all, therefore, be of value to radiotherapy patients. Together
these align with the broad goal of this dissertation study.
Improving Safety in Radiation Therapy
The focus on improving patient safety in radiotherapy was started back in 2010 but did
not end with the New York Times articles. Shortly after radiotherapy safety issues were brought
into focus, a meeting sponsored by the American Society for Radiation Oncology and the
American Association of Physicists in Medicine was pulled together to address the issues at
hand. Attendees included radiotherapy professionals from many areas within the discipline so
that diverse perspectives could be accounted for. The end result of this meeting was the
publication of 20 recommendations to improve safety. An action plan was also put into place that
included creating an anonymous error reporting system, enhancing the practice accreditation
program, expanding training, developing communication tools, developing a program to enhance
interoperability between equipment vendors, and advocating for new legislation (Hendee &
Herman, 2011). Each of these goals was ultimately carried out.
The meeting resulted in some very specific goals that were all achieved, although there
was not an especially large emphasis on the issue of safety culture. It may not have been
addressed as directly as it is a more abstract concept and was, therefore, easier to overlook.
Safety culture encompasses everything from communication patterns, the punitive nature of the
environment when mistakes take place, staff empowerment, resource availability, and a host of
additional considerations. The meeting participants did seek to establish training, education, and
experience requirements for radiation oncology staff, yet even this training falls short of
capturing the importance of safety culture (Hendee & Herman, 2011).
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There is little statistical evidence that safety culture is tied to patient safety in
radiotherapy, yet it has been the expressed opinion of several researchers that it is. One
researcher who sough to establish this connection hypothesized that there was an association
between safety culture and reported errors, yet there was not enough statistical power within
available data to support that conclusion (Sands, 2017). Other researchers have used safety
culture assessment tools to tie an institution’s culture to actual patient safety. The importance of
this need is broadly recognized yet remains unproven, and work in this area is ongoing (Nieva &
Sorra, 2003).
Safety improvement efforts in other areas of radiation oncology have taken many
different forms over the last decade. The use of big data to fuel this effort has been recognized as
having great potential. Information qualifies as big data when the data set is excessively large
requiring computer-based analyses and can support solid statistical significance. Radiation
oncology is a data-driven medical specialty yet is still challenged to make use of big data
analysis techniques; there is too much variation in language and processes between individual
departments to run aggregate big-data analyses (Potters et al., 2016).
Another safety improvement strategy proposed was the enhanced use of peer review
within radiation oncology settings. Some level of peer-to-peer review is a standard component of
best practice standards in radiation oncology. It is required of professional staff, such as radiation
oncologists and physicists as part of departmental accreditation requirements. Some programs,
however, are far more rigorous than others, and one suggested path to safety enhancement was
employing robust peer-review standards (Chao et al., 2014; Marks et al., 2013). In fact, it has
been proposed that standardizing all major workflows within radiation oncology is key to
optimizing safety (Chao et al., 2014). These suggestions are all sensible, and a common thread
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throughout published recommendations is that improved standardization in workflows,
taxonomy, and data collection would allow for broad-level aggregate analyses that currently
heterogeneous systems challenge. The aim of this dissertation study is to make some progress in
this area as it will involve an aggregate analysis of radiotherapy errors that have been reported
from a broad international group of contributors.
One more major avenue that has been proposed to support radiotherapy safety
improvements was the report of Task Group 100 of the American Association of Physicists in
Medicine. A group of professionals met to address radiotherapy failures specific to workflow and
process errors. Their ultimate goal was to provide a method of systematic analysis of institutionspecific processes. With this understanding, resources available for quality management could be
optimally appropriated. The first step in their recommended course of action was to define each
and every step involved in a specific radiotherapy process. Potential failure modes would then be
defined and rated in terms of the frequency of their occurrence, the severity of consequence that
may be involved, and the detectability of the failure. With these ratings, each individual risk
could be objectively prioritized. The third recommended step was to map out a fault tree that
could aid in determining where within the process things could go wrong. Information from all
three components were then recommended to be considered in developing quality management
activities (Huq et al., 2010).
AAPM’s Task Group 100 (TG100) is methodical, logical, and is well-referenced in the
field of radiotherapy safety. Unlike many other safety improvement recommendations, TG100
methodology is a prospective approach; while a department could choose to employ a TG100
strategy in an area where errors manifest, it is a proactive strategy to improve quality and safety.
The challenge with TG100 methodology is that is a time consuming and labor intensive process.
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Well-resourced departments and academic cancer centers may be more likely to employ these
strategies than other smaller more resource-challenged environments. Going back to the
previously referenced calls for improved standardization between departments and organizations,
if the field of radiation therapy had more standardized processes and nomenclature, work done
by the better-resourced institutions would be more applicable to all.
The investigator of this dissertation has established associations between safety events
that have been reported by radiation oncology departments and contributing factors that preceded
them. While retrospective in nature, predictive patterns were uncovered. Like the failure modes
addressed in TG100, this information can be utilized to support quality management and safety
improvement activities.
Incident Learning
Incident Learning in Health Care
The AAPM and ASTRO-sponsored meeting back in 2010 was a call to action in response
to the New York Times publications. The very first point in the resultant six-point plan was to
create an anonymous national database through which errors could be reported and analyzed
(Hendee & Herman, 2011). An error or incident is defined as an “unwanted or unexpected
change from a normal system behavior which causes or has the potential to cause an adverse
effect to persons or equipment” (Ford et al., 2012, p. 7281). The opportunity to utilize reported
incidents to inform safety improvement strategies is called incident learning and incident
learning systems have a rich history both within radiation oncology and beyond.
Back in 2000, the health care industry began more broad usage of incident learning as a
methodology for safety improvement. Some of the impetus for this focus was the notable success
that other hazardous industries had with similar efforts. In particular, it was understood that
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reporting and learning from near-miss events or safety events that were caught prior to reaching
a patient were key to the process. By taking advantage of this information, data analysis and the
resultant prevention strategies could be more efficient and effective; the inclusion of near-miss
data would allow for systems thinking rather than simplistic linear thinking when it came to
understanding which factors predictably contribute to error (Barach & Small, 2000).
While this knowledge and awareness was growing, incident learning remained
challenged in the health care environment. One major void was information tying safety
improvement efforts to improved outcomes. Other industries, such as aviation, had a greater
history of success in this regard. With aviation, the frequency of plane crashes was known before
and after incident learning-based improvements were implemented. Health care is a much more
complex industry in which the number of factors contributing to an incident may be numerous
and patient outcomes are confounded by comorbidities. Without enough evidence to demonstrate
the effectiveness of incident learning systems, some find it hard to justify the resources required
to support them (Benn et al., 2009). One small amount of objective data exists from the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality. AHRQ survey data shows that larger numbers of incident
reports are associated with lower rates of negative indicators that detect adverse events (Ford &
Evans, 2018).
Other challenges to incident learning have also been prominently outlined. Voluntary
reporting has been challenged for many reasons, such as fear of blame or lack of confidence that
reporting will lead to effective change (Health Quality Ontario, 2017; Whitaker & Ibrahim,
2016). This information has confirmed that report databases represent fewer errors and near
misses that actually take place. The actual number of errors may never be known with precision
but can expected to be significantly greater than that reported. Underreporting has been estimated
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to range between 50% and 96% of errors, yet the wide range here is another indication that this
information remains unknown (Barach & Small, 2000). Other problems with incident reporting
include lacking clarity on that which should be reported, the overall cost burden from these
systems, and a lack of visible and effective follow-up (Mahajan, 2010; Stavropoulou et al.,
2015). If feedback to report contributors is lacking, report contributors will become disengaged.
People must feel that their effort and potential risk of blame or punishment are worthwhile and
will be met with improvements to patient safety.
In 2016, 15 years after the landmark publication To Err is Human, a qualitative study was
performed through which eleven experts in health care safety offered their thoughts regarding the
greatest challenges to incident learning. Their findings presented a broader understanding of that
which is needed to make better use of incident learning data. They discussed the engagement of
reporters, visible action taken following report submissions, and cost. They also discussed the
need to take better advantage of health information technology. Finally, these experts pointed to
inadequacies in current report processing. Triaging and analyzing report data were felt to be
haphazard and suboptimal. Improvements in meaningful analyses techniques should drive more
effective follow-up (Mitchell et al., 2016).
The importance of incident learning has been established within the health care
environment, but that value is placed more on its potential to improve safety than on solid
outcome data. The challenges outlined are fairly consistent between authors. Part of the
challenge lies within the stated inconsistencies in workflows, communication patterns, and
nomenclature. Another well-established value of incident learning stems from its success in other
industries. This investigator employed a methodology that has been used in other industries to
find predictive patterns of human contributing factors for reported errors.
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Incident Learning in Radiation Therapy
Foundations and Taxonomy. As the focus of this dissertation study is on safety events
in the radiotherapy space, it is important to understand the history of and need for incident
learning in this area. Ganesh (2014) studied radiotherapy errors between 1976 and 2007 showed
7,741 reported events, 40% of which resulted in patient harm. This result is 16,000 times greater
than the risk of injury or death from an aviation accident in the US (Ganesh, 2014). There is no
objective data comparing the risk of radiotherapy treatment errors to errors in other areas of
health care. It has been noted, however, that radiation oncology departments have particularly
complex human interactions and human-computer interactions due to consistently advancing and
highly sophisticated technologies (Ganesh, 2014; Spraker et al., 2017). For these complex
interactions and other reasons, the need for incident learning in radiation therapy has been
emphasized in many forums and is often underscored both with data and individual stories.
Professional organizations advocating for its use to improve patient safety are also numerous.
Multidisciplinary authorities, such as the World Health Organization and the Joint
Commission for U.S. hospital accreditations, recommend the use of incident learning systems.
Within the radiotherapy space, the American Society for Radiation Oncology goes as far as
listing incident learning among its standards for accreditation. One of the first shared incident
learning systems in this space was the Radiation Oncology Safety Information System or ROSIS.
This system was launched in 2001 by the European Society for Radiotherapy and Oncology
(ESTRO). In 2012, some of the founders of ROSIS worked with the IAEA to launch the Safety
in Radiation Oncology system. ROSIS data prior to 2014 was incorporated into SAFRON, and it
is that system that has been used for this dissertation study (Ford & Evans, 2018). SAFRON had
over 1,600 incidents in its database as of 2019. Other radiation oncology incident learning
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systems include the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) in the United Kingdom,
the National System for Incident Reporting in Radiation Treatment (NSIR-RT) in Canada, and
the Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (RO-ILS) in the United States (Ford & Evans,
2018).
One of the key challenges to incident learning is the lack of comparable workflows and
nomenclature between radiation therapy centers. In 2012, consensus recommendations were
published to provide technical guidance for the implementation and use of incident learning
systems. Definitions were proposed and are accepted for use in this dissertation study. Standards
for process maps, severity scales, report data, and causality taxonomy were also published.
Causal taxonomy in this case is meant to describe contributing factors to an incident as opposed
to an experimentally determined causal relationship. The rationale for proposing the taxonomy
was to allow for increased consistency when interpreting contributing factors to an error. The
factors are separated into seven categories and drill down to nearly 100 more specific descriptors
of potential root causes (Ford et al., 2012). This published list of factors is thorough and detailed
and contain many of the human contributing factors that were used in this study.
A more current study of the AAPM’s causal factor taxonomy, again with the term “causal
factor” representing contributing factors and not experimentally proven causation, was done in
2017. This taxonomy was more concise having six categories with only 17 individual factors. In
the dissertation study, reports were assigned to multiple contributing factors, yet four factors in
addition to those included in the AAPM taxonomy were ultimately needed (Spraker et al., 2017).
Reporting Issues. A well-studied challenge to incident learning is insufficient reporting.
This issue was eluded to in Chapter 1 when the human motivational component of error
communication was introduced. Drivers and barriers for reporting involve personal motivations
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as well as environmental influences. Skills that lend themselves to increased reporting include
both communication and coping (Schwappach & Gehring, 2015). Motivations to report are
typically centered around the desire to improve safety and prevent harm to patients (Okuyama et
al., 2014). Additional motivators, such as fear of being caught without having been honest or
transparent, have not been discussed. Barriers to reporting are far more numerous and have
consistent agreement among published studies. Power dynamics have been cited by several
researchers as having influence in this area. When someone of greater stature is present, his/her
attitudes, beliefs, and relationships with other staff present have a great impact on whether or not
that staff is comfortable speaking up when an error takes place (Morrow, Gustavson, & Jones,
2016; Okuyama et al., 2014; Schwappach & Gehring, 2015). Another commonly referenced
barrier is the belief that speaking up would not result in any effective change. Whether due to
lack of feedback after reporting or lack of infrastructure, leadership, and resources to improve
safety if a person does not believe that his/her reporting will result in change, he/she tend to
remain silent (Health Quality Ontario, 2017; Morrow et al., 2016; Okuyama et al., 2014). That
which was not mentioned in any of these publications was the effect of flawed analyses.
Ineffective incident learning and analysis systems would both cause and then in turn be
hampered by reduced participation.
While these researchers provide insight into why incident reporting may be either strong
or weak, it is fundamentally challenged with the uncertainty of its potential. In other words, even
if the reporting environment was known to be optimal, the number of expected report
submissions would still be unknown. This descepancy is due to uncertainty and subjectivity
around that which should be reported. People’s true reluctance to report is also unknown and
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depends on their private feelings and perspective at the time an error takes place. For these
reasons, stated expectations of report volumes are inherently flawed.
Effectiveness of Incident Learning. With nearly 20 years of incident reporting history
in radiation therapy, there are scores of researchers claiming both positive and negative results.
One researcher used a systematic review from 2015 to determine that while process and clinical
settings may be improved due to information garnered through incident learning, no solid
evidence of outcome improvement or culture change was found (Stavropoulouet al., 2015).
While the lack of outcome data is a solid critique of the usefulness of incident learning, some
improvements noted do lend themselves to overall safety culture improvement. The validity of
findings is notably challenged by subjectivity in how both safety culture and improvements are
understood. There was no universally accepted definition of these fundamentals offered.
Other researchers aligned the shortfalls of incident learning to several other factors. A
lack of effective feedback, for example, has been detrimental. If staff members who report
incidents do not see responsive action taken, they will be less inclined to report in the future.
Punitive “shame and blame” cultures have also been problematic. Staff who are made to feel
reckless or unskilled after involvement in an error are strongly discouraged from bringing future
errors to light (Novak et al., 2015). Few researchers have cited flawed analyses or less apparent
reasons why incident learning in radiotherapy has not reached its potential to inform safety
improvements. Most researchers focus on actions taken or not taken, such as report submission
and timely feedback. The quality of action taken, such as the effectiveness of report triage and
analysis, is more challenging to assess due to subjectivity. This finding may be an important area
with opportunity for improvement, however. One researcher who did comment on the
importance of quality work recommended that analyses should be performed by clinically skilled
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staff familiar with relevant workflows. Sometimes administrators or risk prevention
professionals who do not have experience in a particular specialty perform the analysis work and
this lack of experience can be problematic (Richardson & Thomadsen, 2018). Conversely, it
could be argued that care providers familiar with clinical procedures may not amply focus on
communication breakdowns, environmental factors, poor policy, or understaffing.
A metric that can be viewed very differently by different people, either positively or
negatively, is the meaning for fluctuating report volumes. One researcher spoke favorably of
his/her incident learning experience and exemplified that by noting a major reduction in report
volumes over time (Clark et al., 2010). This finding is in direct contrast to that which was found
through the AHRQ study, which showed the opposite that it was greater numbers of incident
reports not fewer that should be associated with positive change (Ford & Evans, 2018). The
reason for this contradiction makes sense. If one kind of error was reported consistently
whenever it takes place, then fewer reports would indeed indicate fewer errors. Incident learning
is often not as clean and simple as that scenario, however. There so many factors that contribute
to report volumes (as discussed earlier) that an assumption of one error equating to one report is
unsubstantiated. More often than not, the opposite trend makes more sense in that larger report
volumes, including reports of near misses, indicate a positive safety culture and reduced risk of
harm to patients. These are the findings found from the AHRQ study.
Other researchers have used alternative measures to demonstrate incident learning
success. A reduced number of incidents that reached patients and a reduced incidence of safety
policy violations were two such measures (Deufel et al., 2017). These are valid indicators as they
are based on defined standards that can be objectively applied. Even these measures, however,
are still reliant on a constant safety culture and consistent reporting by staff. Changes in
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departmental environments due to workload, staffing, and resources could threaten the
consistency needed as could changes to staff from illness, positive or negative experiences, and
so forth. Similar findings from studies over a longer period of time add to credibility. That which
has been reported fairly consistently is that departments engaged in incident learning tend to
have positive safety cultures. Positive safety cultures in this case include robust engagement by
staff, proactivity in quality improvement efforts, and leadership involvement (Clark et al., 2013;
Gabriel et al., 2015).
One last research took the approach of isolating one specific kind of treatment within an
incident learning database. These were all near-miss events and were rated according to how
much harm they would have caused had they not been caught. Contributing factors were
assigned using the more abbreviated causal factor taxonomy discussed earlier (Spraker et al.,
2017). Rather than concluding that the incident learning process was effective or ineffective in
terms of error or reporting trends, reseachers focused on resultant interventions and the reliability
of those interventions. They found was that the more harm that an error could have caused, the
more likely it was to have had an intervention applied. Those interventions tended to be more
reliable when they included automations and forcing functions (unavoidable given routine
workflows) when the errors involved human error. In other words, the safety improvement
strategies implemented were stronger and more reliable when the errors involved people making
skill errors and personal mistakes as opposed to when those errors were equipment related. When
errors were due to hardware or software malfunctions, interventions were less reliable as they
focused more on rules, procedures, and training (Kim et al., 2017). Techniques used and
assumptions made were reasonable, and the data set was used for statistically significant
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findings. The difference in intervention approach when human error was involved is noteworthy
as human factors are central to this dissertation study.
Human Factors in Safety
Some of the richest research and most supportive data about accident prevention comes
from the field of aviation. Targeted safety improvement efforts have been widely acknowledged
as being successful. Within the US, there has been a 41% decrease in accidents and a 57%
decrease in the accident rate per 100,000 flight hours between 2001 and 2016 (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2018). One of the main focal areas for these improvements has been on the
human factors component of safety. Human factors are “the interrelationships between
individuals, the tools they use, and the environment in which they live and work” (Ford et al.,
2012, p. 7281). The complexity of human interaction was introduced in Chapter 1. Incorporation
of this issue into safety improvement strategy ultimately had a key role in the approach to
aviation safety.
There were several reasons for the advancement in aviation safety, and the initial
successes were prominently due to technical improvements. Accident data between 1977 and
1992 showed a declining number of errors, but these improvements were in large part due to
improved environmental and mechanical factors; human factors had not been contributing to the
noted safety gains. It was recognized at that point that reaching further safety goals would
require a shifted focus on human factors. In fact, human factors were responsible at some level
for between 70% and 80% of all aviation accidents (Shappell &Wiegmann, 1996). In 1997, one
researcher cited multiple sources in his claim that humans had replaced aircraft in being the most
dangerous factor in terms of flight risk (Murray, 1997).
The Human Factors Analysis Classification System
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In light of the recognized contribution of human error to aviation accidents, there was a
need to be able to investigate errors and develop mitigation strategies within a human factors
framework. That need was addressed in 2000 with the Human Factors Analysis Classification
System (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). HFACS was rooted in a widely accepted model for
human error called the Swiss cheese model. The Swiss cheese model contains four different
levels of human failure with each of the four tiers influencing those below it. Each layer is made
up of “cheese,” a protective barrier for safety, and “holes,” opportunities for human error to
occur. When the holes in one layer align with holes in other layers, human error is possible
through the successive layers of safety protection. When holes align in all four layers of cheese,
there is effectively no safety barrier in place to prevent an accident (Reason, 1990a). The
HFACS utilizes the same four levels or tiers of safety with a human factors perspective. The first
ground-level tier is the unsafe act itself, including human errors and violations. The second tier
contains preconditions for those unsafe acts. These conditions are the operator conditions or
practices that fed into the incident. The third tier of the HFACS is unsafe supervision. The fourth
tier, most remote to the unsafe act, is comprised of organizational influences (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2000). When flaws in each of the four tiers align, a situation would be at the highest
risk for error. In Chapter 1, the Swiss cheese model was presented in contrast to a more complex
model of human interaction proposed by S. Dekker in 2010. Dekker’s model challenged an
oversimplified view of error causation and analysis. Both Dekker and Reason’s theoretical
framework lay important groundwork for error analysis with human factors and were considered
in the discussion of results from this study.
HFACS Applied to Aviation and Rail. The HFACS is a tool that allows for systematic
error analyses within a human factors framework. Before this type of analysis schema was
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available, root cause analyses of errors would typically cease once a mechanical or other
objective contributing factor was discovered (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). This simplistic type
of investigation failed to address the more complex nature of that which actually contributes to
error. One study of aviation accidents between 1990 and 1996 utilized the HFACS and
considered both human and non-human contributors to the safety breakdowns (Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2001). The HFACS schema was felt to be appropriate in that no additional causal
categories were needed, and all but two were utilized. There was also good inter-rater reliability,
which contributed positively to the validity of the work. Specific contributing factors were
shown through this analysis, which allowed safety improvement efforts to move forward with
very specific and appropriate goals (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001).
There was another study of military aviation safety events in which the HFACS was
utilized to classify 288 incidents (Hooper & O’Hare, 2013). Different kinds of aviation mishaps
were evaluated along with their associations with different human contributing factors.
Information was learned about the nature of that which led to the mishaps. For example, it was
discovered that skill-based errors, those occurring with familiar tasks that typically do not require
a great deal of thought, were predominantly responsible for rotary wing incidents. Relationships
were also established between these kinds of errors and unsafe supervision (Hooper & O’Hare,
2013). Another study was performed in China that used 523 reported pilot errors. Error types
were mapped to the HFACS framework. The subsequent data analysis showed relationships
between human contributing factors at the four different classification tiers: tier one unsafe acts,
tier two preconditions for unsafe acts, tier three supervision, and tier four organizational
influences. Associations between unsafe acts and contributing factors at both adjacent and
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higher level tiers served to demonstrate Reason’s belief that latent conditions throughout higher
level tiers (tiers two through four) are associated with unsafe acts (Li & Harris, 2006).
Other aviation error studies utilizing the HFACS also had positive results in the sense that
the system was found to be a useful tool to analyze human contributions to error. A study of
naval aviation mishaps from 2001 showed excellent reliability with consistent application of the
system (Schimidt et al., 2001). Contributing factors to error were identified and were felt to be of
great value to safety improvement efforts (Schimidt et al., 2001). A study of helicopter accidents
in 2011 was similarly successful (Liu et al., 2013). The contribution of higher tier four
organizational influences were found to be significantly greater than those of lower tier factors,
such as tier two preconditions for unsafe acts. Strategic improvements to the organizational
safety culture were then central to their path forward (Liu et al., 2013). A comparative study was
done with the HFACS to better understand differences between military and civilian aviation
accidents. Learned information was utilized to improve pilot training with targeted skill building
in atypically weak areas (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2004).
In addition to aviation, the HFACS has also been used successfully in the rail industry.
Researchers applied the HFACS schema to reported rail incidents between 2001 and 2014
(Madigan et al., 2016). The system was felt to work well as the researchers concluded with a risk
profile that was helpful at informing improvement strategies. It was noted, however, that
information about tier three supervision and tier four organizational influence failures were
largely missing from the incident reports (Madigan et al., 2016). The lacking information noted
in this study could be a potential problem with any retrospective review of reported errors as
error reports are finite. This lack of information does not invalidate patterns of contributing
factors discovered through application of the HFACS, but the potential for an incomplete
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analysis must be recognized. That issue applies to this dissertation study as well and was
discussed as a potential limitation.
Reports regarding utilizing the HFACS are generally positive about the potential of this
classification system to show the nature of contributing factors to error. One outlier was about
the use of the HFACS for air traffic control errors with the Australian Defense Force (ADF;
Olsen et al., 2010). These researchers did some extensive testing of inter-rater reliability and
ultimately found the classification schema to be unreliable (Olsen et al., 2010). Other studies
showed good to excellent inter-rater reliability. The potential for subjectivity in utilizing the
HFACS is duly noted and was considered through this dissertation study.
HFACS in Health Care. Consideration of human factors is newer to safety studies in
the health care field. With insight from aviation, one group of health care investigators focused
on data showing that most aviation errors had some contribution of human factors (El Bardissi et
al., 2007). They hypothesized that it would be the case in health care as well. In order to assess
operating room errors from a human factors perspective, they conducted interviews and then
classified the resultant transcripts with the HFACS. The classification schema was deemed
appropriate and human factor contributions to errors were found. These findings began at the tier
four organizational influence level and transcended down through tier three supervision, tier two
preconditions for unsafe acts, and tier one unsafe acts (El Bardissi et al., 2007). In another study
of surgical mishaps, researchers focused on more extreme or serious surgical errors (Thiels et al.,
2015). As soon as an error in this category was discovered, a team was deployed to perform a
root cause analysis (RCA) of the situation. Information from that RCA was then analyzed using
the HFACS. As in studies done in other industries, use of the HFACS led to the discovery of
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predictive patterns of error. The most prominent contributing factors became key target areas for
strategic safety improvements (Thiels et al., 2015).
One researcher described how the HFACS could be applied within the health care setting
in comparison to more commonly utilized error analysis methods such as RCAs (Diller et al.,
2014). It was proposed that RCAs were less effective due to a lack of use standardization, the
lack of a standardized taxonomy, and multiple other less desirable features. Researchers claimed
that RCAs tended to focus on that which happened and who was involved as opposed to focusing
on why an error took place. Lastly, findings from RCAs were said to be too nonspecific to lead
to ineffective safety improvements. By comparison the HFACS was described as being
standardized both in terms of process and taxonomy. The focus was also directed to that which
contributed to error and was used for specific contributing factors to be identified and utilized for
strategic improvement (Diller et al., 2014).
While the literature contains examples of how the HFACS has been used to show
predictive patterns of contributing risk factors, it was important to consider HFACS alternatives.
In 2011, a group of investigators studied 26 different medical error taxonomies (Taib et al.,
2011). They found that most lacked an ability to consider theoretical error concepts in addition to
the more objective descriptors of that which happened. Human contributing factors tend to fall
within a more subjective analytical space and were, therefore, not considered with most of the
available systems. The HFACS was among a minority of classification schemas that considered
human factors and subjective error theory. Further, this group was found to be more generically
applicable to reported errors. Classification tools that were able to capture both system failures as
well as psychological failures were found to be more effective in analyzing risk and error (Taib
et al., 2011).
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There was another valuable study of the HFACS within health care, and the researchers
not only pointed to the system’s unique value but also to potential challenges applying the
system retrospectively to reported medical errors (Diller et al., 2014). Researchers pointed out
that information missing from error reports could prevent one or more tiers of the HFACS from
being considered in the analysis, which could bias study results (Diller et al., 2014), which was
an important consideration for this dissertation study. Positive results from retrospective
applications of the HFACS to error reports in other industries were considered as well.
Ultimately, the value of considering human factors as an integral part of error analysis was
recognized as a priority. In order to mitigate against the challenges of retrospective analysis,
error reports were only selected for study inclusion if they contain sufficient information about
contributing factors. The specific inclusion criteria was addressed in Chapter 3 and was a part of
the study discussion in Chapter 5.
As the HFACS is to be used in this radiotherapy health care study, this section was
concluded with a broad critical overview of the published literature. The HFACS system has
been used extensively in several industries, such as aviation and rail and more recently in
healthcare. Investigators have tested the schema in terms of its applicability and ability to be
utilized with limited bias. Results and reviews of experience have been largely positive. That
which is missing from the literature are reports of the subsequent safety improvement plan
implementations. A complete validation of the HFACS would include not only its usefulness for
error analysis but whether or not the strategic interventions informed by the HFACS actually
work. Publications of this nature are likely lacking for multiple reasons. First, it is challenging
enough to find statistically significant patterns of contributing factors behind error and even
more challenging (beyond the scope of this dissertation study) to determine casual explanations
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of why errors take place. Showing why errors do not happen would be an even more distant and
challenging goal because they are the exception and not the norm. Second, there is so much
complexity to the health care environment that aligning a noted risk reduction with one specific
safety enhancement is particularly challenging as well. Even given these limitations, there is
support in the literature for an expectation that human factors are involved in radiotherapy errors.
Reviews of historic error data have not yet been performed from a human factors perspective and
the HFACS offers a valid system to show associations between those contributing factors and the
reported unsafe acts. As with other studies, predictive patterns can inform safety improvement
strategies that have a substantiated expectation for effective results.
Radiotherapy Safety and Human Factors
Without specific inclusion of the HFACS, there is some work that has been done to link
human factors-based analyses to safety improvements. Researchers noted that technological
advancements in radiation therapy were created to improve efficiency, quality, and safety. In
some instances, however, it is the technologic advancement itself that led to errors (Chan et al.,
2010). Rapid advancement can leave some staff with insufficient system familiarity, and
improved technology can also often come with increased complexity. For these reasons, the very
factors that led to some safety improvements could also have led to safety mishaps. In order to
reduce unsafe acts in this investigator’s institution, a field study was launched to analyze
radiotherapy workflows. A number of human factors were identified as sources of potential
error. Human-computer interfaces were the redesigned to mitigate those errors. Sixteen
radiotherapy students were utilized to test both the original and redesigned systems, and the
human factors-based redesigns were shown to (a) reduce error rates, (b) increase the speed of
task completion, and (c) improve user satisfaction (Chan et al., 2010). This study had a smaller
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scale with insufficient power to experimentally determine causation, but it does reflect positively
on the potential for human factors-based improvements to reduce error and improve efficiency.
Aside from the HFACS studies discussed, there are a number of additional publications
connecting human factors with risk in radiation therapy. One qualitative study was launched in
response to a recognized safety problem concerning radiotherapy communications (Garza
Lozano, 2013). Interviews were used to inform strategic safety culture improvements. Feedback
from staff following those improvements indicated that those improvements helped to improve
communication and enhanced safety (Garza Lozano, 2013). The researcher supported the use a
human factors framework to approach safety improvements but does so subjectively without
strong evidence to support the claims.
There was a more solid study performed in which human factors were linked to safety
risks in radiation therapy (Spraker et al., 2017). The purpose of this investigation was to test a
causal factor taxonomy published by the American Association of Physicists in Medicine. The
taxonomy was applied to 300 randomly selected incident reports from the SAFRON database.
The most common errors involved communication and human behaviors. It was also noted that
reported events involving human factors engineering were associated with more serious or highrisk issues (Spraker et al., 2017). Multiple other researchers supported this finding; the humancomputer interface in areas of technological growth not only advances the capabilities but also
increases the risk of error (Castro, 2014; Palojoki et al., 2017). Magrabi et al. (2010) offered
different perspective on this issue. The purpose of that study was to analyze safety incidents
related to computer use in order to develop a new classification system. It was shown that only
0.2% of reported studies fit that description. The incident learning system involved had over
40,000 reported events, so the study had a sufficient number of included cases (Magrabi et al.,
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2010). This low percentage may not have resulted from a lack of computer use errors but rather
the potential for this human factor to be overlooked. As errors are often studied with respect to
whom was involved and that which happened, it is plausible that human-computer interactions
and other systematic means of communication may be overlooked as contributing factors to
error. In the classification system that was utilized in this dissertation study, the investigator
considered all possible contributing factors, including poor human factors engineering.
Given the strong presence of human factors in safety risk outside radiation therapy and
the high level of human interaction involved within radiation therapy, it is logical to pursue a
human factors-based safety assessment of radiotherapy risk. There is more research needed to
investigate the link between human factors and radiotherapy errors and ultimately to tie the
HFACS schema to outcome data. This dissertation study used the HFACS to serve the former
need. This effort contributed to the lengthy but worthy process of improving radiotherapy safety.
Relevant Theory
Radiotherapy errors, like errors throughout health care and other industries, have
contributing factors from mechanical failures, human failures, and other types of failures as well.
In order to understand predictable contributors to error and ultimately to design optimal safety
improvements, it is important to understand the theoretical drivers regarding human error and
overall error analysis.
Human Motivation
The foundations of human behavior stem from intrinsic motivations. A. H. Maslow
published his theory of human motivation back in 1943, and his understanding remains a wellsupported theory today. The theory uses human motivations through a pyramid of needs that has
been subdivided into five tiers. The more fundamental tiers are lower on the pyramid. The lowest
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tier includes needs that are physiological in nature and include food, water, warmth, and rest.
The second tier from the bottom reflects the human need for safety. These first two levels
together are basic human needs and must be met before humans tend to focus on the next two
levels, which are psychological in nature. The third tier up from the bottom (and first
psychological need) includes belongingness and love, which describes the need for relationships
and human interaction. The fourth tier from the bottom describes the need to serve self-esteem,
to feel accomplished, and to be recognized. Lastly, the top layer of Maslow’s pyramid of needs is
self-actualization. Maslow describes a human’s need for self-fulfillment and feeling
accomplished. Maslow did leave some room in his theory for the order of need fulfillment to be
slightly altered from how it is laid out in the pyramid. He also noted that human behavior is
typically driven by more than one need (Maslow, 1943).
Maslow’s hierarchy was described earlier with regard to event reporting because it is
helpful in understanding why someone may or may not be willing to report an error. Most people
have a desire to be respected and to feel accomplished. These are the two highest tiers of the
hierarchy. A more fundamental driver may be someone’s need for safety, the second tier up from
the bottom of Maslow’s hierarchy. If someone feels that the security of his/her employment may
be threatened by reporting his/her part in an error (which then affects the ability to provide basic
essentials for their family), he/she will most likely stay silent. In contrast in a non-punitive safety
culture, health care workers may feel freer to share their errors and allow others to learn from
their mistakes. If everyone participates in this kind of communication, the risk of error would be
reduced for all.
If most staff members had their most basic needs met, the desire for status, recognition,
and respect may also drive safety behaviors. If someone is personally involved in an error, he/she
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may not be willing to jeopardize his/her own security in order to protect others. Conversely,
someone who feels he/she is not responsible for an error may feel that he/she would earn status
or respect by coming forward and reporting. These issues reflect human behavior both on an
individual scale and on a broader scale within institutions. Incident learning system
administrators often ask whether participant institutions would like to be listed publicly. Some
institutions see this recognition as an accolade as participation in incident learning can be viewed
as an indication of a positive safety culture. Other institutions wish to remain anonymous and
consider participation as an admission of being error prone. Maslow’s publication presents a
framework for how to think about all of these drivers although the order of the pyramid is not
absolute, and multiple factors may play a role in any single motivation. Maslow’s hierarchy
should be understood as a framework or a working theory to better understand human behavior.
Human Error
Motivation is an important aspect of human behavioral theory when it comes to
performance and response to stimuli. With regard to error, there is additional relevant theory
available that helps shape the understanding of why humans make mistakes. With this
knowledge, the industry is better positioned to try to avoid errors.
One of the most renowned theorists with regard to human error is James Reason who
published his landmark theories in the early 1990s. A focal point of his ideas was that people
interact with systems in complex ways that sometimes cause weaknesses. These weaknesses can
be thought of as latent failures or failures that lie dormant until something happens to bring about
a more prominent error. The more latent failures there are, the more likely it is to trigger an error.
These failures can be within an end-user environment, at supervisory level, or even at an
organizational level. Reason’s well-known depiction of this cumulative failure theory is also
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known as the Swiss cheese model. As stated earlier, the holes in the cheese represent latent
failures and when these holes align there are no safety barriers left to prevent error (Reason,
1990b).
Reason developed his theories with reference to other historic work in this area. After
careful review and consideration, he hypothesized that recurrent types of human error stem from
routine human performance mechanisms; Reason felt that more of repeated errors occur when
performing normal functions as opposed to when attempting something new. An important
contribution from his work was the presentation of three error classifications: skill-based slips,
rule-based mistakes, and knowledge-based mistakes (Reason, 1990b). These kinds of errors have
been widely recognized in current error taxonomy, including that within the radiotherapy space.
A slip is a failure is made while performing a task that requires knowledge and skill but that is
performed routinely without error. Rule-based errors are those that stem from either not applying
an appropriate rule or from completely misjudging a situation. A knowledge-based error stems
from simply not having the information necessary to avoid the mistake (Ford et al., 2012). In the
HFACS schema, misjudging a situation is considered a perception error and rule and knowledge
based errors are considered decision errors.
Reason’s theories present a foundation for thinking about how people act within systems
and how multiple unsafe conditions or latent failures can eventually contribute to a more serious
error. While this framework is plausible, it is regularly adopted and cited today, and it maintains
a somewhat simplistic view of cause (or multiple causes) and effect. A different version of how
humans and systems interact with respect to error was presented by Sidney Dekker in 2009.
Human Factors and Systems Thinking
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While not entirely contradictory to the theories around human error provided by Reason,
Dekker’s views go much further to consider the complexities of human interaction; Dekker
focused more on the system and how an oversimplified view of human factors falls short of
understanding or prevent error. In explaining the system view, the better-understood individual
view was clarified. Referred to by Dekker as a Newtonian world view, this individual view is
strongly aligned with historic Western thinking. It is linear in terms of cause and effect, meaning
that one failure leads to another in a simple linear chain of events. The Newtonian world view
also follows the laws of mechanics in that situations are ultimately simple, complete, and
intuitive once enough time has been taken to understand them. The assumption is that in time
complete understanding will be come apparent with all that took place leading to an error. There
is also an assumption about an ontology that if an error has been observed, there must be an
action driving it that can be identified as being responsible (Dekker, 2010).
Dekker’s explanation of the Newtonian view of error is not often specifically referenced
in published accident analyses, but his descriptions of how the root causes of accidents are
pursued and understood are recognized within the literature. One researcher compared individual
versus organizational perspectives of accident causes (Catino, 2008). Medical accidents were
reviewed with regard to that which took place and how situations were ultimately handled.
Individual blame was predominant as the researchers focused on tangible and apparent causes.
Individual blame is also grounded in personal responsibility, a value that western society has
consistently prioritized. While Catino (2008) took a more Newtonian approach to error analysis,
he also recognized the value and need for more complex organizational thinking to optimize
safety improvements.
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Safety protocols and risk reduction behaviors are often aligned with theories around
human error. Dekker pointed out that given the Newtonian ontology in that one should be able to
foresee harm given a true and complete understanding of our environment, it is considered
negligent if steps are not taken to prevent that harm. An example was given of traffic accidents
and low speed limits in congested town squares. Given the understanding of increased traffic,
parking, and pedestrians, drivers lower the speed limit as a means of lowering the risk of an
accident. If someone breaks that speed limit and hits another vehicle, there is an assumption that
the accident was due to the person’s negligence by going too fast. As Dekker went on to explain
a more complex theory of human factors and system complexity, it was questioned whether the
accident would have necessarily been due to the person’s speed. In the Newtonian theory, there
were a finite number of possible contributing factors and so the fault analysis would have been
fairly simple. Dekker proposed that this view is oversimplified and further attention paid to gain
a more accurate understanding of human error theory (Dekker, 2010).
Dekker explained the alternative to the Newtonian theory with a so-called complexity and
systems world view. With this theory, systems are not closed or finite, they are open and very
much dependent on interactions within the environment. The added complexity leads to a
conclusion that the number of interactions between humans, between humans and computers,
and between humans and other aspects of the environment is far too large for people to process.
Under this theory, each new computer system set up to mitigate error may reduce some aspects
of error but also contributes significantly to added complexity and subsequent error. “With the
introduction of each new part or layer of defense there is an explosion of new relationships”
(Dekker, 2010, p. 18). The more typically embraced Newtonian view does not account for this
buildup of risk or buildup of safety breakdowns that could ultimately lead to error and patient
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harm. Dekker’s views are not refuted in the literature, but it is notably rare to find researchers
who apply the complexity and systems world view to error analysis. In more recent articles, the
need for systems-based thinking is acknowledged, but none go as far as to acknowledge the
elusive and uncertain nature of error analysis that Dekker proposed. The investigator of this
dissertation study found associations between reported safety events and different aspects of the
systems that surround them. The goal, therefore, is not to seek a complete understanding or finite
explanation of causal factors but rather to establish predictive patterns. With that limited
information, safety issues are not likely to be completely resolved but rather to be improved.
Safety improvements are considered a worthy goal and are not in contradiction of Dekker’s
complexity theory.
The complexity and systems theory led Dekker to some final conclusions that are worthy
of mention and were incorporated into this study and discussion. It was hypothesized that the
truth regarding error causation is not limited to a single explanation. It is incumbent upon safety
improvement strategists, therefore, to gather as much information from as many sources
possible, but never to believe that the information garnered is complete. It was also advised that
strategists be nimble and open enough to reverse prior conclusions when new information
suggests that reversal. It should be understood, however, that in those circumstances the initial
conclusions leave a fingerprint on the system and change the reality of the system for future risk
and error (Dekker, 2010).
Other analysists who presented system-based theories for accident or error analysis are
not in contradiction with Dekker though some offer more in the way of solutions. For example,
one theorist proposed using the five consecutive “why’ questions from Six Sigma methodology.
With this approach, a problem is addressed with the question “why,” and the subsequent answer
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is then also addressed with the question “why.” After repeating this process five consecutive
times, the depth of the root cause is felt to be adequately approached (Leveson, 2011). This
process has a reasonable path forward in addressing error complexity without forfeiting the
entire exercise due to the infinite and unsolvable nature to the problem as presented by Dekker.
Several additional researchers offer theories of systems thinking, yet tools available to
apply this kind of approach to incident learning data is lacking, which is largely due to the
heterogeneity of relevant data sets and to the relatively few number of reports that are voluntarily
submitted. It is more likely that progress in this area will be realized through the use of big data
from electronic medical records. Once computer-based analyses are able to be performed on
these enormous and complex databases, advancing safety in ways that combat the challenges that
Dekker described will be likely. Until then and with unique opportunity still available beyond
that point, there is valuable insight to be gained through incident learning. That insight was
approached in the dissertation study through the analysis of an international database of reported
errors. The potential here fell short of that which a computerized big data analysis may someday
be able to accomplish, yet it incorporated free text contributions from submitters describing
errors and contributing factors. That kind of non-discrete data contributes a unique value beyond
that which computerized analyses of discrete data can offer today.
Summary of Literature
There is a rich history of error and safety analysis that predates this dissertation study.
That history both substantiated the need for this study and presented a wealth of knowledge and
perspective from which further insight was gained. The most basic imperative to improve patient
safety in radiotherapy stems from the history of harm in medicine. The Institute of Medicine’s
report, To Err is Human, put the issue of patient harm in the spotlight back in 1999 (Institute of
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Medicine Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, 1999). This and other subsequent
reports have highlighted the prevalence of preventable patient harm and also showed that a small
fraction of errors are apparent that actually take place. The same situation exists within the
medical specialty of radiation therapy. This discipline is dedicated to treating cancerous tumors
with high doses of radiation. While radiation is effective at damaging cancer cells, it is also toxic
to healthy organs and tissues that are exposed as part of treatment. The balance of maximizing
dose to tumors and minimizing dose to healthy tissues is delicate, and when treatment errors take
place, patient harm can be devastating. Stories of radiotherapy harm were notably published in
2010 and as with harm in other areas of medicine, known errors are expected to be a gross
underrepresentation of reality (Bogdanich, 2010a).
Following the stories of radiation therapy harm in 2010, the American Society for
Radiation Therapy and the American Association of Physicists in Medicine held a meeting to
address safety and to set appropriate safety improvement goals. Efforts existed beyond those
stemming from this meeting and included making use of big data, enhancing peer review, and
improving standardizations (Chao et al., 2014; Marks et al., 2013 ). The AAPM also published a
proactive strategy to address workflow and process errors. This publication from AAPM’s Task
Group 100 offered the radiotherapy community a logical and potentially effective methodology
to reduce patient risk (Huq et al., 2010). The task group’s strategy was notably time consuming
and not able to be easily implemented in all settings.
One important avenue for radiotherapy safety improvement is incident learning. This
practice involves the voluntary reporting of errors so that information regarding that which went
wrong can be used to inform future error avoidance strategies. The history of incident learning is
not confined to radiotherapy or even to health care. For example, it was used successfully by the
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aviation industry. In comparison to aviation, however, health care has greater complexity and
greater heterogeneities in its technology and communications. With these challenges, incident
learning has been resource intensive and by some reports questionably effective (Benn et al.,
2009). Published researchers in this area describe problems with report submissions due to
several reasons, such as fear of repercussion or disbelief that reporting would result in positive
gain (Health Quality Ontario, 2017; Whitaker & Ibrahim, 2016). Other researchers cite the more
positive effects of incident learning; the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality noted a
reduced rate of negative safety indicators with an increased volume of incident report
submissions (Ford & Evans, 2018).
Specifically in radiotherapy, incident learning has been accepted and promoted as a
fundamental means of quality and safety improvement. There has also been a call for a consistent
and systematic taxonomy to address the recognized heterogeneity in workflows and
communication patterns (Ford et al., 2012). Several incident learning systems have been
established for radiation therapy, including the SAFRON system, which is run by the IAEA.
Data from this system were utilized for this dissertation study.
As in other areas of incident learning, radiotherapy error reporting challenges have been
recognized and discussed in the literature. This issue may introduce an information bias within
incident learning databases (Health Quality Ontario, 2017; Morrow et al., 2016; Okuyama et al.,
2014). The effectiveness of incident learning is another important topic of discussion in
published literature. There are many positive studies showing that a robust incident learning
environment promotes a positive safety culture and an improved focus on quality and safety
(Clark et al., 2013; Gabriel et al., 2015). Other researchers point to the fact that while cultures
and focused efforts may improve with incident learning, there has yet to be solid outcome data
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supporting the value and need for incident learning (Stavropoulou et al., 2015). The complexities
of health care and radiotherapy have been noted with respect to the challenge of linking
radiotherapy incident learning to outcome data. Associating incident learning with outcome data
is a lofty goal due to the many confounding factors involved with tying clinical outcomes to
upstream safety improvement efforts.
Human factors have been widely recognized for affecting safety in many industries. The
link between these factors and aviation accidents led to the development of a Human Factors
Analysis Classification System. This system has information from safety errors to be organized
and classified within a human factors framework. The framework consists of four successive
tiers of error, a concept originally suggested by James Reason. The HFACS schema depicts how
human factors can be propagated from the tier four organizational influence level to the tier three
supervision level to the tier two preconditions for unsafe acts level and then to the tier one unsafe
acts level (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000). The HFACS has been used successfully in both the
aviation and rail industries and has more recently been introduced for use in health care.
Alternatives, such as root cause analyses, can sometimes be too nonspecific and can focus too
much on that which happened and who was involved. In contrast, the HFACS is designed to
focus more on why errors took place (Diller et al., 2014). The HFACS was used in this
dissertation study to show predictive patterns of contributing factors to reported radiotherapy
safety events. While the HFACS has never been specifically utilized in radiotherapy, the need to
focus on human factors has been well recognized in the literature (Chan et al., 2010; Spraker et
al., 2017).
Relevant theory supporting this dissertation study is rooted in human motivation.
Maslow’s hierarchy of human need describes those needs that drive motivation. His hierarchy
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consists of five successive needs arranged in a pyramid with the most basic and fundamental
needs making up the bottom layer. The second most fundamental of the five layers includes the
need for safety, which can drive decisions around reporting; the need for job and income security
are likely to influence error reporting. The fourth layer, second from the top of the pyramid,
includes the human need for recognition and self-esteem, which can also affect decisions about
reporting into an incident learning system (Maslow, 1943). Maslow recognized that there is a
lack of rigidity in the ordering of tiers in his pyramid. That recognition supports a loose
association between tiers of the hierarchy and the relative importance of human behaviors. The
hierarchy provides a valuable framework for thought around human motivation.
Theory about human error has been offered by many, and one renowned theorist was
James Reason. In the 1990s, Reason described the idea that people interact with systems in ways
that bring about weaknesses or latent failures. These latent failures lie dormant but overlap with
one another and build until one triggering event may result in a realized error. His popular
depiction of this cumulative factor theory is called the Swiss cheese model. The alignment of
holes in the cheese are akin to the alignment of latent failures that eventually cause error
(Reason, 1990a). Reason categorized errors as (a) skill-based slips, or atypical errors made
during routine skill-requiring practices; (b) rule-based mistakes that happen when someone
misapplies a rule or misjudges a situation; and (c) knowledge-based errors that occur when
someone lacks needed information (Reason, 1990b). These categories and Reason’s error
theories have informed historic and current thinking about human error and have influenced the
HFACS schema that was used in this study.
One last yet important theory addressed human factors and systems thinking. A theorist
named Sidney Dekker contributed a fundamental perspective to the literature in 2009. Dekker
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first described a historic and more typical worldview of error that was referred to as the
Newtonian world view. Within this framework, errors are described in linear chains of cause and
effect. These errors are contained within finite systems that are balanced, obey the laws of
mechanics, and abide by an understanding that there are always identifiable causal actions for
errors (Dekker, 2010). Dekker proposed that this Newtonian framework is oversimplified and
inaccurate. As an alternative he proposed a complexity and systems world view that recognized
the enormity of interaction between humans, computers, and the environment. With every
interaction, Dekker recognized an “explosion” of new relationships that must be factored into the
analysis of human error (Dekker, 2010). This worldview involves a much greater amount of
uncertainty than its Newtonian counterpart. It is likely a significant factor relating to why the
Newtonian theory has persisted for so long. Dekker argued that despite these challenges, it is
vital to recognize and attempt to account for the reality of human-system interactions. It can be
done by gathering information from a multitude of sources, by being open to changing the
direction of thought, and by accepting the inherent uncertainty in analyzing human error
(Dekker, 2010). Dekker provided a valuable framework that was utilized in this dissertation
study to explore the role of human contributing factors for radiotherapy safety events.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction to the Chapter
This dissertation study is being conducted to find predictive patterns of human factors
that contribute to radiation therapy errors. High reliability industries, such as aviation, have made
significant safety gains throughout the years and have incorporated an analysis of human factors
into their strategic approach for safety improvement. The Human Factors Analysis Classification
System has been utilized successfully as part of that effort and has more recently been utilized in
the health care industry as well (Diller et al., 2014). The classification schema has rarely been
used in radiotherapy. The HFACS contains four tiers of human factors, including tier one unsafe
acts, tier two preconditions for unsafe acts, tier three supervision, and tier four organizational
influences. For this dissertation study, the HFACS schema was applied to reported radiation
therapy safety events.
Information about these safety events came from reports submitted by radiation therapy
staff to the IAEA through its SAFRON incident learning system. The reports include
information about safety issues, errors, and their potential causes. Through SAFRON, the IAEA
provides a web portal so that radiotherapy departments around the globe can quickly and easily
turn their mishaps into learning opportunities for others. The voluntary nature of report
submission means that the SAFRON data like all incident learning data may be heavily
influenced by human factors and motivations. These human drivers not only can affect that
which is reported but can affect the pathways that ultimately led to error. Understanding how
people’s communications, interactions with their surroundings, response to inadequate
supervision, and behavioral connections to culture all contribute to error is important to
understanding safety and risk.
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This investigator will uncover the relationships between different human contributing
factors to error. She also explored different types of radiotherapy errors, such as those that occur
during the treatment planning process, the quality assurance process, the treatment set-up
process, or a documentation workflow. More specifically, the study included an analysis of how
these error types relate to human contributing factors. The human influence on safety and risk is
rooted in motivation theory and is, therefore, affected by Maslow’s hierarchy of that which
drives individuals (Maslow, 1943). From physiological needs to needs for safety, for positive
recognition, and for achievement, the fundamental motivators affect the choices made and how
tasks are performed. For these reasons, a human factors approach was selected to analyze
reported radiotherapy incidents. This methodology had insight to be gained beyond descriptive
detail about that which happened; it will allow for the discovery of predictable patterns of human
factors that contribute to error and put patients at risk was apparent, which can be utilized to
improve safety.
Following the application of strategic inclusion and exclusion criteria, a sample of
SAFRON reports were assigned a single (the most appropriate) error type from the list in Table
2. These error types are separate and distinct categories meant to represent the first in a potential
series of errors that took place within a single reported event. Each report was also analyzed to
determine which human contributing factors from the HFACS were applicable to the described
incident. All contributing factors mentioned in the report were noted and utilized. A statistical
analysis was then conducted to show predictive patterns of human contributing factors as they
relate to radiotherapy errors. This analysis included uncovering predictive relationships between
subcategories of higher and lower tiers on the HFACS and predictive relationships between
radiotherapy error types and human contributing factors. The value of this study lies with the
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application of a human factors-based approach to understanding that which puts radiotherapy
patients at risk and that which is likely to contribute to error. With that understanding, future
safety improvement efforts can incorporate mitigation strategies that target relevant human
factors-based issues.
This chapter addresses the strengths, weaknesses, and threats to the study design. It also
had detailed procedures and information about the study data, instruments, statistical analysis
and power, reliability and validity issues, limitations and delimitations, and other aspects of the
study methodology. The design was a valuable assessment of which patterns of human
contributing factors were supporting reported radiotherapy errors. This chapter shall also
presented a thoughtful analysis of challenges to this research.
Practical Applications of the Findings
Despite the wealth of knowledge and technology that has developed over time in the field
of medicine, patients still remain at risk of being harmed while being cared for. That risk in
radiation therapy involves potential radiation over-exposures that can cause intense suffering and
even death. It also involves a risk of under-exposures that could compromise the effectiveness of
treatment. It has been shown in other industries that human factors, such as decision making,
communication, supervision, and human-computer interactions, have a role in the majority of
errors. Radiotherapy is not likely to be any different in terms of this vulnerability. In fact,
complex and rapidly changing technologies along with a large number of professionals involved
in patient care likely increase the risk of human factor-related errors (Cohen, 2017; Diller et al.,
2014). By evaluating reported safety events with regard to human factors, awareness of
contributing factors can be improved so that patterns associated with error can be avoided and
reduce the risk of safety events.
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Research Design and Methodology
This investigator utilized a quantitative approach that addressed the following question:
How are human factors associated with error in radiation therapy? The IAEA’s SAFRON
database of voluntarily reported radiotherapy events was utilized to determine these associations.
A quantitative approach was used for relationships between variables to be established and with
this information, predictive patterns were understood. This information can then inform future
safety work so that error mitigation can be strategically optimized.
This approach made use of a representative sample of error data. This error data was not
only a subset of the SAFRON database but a small subset of the errors that actually take place in
radiation oncology. This reality introduced a potential bias to the study and limited the
generalizability of the outcome. A mechanism of full disclosure regarding error does not yet
exist and is, therefore, not available to SAFRON or to any other incident learning system. The
data utilized had been reported by a diverse population of radiation oncology professionals from
around the world. Specific information regarding the origin of any particular report was
unknown to the investigator so a distribution of reports by geographic location or even by unique
institutions is not available. This lack of information introduced another potential bias to the
data, which is discussed in the limitations section. Despite these challenges, the classification and
aggregate review of human factors in radiotherapy events has not yet been done and offers
unique perspective and value to safety improvement.
The SAFRON data was obtained directly from the IAEA with its express permission for
its use. This deidentified data is a non-probability sample as all reports were voluntarily
submitted to the system. This sampling method is also referred to as self-selection sampling.
With regard to medical error and this kind of study, the sampling method is the only one
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available and can ultimately offer a valuable answer to the research question. Limitations from
this type of sample were reviewed and discussed. Of over 1,600 reports, a purposive sample of
141 reports was selected for use. This sample was chosen to ensure that sufficient information
was available to inform the classification process.
Reports were categorized with error types and with human contributing factors from the
HFACS. Error type options were arrived at through the investigator’s extensive experience with
incident report analysis and with consideration of existing error-type menus (Ezzel et al., 2018).
The HFACS has been accepted and utilized widely in published literature, including that in the
health care realm (Diller et al., 2014). With these foundations and appropriate inclusion criteria,
the classifications performed throughout his study should be reproducible by other researchers.
To address potential disparities in the individual report information, events were rated as being
of low, medium, or high quality. All of the included reports have met the minimum standard set
for quality in that they contain both a narrative explanation of the safety event as well as
information regarding perceived contributing factors. Still, the richness of information presented
by individual report submitters was variable. Relative quality ratings were used to assess the
quality distribution of reports beyond the baseline inclusion criteria, which aided in interpreting
the validity and generalizability of the study results.
Study Design
This dissertation used a non-experimental quantitative and predictive study design. The
research question was addressed by through an assessment of which relationships naturally exist
between human contributing factors to error and also between radiotherapy errors and the
precipitating human factors that preceded them. Each included incident report was classified in
terms of the involved error type. All involved human factors under the four tiers of the HFACS,
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namely tier one unsafe acts, tier two preconditions for unsafe acts, tier three supervision, and tier
four organizational influences, were also specified for each report. Each of the four tiers of the
HFACS contain a number of human contributing factor subcategories. After reading through
each of the reports, those subcategories that had been indicated were recorded in the database.
Each progressively higher tier of the HFACS represents contributing factors that are more
remote to the safety event with tier one representing the unsafe acts themselves and tier four
representing the most remote factors that contribute to error through organizational influence. A
test for association between subcategories at different tiers was run to determine whether those
from higher tiers are associated with subcategories from lower tiers. The Goodman and
Kruskal’s lambda statistic was utilized to determine whether a proportional reduction in error
was present or whether having information about the contributions to error from higher tier
subcategories is used to more accurately predict contributions from lower tier subcategories. A
chi-square test was then run to determine whether there are significant associations between
radiotherapy error types and human contributing factors as represented by subcategories from all
four tiers of the HFACS. Predictive patterns were shown and are presented in the results and
discussion chapters of this study.
Rationale
The need to improve safety for radiotherapy patients is evident from the historic and
well-documented patient harm that has existed over the years. While medicine and radiation
therapy are not uniquely complex or hazardous, there is a heightened level of both of these
factors that puts patients at risk of harm. Other complex and hazardous industries have made
significant and successful safety improvements that have earned them recognition as high
reliability organizations. Health care has yet to achieve that status.
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Tools, such as the HFACS, which have been used successfully in aviation and other high
reliability industries, may offer similar safety gains for health care. The human factors approach
for evaluating contributing factors that support safety events has not yet been taken with an
international database of reported radiotherapy errors. This investigator utilized this approach by
testing for predictive associations between human contributing factors and for predictive
associations between those factors and radiotherapy error types. The results from this study
improve the understanding of that which contributes to error will better position radiotherapy
staff to make strategic safety improvements.
Threats
There were a few key threats to the validity of this research study. The first pertains to
construct validity. The data that were used is comprised of information reported through the
SAFRON incident learning system. Associations made from that data have a presumption that
the SAFRON data intake form included all relevant and no superfluous pieces of information.
Although it is a given that individual report submitters may have left out relevant information on
a case by case basis, it is also possible that key elements regarding either the errors or the human
factors contributing to them were standardly omitted from the SAFRON system design. That
possibility threatens the validity of the study outcome.
It is also important to consider the fact that the incident learning database is made up of
voluntary report submissions. As mentioned earlier, self-selection sampling was used to sample
all radiotherapy errors within the SAFRON system. A purposive sampling method was then
utilized to hone in on a subset of SAFRON cases. Any distinction that can be made between the
reports included in this dissertation study and the complete (largely undisclosed) set of
radiotherapy errors that actually take place detracts from the generalizability of this study’s
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results. The great span of time (2001-2019) and geographic location included in the data set
reduce the amount of bias in the data, and the sample was allowed to represent a reasonable
approximation of voluntarily reported errors. The extent of any bias that may exist is unable to
be accurately determined; radiotherapy errors that are hidden or denied would not be represented
in this research and are a threat to external validity. This potential difference in how the study
sample compares with all radiotherapy errors is also a threat to internal validity. Again, given the
heterogeneity of perspective within the data, the sample was considered reasonable to support the
study.
Threats to internal validity are also present with regard to the fact that this study data
spans nearly two decades. Over this period of time, technology has changed dramatically, and it
is fair to presume that safety cultures and trends have also. Technological advancement has been
rapid and palpable over the past two decades with everything from cell phones to the medical
technology industry. Radiation therapy has changed significantly with increased automation,
increased treatment complexity, and increased electronic documentation. As the environment has
changed, it is reasonable to assume that the nature of radiotherapy errors has as well. Given the
low percentage of errors that are actually reported and the relatively small sample included in the
study, this research is not powerful enough to account for those temporal changes. The lack of
ability to consider that confounding variable is a threat to internal validity. Despite these threats,
the predictive associations made from this research are powerful enough to inform next steps for
informed and effective safety improvements.
Strengths and Weakness of Design
The major strength of this design is that a respected and proven classification system for
human contributing factors to error was applied to an aggregate database of radiotherapy
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incidents. This approach was taken due to marked successes that have been reported in other
high reliability industries. In that respect, this approach was not novel but instead utilized
valuable insight gained from success in other areas. Associations between errors and contributing
factors can move the understanding about radiotherapy safety beyond a working knowledge of
that which radiotherapy errors occur to a working knowledge of the causes.
Weaknesses involved in this research design include those discussed previously in terms
of internal and external validity. The voluntary nature of incident reporting into SAFRON
introduced a bias threatening both internal and external validity. The sampling method within
SAFRON also added bias and detracts from the generalizability of study results. It is also a
design weakness that the origin of included reports is unknown. It is possible that few institutions
contributed a disproportionate share, which would further degrade the external validity of this
study.
Incident learning datasets are challenged in many ways with respect to being a small
subset of actual errors. They remain, however, strong opportunities to learn from the mistakes of
others. It should be noted also that the more egregious errors that result in patient harm are more
difficult to hide than minor errors. With that understanding, it is more likely that reported errors
include the more clinically significant of those that take place. From a learning standpoint, it
adds to the potential that this study had to produce meaningful results. This dataset is also unique
in that it represents radiotherapy errors that happen all over the world. While cultures and
geography may differ greatly, human factors are common threads that persist wherever humans
live and work. Human factors rooted in fundamentals, such as Maslow’s hierarchy, also
transcend time and technological change. With that understanding, there was great potential for
this study to show predictive patterns of human factors that put radiation therapy patients at risk.
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Specific Procedures
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Safety in Radiation Oncology database
contains reported events from an international radiation oncology community and was utilized
for this research (IAEA, 2019). A subset of the reports with higher severity levels (critical,
major, serious, potentially major, and potentially serious) were used for the study sample; events
with minor severity levels or an unspecified severity level were not incorporated. Additionally,
reports were only included if they contained information regarding contributing factors to the
event; incidents lacking information about that which contributed to the error were excluded
from the dissertation study.
Each of the SAFRON incident reports has 28 unique data fields. Some of those fields
contain information in a free-text format and some have discrete data. The full SAFRON report
form can be found in Appendix A with the discrete data options for all of its drop-down fields
listed in Appendix B. The focus of report reviews for this study was on the following fields:
description of the incident in detail (free text format), clinical incident severity (discrete options),
description of the causes of the incident (discrete options), and description of contributing factors
to the incident (free text). After careful review, each of the reports was rated as having either a
low, medium, or high quality of information so that the investigator could discuss the quality
aspect of data incorporated in the analysis. As stated previously, those ratings indicate the
richness of information contained in the respective reports above and beyond the minimum
quality standard that was set through report inclusion criteria. A rubric for that determination
can be found in Table 1.
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Table 1
Rubric for Classifying the Quality of SAFRON Reports
Quality Level Criteria
Lower

Narrative provided minimal information about the event. Information
provided about contributing factors left a strong possibility that
important factors were missing from the report

Medium

Narrative provided a reasonable description of the event and included
some but limited information regarding what happened, who was
involved, what the suspected root causes were, and/or what human
interactions led to the error. Information provided about contributing
factors was sufficient to give the investigator a baseline understanding
of significant contributors to the reported error

High

Narrative provided a thorough description of the event and may have
included information such as detail around what happened, who was
involved, what the suspected root causes were, and what human
interactions led to the error. Information provided about contributing
factors was extensive and may have included both discrete and free
text descriptions

A list of radiotherapy error types was utilized to assign each incident report to a single
error category. In reports in which multiple errors were described, the initial propogating error
type was selected. Categories were general enough in nature to encompass wide swaths of error
descriptions in some basic and typical areas. The investigator’s experience reviewing
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radiotherapy error both as a clinical physicist and as chair of a radiotherapy incident reporting
advisory council was used to formulate this list. There are commonalities between this list of
error types and those used in published literature, but modifications were made to reduce
redundancy while preserving inclusivity (Ezzel et al., 2018). That list of error types can be seen
in Table 2.
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Table 2
Radiation Therapy Error Types
Error Type
Approval

Description
Appropriate approval was missing or something was inappropriately approved

Documentation
Incomplete
Documentation Erroneous

Documentation was incomplete or missing

Equipment

Equipment malfunction included software, hardware, connectivity, or networking

Image Guidance

Images were not interpreted correctly, shifts were made in the wrong direction or by
an incorrect amount based on a misreading of images, images were accidentally
omitted or too many images were taken, image guidance instruction was not
followed, there was a failure to assess images based on priority instruction, or there
was a lacking skill set in analyzing images appropriately

Treatment Planning

Ex: planner used wrong dose, wrong technique, planner did not account for certain
anatomy or implants, prior RT was disregarded, an incorrect target or contours were
used, the wrong CT data set was used, etc.

Collision

Either a collision or a potential collision with equipment and/or a patient

Quality Assurance

Quality assurance of a treatment plan, ongoing treatment, or equipment was
performed erroneously, was missed, missed a standard component, or was
suboptimal with respect to applicable policy or guidelines

Scheduling

Any error around patient scheduling

Simulation

Ex: wrong body part or location simulated, substandard scan protocol, insufficient
scan length, incorrect isocenter marked or tattooed, failure to complete the standard
simulation process

Treatment Setup

These errors include setup and positioning errors, alignment to incorrect skin
markings, forgotten or misplaced bolus, incorrect shifts in setting up the patient for
treatment, etc.

Treatment Delivery

These errors include the wrong field treated, a missing treatment accessory, or any
other issue that involves an incorrect component of radiation delivery (not setup)

Wrong patient

Patient ID issue

Patient

A patient-related problem occurred such as a significant delay, miscommunication,
health problem unrelated to treatment, inadequate coordination with their other care
providers, or failure to comply with information in their medical record outside
radiation therapy such as allergies or other special care needs

Documentation contained erroneous or inaccurate information

The HFACS system has four tiers of human factors, namely tier one unsafe acts, tier two
preconditions for unsafe acts, tier three supervision, and tier four organizational influences. Each
of those four tiers has a sublevel of classification below it, containing a number of subcategories.
In total, there were 19 subcategories of human contributing factors throughout the four tiers.
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Associations of all HFACS subcategories specified in each report were made and tracked in the
study database. Reports were evaluated individually, and all relevant subcategories were
included.
The HFACS has been utilized previously in the health care setting and that use was
described by Thomas Diller. Diller’s version of the HFACS was slightly modified for use in this
study so that the classification schema was more appropriately fitted to radiation therapy incident
learning data. Modifications included a consolidation of factors within tier two preconditions for
unsafe acts; the HFACS presented by Diller originally offered a third more granular level of
subcategories under tier two preconditions for unsafe acts. Information contained within
incident learning reports was not rich enough to make this third level of subcategories within the
HFACS helpful. A diagram of the HFACS utilized for this dissertation study (modified from
that presented by Diller et al.) can be seen in Figure 1 (Diller et al., 2014).
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Figure 1
The Human Factors Analysis Classification System

Note. Four tiers of human factors represent distinct categories of contributing factors to error as
applied from health care. Adapted from The human factors analysis classification system
(HFACS) applied to health care by T. Diller, G. Helmrich, S. Dunning, S. Cox, A. Buchanan, &
S. Shappell, 2014, American Journal of Medical Quality, 29(3), 85. Copyright 2014 by Sage.
Coding with Human Factors
Coding individual SAFRON reports with human contributing factors from the HFACS
used the systematic application of well-defined factors. The four tiers of factors along with their
subcategories and basic definitions are presented in Table 3, and a more detailed description of
the coding process is presented here. The progression of tiers from tier one unsafe acts to tier
four organizational influences includes a degree of remoteness in which tier one is most proximal
to the erroneous act and tier four is most distal.
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Table 3
The Human Factors Analysis Classification System Tiers and Descriptions
HFACS
TIER

HFACS SUB-TIER
Tier 1 Unsafe Acts

1

Errors - Skill based error

1

Errors - Decision error

1

Errors - Perceptual error

1

Violation - Routine

1

Violation – Exceptional
Tier 2 Preconditions for
Unsafe Acts

2

Environmental factors

2

Personnel factors

2

Conditions of the operator

Tier 3 Supervision
3
3
3

3

Inadequate supervision
Inappropriate planned
operations
Failure to address a known
problem

Supervisory ethics
violation

DESCRIPTION
Actual actions that take place resulting in an undesirable
outcome
Errors made when performing familiar tasks that are routinely
done without a great deal of thought
Information, knowledge, or experience is lacking
Input to any of the five senses is compromised and someone
subconsciously fills in missing information
Disregard for the rules but habitual in nature as "bending the
rules" is typically tolerated
Disregard for the rules in a way that is atypical, not done by
others and not condoned by leaders
Describes the environment and conditions contributing to
increased risk
Physical Environment: Issues with the physical environment
such as poor ergonomic layout, lighting, or clutter OR Technical
Environment: Issues with equipment, networking, the humancomputer interface, or automation
Communication: miscommunication between individuals:
information either unavailable or incomplete. OR Coordination:
health care providers work independently and do not manage
care well between them. OR Planning: patients’ needs are not
correctly anticipated or for any reason appropriate care plans are
not made. OR Fitness for Duty: Care providers have a
substandard physiologic state due to issues, such as being tired
or being on medication
Adverse Mental State: Examples include fatigue, stress, or
distraction. OR Adverse Physiological State: Examples include
illness, injury, or other temporary incapacitation. OR Chronic
Performance Limitation: These limitations are either chronic or
long term
These are issues with front line management who are
directly responsible for training, guidance, and oversight
Leadership failure with respect to training, guidance, and
keeping up with best practice standards
Includes scheduling, assigning duties, and keeping staff
members aware of the plan so that they are able to execute
Applies when deficiencies, equipment failures, a lack of training,
or other issues are known and ignored

Applies when supervisors allow things to occur that
are known to be against policy or regulations
Continue
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HFACS
TIER

HFACS SUB-TIER

DESCRIPTION

Tier 4 Organizational
Influences

Involve upper level management decisions that affect
supervisors and staff
Resource allocation and maintenance, including budgets,
equipment, and staffing allowances
Describes the safety culture, working atmosphere, chain of
command, and values
Includes failures of corporate rules that govern everyday
activities, such as scheduling and communication

4

Resource management

4

Organizational climate

4

Organizational process

To facilitate an efficient coding process, abbreviations for the HFACS subcategories were
utilized on the data collection form. Those abbreviations are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
HFACS Subcategory Abbreviations Used to Classify SAFRON Reports
HFACS
Subcategory
Tier

HFACS
Tier or
Subcategory

Description of HFACS

Tier 1, Unsafe Acts
ES

1

Error–Skill based error

ED
EP

1
1

Error–Decision error
Error–Perceptual error

VR

1

Violation–Routine violation

VE

1

Violation–Exceptional violation

PE

2

PP

2

PC

2

SIS

3

SIO

3

SFP

3

SSE

3

ORM

4

OOC
OOP

4
4

Tier 2, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Environmental factors – physical or technological
Personnel factors – communication, coordination, planning, or fitness for duty
Conditions of the operator – adverse mental state, physiological state, or
chronic performance limitation

Tier 3, Supervision
Inadequate supervision
Inappropriate planned operations
Failure to address a known problem
Supervisory ethics violation

Tier 4, Operational Influences
Resource management
Organizational climate
Organizational process
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As was discussed previously as a weakness of this study, SAFRON reports and all
incident reports contain only a finite amount of information; additional information as could
otherwise be provided through follow-up interviews was not available here. All SAFRON data
had been deidentified and contact with the submitters was not possible. In an effort to minimize
investigator bias from presumptions, human factor subcategories from the HFACS were not
mapped to a report unless information indicating the presence of that subcategory had been
submitted in the report. Even with that caveat, the potential for ambiguity existed within the
interpretation of meaning for each human factor. In order to protect against that bias, clear
interpretations and definitions were established prior to reading through the reports so that the
classification system could be utilized consistently.
Consistency in the coding process was achieved in part by systematically utilizing
discrete responses to the SAFRON data prompt “describe the causes of the incident.” These
discrete options, which would more accurately be termed “presumed contributing factors,” were
mapped to subcategories in the HFACS. This mapping algorithm can be seen in Table 4. Not all
of the reports were able to be mapped this way because some of the discrete contributing factors
did not align directly with a single subcategory from the HFACS. The response data that were
systematically mapped included multiple subcategories under tier two preconditions for unsafe
acts and under tier three supervision.
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Table 5
Mapping of Discrete Contributing Factors from SAFRON Reports to the HFACS
SAFRON Contributing Factor

HFACS Tier and Sub-Tier

Code

Lack of communications

Tier 2 Preconditions for unsafe acts, Personnel factors

PP

Inadequate communication of

Tier 2 Preconditions for unsafe acts, Personnel factors

PP

Tier 2 Preconditions for unsafe acts, Personnel factors

PP

Tier 2 Preconditions for unsafe acts, Conditions of the

PC

procedure
Misunderstood
communications
Time pressures

operator
Workload and time pressures

Tier 2 Preconditions for unsafe acts, Conditions of the

PC

operator
Fatigue

Tier 2 Preconditions for unsafe acts, Conditions of the

PC

operator
Inadequate

Tier 3 Supervision, Inadequate supervision

SIS

Tier 3 Supervision, Inadequate supervision

SIS

Tier 3 Supervision, Inadequate supervision

SIS

standard/procedure/ practice
Inadequate
training/orientation
Inadequate direction/
information
Continued
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SAFRON Contributing Factor HFACS Tier and Sub-Tier

Code

Lack of or ineffective

Tier 3 Supervision, Inadequate supervision

SIS

Tier 3 Supervision, Inadequate supervision

SIS

Unclear roles, responsibilities, Tier 3 Supervision, Inadequate supervision

SIS

procedures, protocols, and
documentation
Availability (with respect to
equipment)

and accountabilities
Personnel availability

Tier 3 Supervision, Inappropriate planned operations

SIO

Availability (with respect to

Tier 3 Supervision, Inappropriate planned operations

SIO

Tier 3 Supervision, Inappropriate planned operations

SIO

staff)
Conflicting
demands/priorities
Failure to address recognized

Tier 3 Supervision, Failed to address a known problem SFP

hazard

Aside from the mapping of discrete SAFRON data to the HFACS, a clear and
documented interpretation of each subcategory within the classification schema was developed
so that they could be consistently applied to the reports. Basic definitions of each tier and
subcategory were presented in Table 4. Additional detail for the subcategories is presented here.
Human contributing factors closest to the reported safety event have described tier one
unsafe acts. It contains five subcategories, consisting of three kinds of error and two kinds of
violations. One error type, skill based errors, refers to errors made while performing familiar
tasks without thought. An example of this from the data sample was when a staff member
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copied data incorrectly from a treatment planning system into a medical record. In contrast, a
second error type called decision errors is used to describe unsafe acts when there was
information, knowledge, or experience lacking. An example of this type of error was when a
physicist did not understand how to appropriately perform calculations that were required for a
radiation-producing machine calibration and then performed those calculations incorrectly.
Context of the written narrative describing the event was used to differentiate between skill and
decision type errors. Perceptual errors are the third type, and these errors are used to describe
unsafe acts when input to any of the five senses is compromised and someone subconsciously
fills in missing information. Perceptual radiotherapy errors included the wrong vertebral body
being being mistaken for the correct one and an incorrect skin marking being perceived to be the
desired positioning mark. Other perceptual errors stemmed from atypical situations when the
more common scenario was presumed. These situations included assumptions of no previous
radiation therapy, assumptions of a single treatment being prescribed per day, and assumptions
of supine feet first positioning. The final two subcategories under tier one unsafe acts were
routine and exceptional violations. Routine violations were those that were more habitual in
nature and were typically tolerated. Exceptional violations required a disregard for the rules or
policy that was not condoned by leaders. The narratives were used to make a determination on
which violation had been submitted to SAFRON.
Tier two preconditions for unsafe acts included three subcategories: environmental
factors, personnel factors, and conditions of the operator. Environmental factors included both
physical and technological components. Some of the earlier reports in the database described
egregious equipment issues with linear accelerators that lacked many of the safety features that
evolved over the subsequent decades. The more current environmental factors were mostly
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related to software errors and human-computer interface issues. Personnel factors included
issues of care coordination, planning, communication breakdowns, and substandard
physiological states. The final category in this tier, conditions of the operator, included more
chronic adverse states and issues, such as fatigue, stress, or distraction. This category was
mapped to SAFRON reports that described rushed workflows, time pressures, and instances of
employees being worn out or fatigued.
Tier three supervision was the most challenging tier to map as there was a fair amount of
ambiguity in how the subcategories could be interpreted. Use of discrete contributing factors
from the SAFRON reports were helpful in minimizing bias in the coding process. The first of
the four subcategories in this tier was inadequate supervision. This subcategory was used to
describe a leadership failure with respect to training, guidance, and adherence to best practice
standards. In order for this subcategory to have been assigned, the SAFRON report must have
indicated that there was some kind of leadership failure in one of these areas; presumptions were
not made unless that information was given. The next subcategory, inappropriate planned
operations, was more focused on the day-to-day operations of the clinic rather than general
guidance and adherence to standards. This category included scheduling and assigning day-today duties. When “availability” was mentioned as a contributing factor, it was considered
inappropriate planned operations if the comment was with respect to staff, whereas it was
considered inadequate supervision if the comment was made with respect to equipment (which
would be more of an issue of general workflow standards as opposed to day-to-day availability
for operations).
The final two subcategories in tier three supervision were failure to address a known
problem and supervisory ethics violations. In both instances, the problem or issue would have to
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have been known and ignored. If the SAFRON event did not explicitly state that this situation
was the case, these two subcategories were not selected. Failure to address a known problem
included instances of ignored equipment failures and ignored issues with compliance.
Tier four organizational influences included three subcategories. The first was resource
management, which was used to address issues with resource allocation, such as budgeting,
equipment, and staffing. The second was organizational climate that was used when safety
culture, values, or the chain of command were contributing factors to the submitted event. The
last subcategory in this tier was organizational process, which included failures of corporate or
organization-level rules that govern everyday operations, such as scheduling and communication.
Approach to Data Analysis
Descriptive analytics were used to present key features of the data sample. Graphical
representations show the distribution of errors and contributing factors within the data sample;
bar graphs were used to present the prevalence of the different error types and of human
contributing subcategories within all four tiers of the HFACS. A statistical analysis was
performed to determine whether there were significant associations between subcategories of
higher and lower tiers of the HFACS. This information led to the understanding of whether and
how human factors more remote to unsafe acts may predict the likelihood of other contributing
factors closer to them (or more directly involved). The HFACS was based on James Reason’s
idea that latent errors build and increase the risk of a more apparent and potentially harmful error
taking place. This theory was used to support the concept that human contributing factors at
higher tiers of the HFACS may increase the likelihood of contributing factors at lower tiers. In
order to test this theory, all combinations of higher and lower tier human contributing factors
from the HFACS subcategories were tested for significant associations. The higher tier
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subcategories were considered independent variables and the lower tier subcategories were
considered dependent variables for these tests. For each combination, an analysis for
proportional reduction in error between the two subcategories was performed using the Goodman
and Kruskal’s lambda test statistic. When significant associations were found, it was understood
that the dependent variable (lower tier subcategory from the HFACS) could be better predicted if
the independent variable (higher tier subcategory) was known. Lambda values below 0.1 were
considered weak associations, those between 0.11 and 0.30 were considered moderate, and those
above 0.31 were considered strong. The significance of each lambda value was also assessed,
and all results are presented in Chapter 4. While a significance of p < .05 was desired, lambda
values with p < .20 were reported. This dissertation study included 141 SAFRON events and
smaller subgroups contained specific subcategories from the HFACS. With that data limitation,
results with confidence levels greater than 80% were found to be worthy of discussion and were,
therefore, included in Chapters 4 and 5. Each significant human factor association was further
explored through the calculation of an odds ratio, which showed the relative odds of the
dependent variable existing with the presence of the independent variable versus without the
presence of the independent variable.
Additional statistical analyses were used to evaluate associations between radiation
therapy error types and human contributing factors from the HFACS. This analysis was
accomplished with the chi-square test for independence. Each subcategory within the HFACS
(at all four tiers) was tested against all error types. The p values below .05 showed that there
was at least one significant association between the tested human contributing factor and an error
type. An evaluation of adjusted residuals was then done to determine which specific error types
had that significant association. Adjusted residuals greater than 1.96 demonstrated that
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significance with 95% confidence. Significant results are presented in Chapter 4 and discussed
in Chapter 5.
Subjects
Subjects involved in this dissertation study were the staff members whose interactions,
relationships, communications, and other human factors have contributed to the safety incidents
reported into the SAFRON incident learning system. The source of information for this study
was SAFRON incident learning reports. As the data was secondary in nature and had been
deidentified, specific patients and staff involved in these incidents were unknown to the
investigator and shall, therefore, remain anonymous.
Power
It was the goal of investigator to analyze associations between radiotherapy errors and the
human factors that contributed to them. Statistical testing to show predictive patterns between
these variables needed to be both accurate and reliable. The strength of study results was
dependent upon several factors and power of those tests determined the likelihood that
significant associations (below the threshold for an acceptable p value) would be discoverable if
they in fact existed (Statistical Solutions, 2020). Association between variables was tested
through two different means. A proportional reduction in error test was performed with the
Goodmand and Kruskal’s lambda test statistic to determine how useful it would be to know
about the presence of a higher-tier subcategory (human contributing factor to error) from the
HFACS in predicting the presence of a lower-tier subcategory. A finding of zero would indicate
no usefulness and a finding of one would mean that we could make the prediction with one
hundred percent accuracy. A power limitation from this kind of test rests with the fact that if the
modal category was the same for both crosstab cells pertaining to the independent variable, the
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lambda test statistic will be zero (Goodman & Kruskal, 1979). In other words, if testing for an
association between the higher-tier subcategory “inadequate supervision” and the lower-tier
subcategory “decision errors,” the lambda statistic could be zero even if the presence and
absence of the supervision error with decision errors had vastly different report volumes. With
the data from this study sample, it was not the case and the power limitation from this test was
not an issue. Odds ratios were calculated for all associations having significance level of at least
.05. These measures of relative effect size allow for a further discussion of power associated
with these tests.
The second test of association, a chi-square test, was used to determine whether or not
there was a predictive relationship between any of the HFACS subcategories and a specific kind
of radiotherapy error. There were 141 events included in the study sample but as each was
assigned to only a single radiotherapy error type, there were ultimately some error types with
relatively few data points. Work was done to pool data in order to avoid having crosstab cells
with expected counts less than five but ultimately those pooled categories were not used. While
this served to improve the power of the chi-square testing, it washed out the meaning behind
associations with specific error types. Power from chi-quare tests is also affected by significane
level (as represented by the p value) and effect size. Results were considered significant if their
p value was less than .05. Odds ratios were calculated in order to address relative effect size.
All these components of statistical strength were used to support the findings from this study and
the recommendations made to mitigate radiotherapy error.
Sample Size
The full database of SAFRON incident reports was provided by the International Atomic
Energy Agency in 2019, and it contained 1608 reports dating back to 2001 with the exception of
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one additional report, which had been submitted in 1986. After careful selection of appropriate
cases with the exclusion and inclusion criteria described below, and 142 incident reports made
up the sample for this study. One of those cases was ultimately found to be the duplicate of
another entered in the same timeframe so the final sample size was 141 cases.
Inclusion Criteria
SAFRON reports were included in this study if they had been submitted to the IAEA’s
web-based report intake platform prior to prior to February 2019. They were also included if
they had been incorporated into SAFRON from the legacy ROSIS database, which was described
earlier. This incident learning system is international, so contributors work in radiation oncology
departments all over the world. Reports shared with the investigator for use in this dissertation
study lacked any information about the origin of the reports; all reports contained only
anonymous de-identified data. Every report in the SAFRON database was submitted voluntarily
although reporting may have been influenced by departmental policies or safety cultures.
The SAFRON report contains 28 response items 28 opportunities for contributors to input
data. Some of those fields have drop-down menus with discrete data options, and some allow for
free text. A blank report and a listing of all dropdown menu options can be found in Appendix A.
A report was only able to be submitted to SAFRON if all required data had been entered by the
contributor. All data fields were reviewed by the investigator although a select few response
items were particularly critical to the study analysis. Those were as follows: clinical incident
severity, detailed description of the incident, description of the incident causes, and the
description of contributing factors to the incident.
Exclusion Criteria
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In order to improve the quality of analysis for this dissertation study, certain exclusion
criteria were applied. While it is important to report about and learn from all radiotherapy errors
whether or not they resulted in clinically significant harm to patients, only reports of higher
clinical severity were included. These reports tended to contain more detailed information, which
was used for a more thorough analysis. There were six options in the drop-down menu under
clinical severity. The selections of critical severity, major severity, potential major severity,
potential serious severity, and serious severity were all included. Cases that had either minor
severity selected or no information provided were excluded.
As the focus of the investigator was on predictive patterns of human factors that
supported radiotherapy errors, it was important that studies be excluded if they did not contain
information about contributing factors or perceived causes. One data field in the SAFRON report
offered a drop-down menu of potential causes of the reported error. The question on the report
says “Describe the causes of the incident.” Any report that had “other” or a blank response to
that question was excluded from this study.
One of the most important data fields from the SAFRON report was the detailed
description of the event. Reports with no entry for this data field were also excluded from this
study. The three exclusion criteria described reduced the initial 1608 events to 142 and 141 after
exclusion of one duplicate entry. Of those 141, 96 had additional free text information offered to
describe contributing factors to the incident.
Characteristics
The 141 reports that have been included in this study were submitted between 2001 and
2019. They were submitted from undisclosed radiation therapy clinics around the world. The
commonalities these clinics have is that they treat cancer patients with high doses of radiation.
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The radiation producing devices and the planning, calculation, quality assurance, and
communication systems that support them are complex in nature and there is a requirement for
highly trained staff. The treatment of cancer patients also has a requirement for communication
between a number of specialists, such as radiation oncologists, nurses, physicists, dosimetrists,
radiation therapists, administrators, social workers, and other multidisciplinary medical teams.
These complexities are important as they contribute to the human factors and safety cultures for
these reports.
Each report described a safety event or error that occurred in a radiation therapy
department and was voluntarily entered into the SAFRON incident learning system. The content
of each report was unique and contained a mixture of standardized discrete data responses and
free text descriptions of the incident. The amount of information offered varied from report to
report.
Recruiting Procedures
There was not any recruiting requirement for this dissertation study. The IAEA had
provided incident reports from the SAFRON incident learning system for use. There was not any
involvement of individuals or data outside of these reports.
Formats for Presenting Results
A unique identification number was assigned to each report. A sample table has been
presented in Chapter 4, showing a distribution of human contributing factors that were selected
for each of those reports. Graphs were also utilized to depict frequency patterns of how well or
poorly different categories of human factors (subcategories from the HFACS) were represented
in the data set.
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Tests for significant associations were run to determine whether predictive patterns
existed between higher and lower tier subcategories from the HFACS. Results of these tests,
presented with the Goodman and Kruskal’s lambda test statistic, significance levels, and odds
ratios, are presented in Chapter 4. Significant associations between radiation therapy error types
and subcategories from the HFACS (at any of the four tiers from the HFACS) were also
uncovered. These results were presented with the chi-square test statistic, significance levels,
adjusted residuals, and odds ratios. Predictive patterns of human contributing factors associated
with one another and associated with radiotherapy error types are discussed in Chapter 5.
Resource Requirement
The incident report data for this dissertation study came from the SAFRON database. As
described previously, the analysis was performed by associating each included report with a
number of human factors that had been organized through HFACS. The HFACS was originally
introduced by Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) for use by the United States (U.S.) Navy and
Marine Corps and was first modified for use in health care in 2007 (El Bardissi et al., 2007).
That system was further modified for use in health care and for use with the radiotherapy data in
this study (Diller et al., 2014). All other supportive literature came from scholarly publications.
Reliability and Validity
A fundamental challenge to reliability and validity comes from the voluntary nature of
incident learning submission. With all report submission, there is a potential bias to the data;
submitters fit a profile of being informed about the reporting program and of being willing to
report. Not all radiotherapy staff fit that description, so contributors to the SAFRON database
may have a stronger commitment to patient safety than others in the field. As more severe
incidents are typically more difficult to hide, the selection of higher severity events for this
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research partially limited the bias regarding willingness to report (Morrow et al., 2016). The
reports themselves may also have reflected a biased view from their contributors.
A modified version of the Human Factors Analysis Classification System was utilized to
analyze reported incidents. This system incorporated four tiers of human factors: tier one unsafe
acts, tier two preconditions for unsafe acts, tier three supervision, and tier four organizational
influences (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). The retrospective nature of incident learning limited
the extent to which information was available in any or all of these areas. An analysis of both
free text response information and discrete data concerning contributing factors was conducted
during the classification process. A standardized system with clear definitions was applied in
order to identify involved human factors at each of the four tiers. While steps were taken to
minimize investigator bias, this process was a manual process, and so some amount of
subjectivity could not be avoided.
Regarding the time component of the report submissions, it was possible that reporting
volumes were influenced by factors other than the prevalence of errors. The difficulty or ease of
submission, publicity around other adverse events, leadership or safety culture changes, and
variable staffing levels are just a few examples of that which may have influenced the volume of
report submissions over time. Lastly, due to the de-identified secondary nature of the report data
available to the investigator, there was no way to understand where reports were submitted from;
it was not known how geographically diverse the report origins were nor was it known if a
smaller number of institutions had contributed a disproportionate share of the reports.
Ethical Considerations and Review
The investigator utilized reported information about various unsafe acts that had been
reported by staff members in radiation oncology clinics. Relationships between unsafe acts and
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the human factors that contributed to them showed predictive patterns and was used for an
actionable understanding of risk. The involvement of radiotherapy staff in these errors presented
a type of human research warranting ethical consideration and protections. This research and any
kind of human research have a requirement that the principles of justice, autonomy, beneficence,
and nonmaleficence are upheld and respected.
The reports utilized by the investigator contained secondary deidentified data. The IAEA
had primary ownership of this data and had not disclosed any information from which the
identity of involved parties could be shown; the report data was completely anonymous. This
anonymity had both security and confidentiality for this research. As outlined by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), patients have a right to their
privacy as part of their health care process. The act has standards for the protection of
information, and those standards were upheld throughout this study to make sure that patient
rights were amply respected and protected (Office for Civil Rights Headquarters, n.d.). If
confidential patient information is ever disclosed through the incident learning process, involved
patients could potentially be adversely affected and future patients may refrain from seeking
care. Under these circumstances, patients may also become distrusting of their health care
providers and may seek care elsewhere (which could adversely affect participating institutions).
Due to the anonymous nature of this study, none of those concerns had materialized.
Aside from sensitivities around patient information, it is also important that privacy be
maintained for radiotherapy practices contributing incident learning reports. Error is an inherent
part of any human process (Reason, 1990a). It is, therefore, part of any health care practice,
radiotherapy included. Reporting unsafe acts is used for preventable errors to become
opportunities for learning; involved and uninvolved health care practices can analyze that which

93
happened and use that information to improve safety. However, there is still a stigma around
reporting error. It seems to be an irrational but ever-present concept that the best health care
practices operate without error. Public disclosure of institutions that submit incident learning
reports may put those institutions at risk of having their reputations tarnished. While
participation in incident learning should rightfully improve these reputations, public perceptions
of incident learning have not yet aligned with safety culture realities. For these reasons, it would
be important to protect the privacy of contributing institutions. The IAEA had supported this
need by providing data for this study in a deidentified state.
In order to ensure that the ethical considerations described above were supported, several
layers of security were involved in the dissertation process. A research committee was
established and served to oversee the study. A committee chair, a second University advisor, and
an expert in the field of radiotherapy incident learning were all part of this committee. They had
been recognized by the University as having the experience and ability to oversee an ethical
process.
Following a formal and accepted research proposal defense, this investigator sought
approval from Nova Southeastern University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). Detailed
information about this study was submitted as part of that IRB application. The submission
included goals and justification for the research, information about proposed variables and
participants, a full description of potential risks and protections, and specific steps being taken to
ensure confidentiality. The study was initiated after the IRB had reviewed and approved the
proposed research and ethics practices.
Funding
This dissertation study was unfunded.
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Study Setting
As this study involved a review and analysis of secondary data reports, it was conducted
on the investigator’s personal computer at the investigator’s residence in Massachusetts, USA. A
backup of the study information was retained on a single encrypted drive, which was secured in a
locked drawer when not in active use. Interaction with the committee was largely remote through
email and phone call communications.
Instruments and Measures
The primary instrument utilized for this study was the SAFRON incident report. This
instrument was the data collection form that had been filled out by staff from radiation therapy
centers around the world. A blank copy of the report can be found in Appendix A. The report
contains question prompts for both both discrete response options and for free text responses.
Reports had been submitted online through the IAEA’s SAFRON web portal.
The instrument begins with questions about the kind of treatment the safety event is
associated with, the phase in the workflow process it is associated with and how the incident was
discovered. It also contains a response prompt regarding clinical incident severity. Defined
options for severity include critical, serious, major, and minor clinical significance. The
instrument has a prompt for the contributor to classify incidents that were caught before they
reached a patient, which was accomplished with the inclusion of options, such as potential
serious incident and potential major incident. The instrument additionally has prompts for the
submitter to include information about whether or not the incident reached the patient, whether
any part of the prescribed treatment was delivered incorrectly, and if anyone was affected by the
incident.
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The reliability and validity of this information depended in part on the contributor and in
part on the incident itself. Radiation therapy incidents have some unique complexities; clinical
harm from a radiation error may not be apparent for weeks, months, or even years after an error
takes place. When effects are temporarily distanced from an error, there are additional
confounding variables that complicate the understanding of cause and effect. In order to optimize
the quality, reliability, and validity of SAFRON data, the instrument contains help buttons that
define selection options within the report.
Because of several data fields on the instrument, the contributor is able to enter free text
descriptions of the incident. With this format, each report offers a narrative description of that
which is being reported and a separate description of that which is understood to be contributing
factors. There is value to most if not all of the data fields although the free text narratives were
particularly informative and typically made for a solid understanding of that which took place.
As with any free text descriptions, the level of quality and detail varied by report. Also, while
containing some of the more valuable information from reports, these free text narratives were
also notably vulnerable to reliability and validity issues. Reporters may have had biased
understandings of that which took place, and they may have presented a flawed representation of
the incident.
The instrument contains prompts for the contributor to offer information about that which
they believed contributed to the safety incident. This information could be offered through free
text descriptions or through a selection of discrete data options. A selection of discrete options
was utilized to obtain information about safety barriers that failed, worked, and may have
worked. The instrument contains a request for information about the equipment that was used,
the treatment method associated with the incident, whether or not the incident occurred on the
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patient’s first day of treatment, and whether or not a risk assessment had been completed. Again,
all of this information had been contributed to a SAFRON report by a radiation oncology staff
member. Submitted information was, therefore, vulnerable to reporter bias and potential issues of
reliability and validity. With the optional and voluntary nature of this reporting, however, it was
reasonable to presume that reporters had done their best to offer valid information with minimal
bias.
In summation, the SAFRON incident submission form is a tool available to all radiation
therapy sites who choose to use it. The form has been structured to allow the contributor to
supply relevant information about the unsafe act that took place. The format of the data
collection contains both free text descriptions that allow the contributors to communicate their
own perceptions and menus of discrete data options. This blended format was used to support a
meaningful analysis.
Data Collection Procedures
SAFRON data was collected for this dissertation study directly from the IAEA. The
investigator contacted the IAEA employee responsible for oversight of this data and a formal
request was made for the data to support this dissertation study. The request was granted and the
entire database was electronically transmitted to the investigator.
Data Analyses
The goal of the investigator was to determine whether human factors are associated with
unsafe acts in radiation therapy. Associations found through this study were positioned to show
predictive patterns useful to inform effective safety improvements and error mitigations.
Associations between human contributing factors to error were determined by evaluating
proportional reductions in error with Goodman and Kruskal’s lambda statistic. These tests
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evaluated the relationships between subcategories at higher tiers on the HFACS schema and
subcategories at lower tiers (which they may or may not predictably influence). Chi-square tests
were then utilized to determine whether or not there were statistically significant relationships
between radiotherapy errors and associated human contributing factors, namely those falling
under tier one unsafe acts, tier two preconditions for unsafe acts, tier three supervision, and tier
four organizational influences. The significance level for all tests was noted as were odds ratios.
Format for Presenting Results
Descriptive statistics were utilized to present frequency distributions of both error types
and of assigned human contributing factors from the HFACS. Associations between higher and
lower tiered subfactors from the HFACS were presented with Goodman and Kruskal’s lambda
statistic. The p values for these associations were presented and odds ratios were calculated for
all significant relationships. Significant relationships between human contributing factors to
error (presented as subcategories from the HFACS) and specific radiotherapy error types were
determined and presented with chi-square test results. Data tables are presented in Chapter 4
showing significance levels and adjusted residuals for those relationships. Odds ratios were also
presented.
Summary of the Chapter
Human beings are naturally prone to error, and in the field of health care, it puts patients
at risk. Within the radiation therapy specialty, there is ongoing work to reduce that risk by
improving safety. This dissertation study was used to aid in that effort through a quantitative
analysis of human contributing factors to error. A non-experimental quantitative and predictive
study design was utilized for that work.
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Human factors contributing to reported radiotherapy incidents were ascertained from
reports to the IAEA’s SAFRON database. A representative sample of reports was selected for
this research. These voluntarily submitted reports showed information about radiotherapy errors
yet contained some amount of inherent bias; contributions were offered through self-selection
sampling. This bias is addressed and does not overshadow the potential for this research to
contribute to safety improvement strategy.
The goal of this research was to determine the nature of associations between
radiotherapy errors and the human factors that precede them. Each incident report in the included
sample was reviewed and assigned to a single error type as well as to all applicable human
contributing factors from a well-established human factors classification system. Within this
system, human factors exist at four levels or tiers, including tier one unsafe acts, tier two
preconditions for unsafe acts, tier three supervision, and tier four organizational influences. An
analysis was done to determine whether there were significant predictive associations between
human contributing factors at higher tiers of the HFACS and factors at lower tiers. The
Goodman and Kruskal’s lambda statistic was utilized to assess that significance. Statistical tests
for association between human contributing factors and radiation therapy error types was then
performed. The chi-square test with an assessment of adjusted residuals was used for this
assessment.
Threats to this study included construct validity with the SAFRON incident learning
report. Radiotherapy incidents are complex, and it is possible that (as would be the case for all
incident learning reports) the standard SAFRON intake form did not let information to be shared
optimally. The voluntary nature of the reports and the purposive sampling method used to
include only a sample of reports also detracted from overall generalizability. The lack of
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generalizability detracted from external validity. Internal validity was affected by a 20 timespan
over which the reports were submitted to SAFRON. Changes in technology, communication
patterns, and workflows were not able to be accounted for with the given sample size.
An important strength to this dissertation study is that validated human factors
classification system was utilized to better understand how and which human factors contribute
to error in radiation therapy. This approach has achieved success in the aviation industry, in other
high reliability industries, and has recently been used in health care. The approach is new,
however, to radiation therapy incident learning. Associations between human factors and error
types were made systematically in a valid way that could be reproduced by another researcher.
One weakness of this study design was the inclusion of voluntarily submitted incident learning
reports. It is understood that the reported errors are only a subset of the actual errors that take
place.
The SAFRON database contributed to this study by the IAEA contained over 1,600
reports. This database included reports that had originally been submitted via the ROSIS
database described in Chapter 2; reports were included in the database if they were submitted
through either the ROSIS or SAFRON web-based intake forms. Events were excluded from this
study if they were labeled with either minor or unspecified patient harm or if they were missing
information in key areas, such as the incident description or the presumed causes of error.
Ultimately, 141 reports were included, which allowed for reasonable power and statistical
certainty from the analysis. Results from this study are presented in Chapter 4 with graphs and
with relevant statistics. Reliability and validity issues were assessed, and quality ratings for the
reports were presented to aid in that discussion.

100
Incident report data utilized for this study contained sensitive information about radiation
therapy safety events. The data as supplied by the IAEA had been deidentified such that all
parties were anonymous. This step was necessary from an ethical standpoint and is required by
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, 1996). High ethical standards were upheld throughout this dissertation study
to insure that involved parties were respected with appropriate privacy and confidentiality. Both
the Nova Southeastern University IRB and the appointed dissertation committee served to ensure
that these ethical standards were preserved.
Data for this study were provided by the IAEA as a database of SAFRON incident
learning reports. As stated, all of those reports had been voluntarily submitted over the past two
decades. Following the mapping of each report to an error type and to the specified human
contributing factors, tests were run to find associations and predictive patterns. Those results are
presented in Chapter 4 and are discussed in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction to the Chapter
The purpose of this dissertation study was to uncover predictive patterns of human
factors contributing to radiotherapy errors. An evaluation was done from an international sample
of reports submitted to the SAFRON incident reporting and learning system. The HFACS was
utilized to map each of the reports to as many human contributing factors as were noted to be
relevant. Those factors spanned four distinct tiers with tier one unsafe acts being closest or most
proximal to the noted error and tier four organizational influences being most remote. Radiation
therapy-specific error types were also assigned to each of the reports.
A Goodman and Kruskal’s lambda test statistic was used to measure the proportional
reduction in error between all combinations of subcategories from higher and lower tiers on the
HFACS. For example, each of the three subcategories from tier four organizational factors was
tested for an association with every subcategory within each of the lower three tiers, and each of
tier three supervision subcategories was tested for an association with every subcategory from
tiers one and two. Results are presented to show that there are predictive associations between
some of the higher and lower tier HFACS subcategories. These significant associations indicate
that the lower tier factor can be better predicted if the higher tier factor is known. Additional
analysis was done to determine whether there were significant associations between human
contributing factors to error (as represented by subcategories from the HFACS) and specific
error types. Chi-square testing with an analysis of adjusted residuals was utilized for this
determination. Odds ratios were calculated for all associations as a measure of relative effect
size.
Data Analysis Results
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One hundred and forty-one SAFRON incident reports were analyzed for this dissertation
study. As incident learning report submissions are always voluntary, the SAFRON data were
voluntarily submitted by the international population of radiation therapy workers who chose to
participate, which resulted in variable report quality. In order to assess this variability, the quality
of each report was assessed using the algorithm presented in Table 1, and the distribution of
report qualities is presented in Figure 3. Approximately one half of all reports, 70 in total, were
of high quality. Another 46 reports (33%) were of medium quality, and the final 25 reports
(18%) were of lower quality.
Figure 2
SAFRON Report Quality
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This investigator focused on 14 different types of radiation therapy error, which were
defined in Table 2. A single error type was assigned to each of the 141 SAFRON reports. The
error type assigned was the one that best fit the main error described in the report. If multiple
errors of equal significance were described, the first or precipitating event was used for the error
categorization. Each of the categories was utilized at least once within the data sample, and the

103
distribution of assignments is shown in Figure 4. As a means of assessing the impact of report
quality on error type, Figure 3 shows this distribution both with and without inclusion of lower
quality reports. The comparison is discussed further in Chapter 5.
Figure 3
Error Type Distribution of SAFRON Reports with and without Lower Quality Reports
35

Number of Reports

30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Quality = High, Medium, and Lower

Quality = High and Medium Only

Note. This graph shows the error type distribution from 141 SAFRON event submissions of all
quality levels and 116 from high and medium quality SAFRON events (with the exclusion of 25
lower quality submissions).
Coding Human Contributing Factors to Error
In addition to being assigned a single radiotherapy error type, each of the 141 SAFRON
reports was assigned a number of human contributing factors from the HFACS. A sample data
collection form that was used to organize the process is presented in Figure 4. Each report had at
least one HFACS subcategory assignment and there were 564 assignments in total.
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Figure 4
Sample Data Collection Form

Report
ID

Quali
ty

1

H

2

H

QA

ED

3

H

ED

4

H

5

H

QA
Tx
Delivery
Tx
Delivery

6

H

7

H

8

H

9

M

10

H

Error
Tx
Planning

1
ES

1
ED

ES

1
VR

1
VE

2
PE

HFACS Subcategories
2
PP

2
PC

3
SIS

3
SIO

3
SFP

SIS

SIO

SFP

3
SSE

4
ORM

4
OOC

4
OOP

VR
VE

PE

ES

PE
ED

Tx Setup
Tx
Delivery

ED

ORM

OOP

SIS

ES

Tx Setup
Tx
Delivery

Tx Setup

1
EP

PP

EP
EP

PP

EP

PP

EP

PP

EP

VR

SIS

PP

Note. Report quality abbreviations are as follows: “H” corresponds to high, “M” corresponds to
medium and “L” corresponds to lower. Codes representing the HFACS subcategories can be
found in Table 4. The presence of a code in the body of this table indicates the presence of that
contributing factor in the corresponding report. An example of coding from 10 reports is shown.
Descriptive Statistics around Human Contributing Factors to Error
Among the 141 SAFRON reports, each with a single error type, there were 564 relevant
human contributing factors assigned. The average number of factors or subcategories within the
HFACS that were assigned per individual event was 3.84. The mode within the event sample
was 3. The standard deviation was 1.83 and the variance was 3.36. The minimum number of
human factors assigned to an individual case was 1 and the maximum number was 11. The
distribution of these assignments per SAFRON event can be seen in Figure 5.
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Figure 5

Percentage of 141 SAFRON Events

Volume Distribution of Human Contributing Factors Assigned to SAFRON Reports
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Within four tiers of the HFACS, the 564 subcategory assignments were predominantly
made in tiers one through three; there were relatively few assignments made to tier four
organizational influences. The relative distribution of assignments between the four tiers can be
found in Figure 6.
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Figure 6
Subcategory Assignments within the Four Tiers of the HFACS
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Note: The distribution of subcategory assignments from all four tiers of the HFACS is presented
in Figure 7.
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Figure 7
Prevalence Distribution of Human Contributing Factors
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Note. This graph shows the distribution of 564 human contributing factors from all four tiers of
the HFACS. The assignments were distributed among 141 individual SAFRON incident reports.
Codes used to define the HFACS tiered subcategories can be found in Table 4.
As can be seen in the figure, the most frequently assigned contributing factor (with 93
assignments) was the tier three supervision subcategory called inadequate supervision. The
second most common contributing factor was the tier two preconditions for unsafe acts
subcategory called personnel factors. These involved communication, coordination, planning, or
fitness for duty.
Volume distributions have now been presented as radiotherapy-error types and for human
contributing factors to error (subcategories from the HFACS). Figure 8 shows a comparison of
the relative volume of assignments made in these two areas. The graph shows the relative
prevalence (percentage distribution) of the 141 error type assignments. For each of the error
types, it also shows the percentage of the total 564 factor assignments were allocated to that error
category. This graph does not distinguish between human factor subcategories in any way.
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Figure 8
Distribution of Error Types and Human Factors Assigned to SAFRON Events

Relative Prevalence Rates of
Assignments to SAFRON Reports
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Note. This graph shows the prevalence rates for 141 errors and for 564 human contributing
factors assigned to the SAFRON events. Rates were calculated as a percentage of the total
number of assignments multiplied by 100.
Associations between Tiered Subcategories of the HFACS
James Reason’s original Swiss cheese model of error was based on the theory that latent
errors increase the risk of a serious error actually taking place (Reason, 1990b). Similarly,
contributing factors to error, which are in a sense latent errors or suboptimal conditions, increase
the risk of an error or unsafe act. The HFACS schema is tiered in order to incorporate the
concept remoteness. Human contributing factors closest to the safety error fall under tier one
unsafe acts and factors most remote or indirectly influential to the safety error fall under
increasingly higher tiers. The schema culminates with tier four organizational influences. It
follows in theory that that contributing factors from lower tiers would be dependent on those
from higher tiers; contributing factors close to the unsafe acts would be dependent on other
contributing factors more remote to those unsafe acts.
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Testing was done for significant associations between all combinations of subcategories
from higher and lower tiers. For each test, the lower tiered subcategory was considered the
dependent variable. Significant associations along with their significance level and strength of
association (as given by Goodman and Kruskal’s lambda) are presented in Table 6. Odds ratios
were also calculated and presented as a means of understanding relative effect size.
The strengths of the associations have been described as proportional reductions in error
(PRE). They describe predictability of the lower-tier contributing factor given the presence of the
higher-tier contributing factor. A lambda (or PRE) value of zero means that the higher-tier
contributing factor would be of no use in trying to predict the lower-tier contributing factor. All
non-zero lambda values show some level of predictability. A 5% threshold, a minimal lambda
value of 0.05, has been used in other publications for reporting, and greater lambda values would
indicate stronger predictability (Hooper & O’Hare, 2013). The p values for the findings ranged
from .07 to .16 Odds ratios ranged from .37 to 6.26.
It was found that decision errors from tier one unsafe acts can be predicted from
inadequate supervision. With a lambda value of 0.25, reports of inadequate supervision have a
25% reduction in error when predicting decision type errors. In the study sample, decision errors
were over six times more likely to be reported when inadequate supervision had been reported.
Reported failures to address known problems from tier three supervision have improved
predictability of three different lower-tier contributing factors to error. When these supervisory
errors are known to be present, the predictability of decision errors is improved by 14%, the
predictability of environmental factors from tier two preconditions for unsafe acts was improved
by 12%, and the predictability of personnel factors from tier two preconsitions for unsafe acts
was improved by 13%. Odds ratios from the data sample showed that decision errors were
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reported nearly four times more often and environmental conditions were reported 2.8 times
more often when supervisors failed to address known problems.
The odds ratio for tier three supervision failures to address known problems and tier two
preconditions for unsafe acts personnel factors was 0.37. Personnel factors were less likely to be
reported when supervisors failed to address known problems. This is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 5.
Table 6
Significant Associations between Human Contributing Factors to Error
Human Contributing Factor Subcategories from the HFACS
Higher-Tier Factor

Lower-Tier Factor

Lambda

p value

Odds Ratio

(PRE)
Tier 3 SIS

Tier 1 ED

.25

.08

6.26

Tier 3 SFP

Tier 1 ED

.14

.16

3.95

Tier 3 SFP

Tier 2 PE

.12

.16

2.80

Tier 3 SFP

Tier 2 PP

.13

.07

0.37

Note. This table displays higher-tier subcategories from the HFACS that are associated with
lower tier subcategories. Goodman and Kruskal’s lambda values less than 0.10 are considered
weak associations, values 0.11 to 0.30 are considered moderate, and values greater than 0.31
are considered strong. Tabled associations have a minimum of five SAFRON events in each
cross tabulated category and a p value of up to .20. Abbreviations for subcategories from the
HFACS are listed in Table 4.
Predictive Associations between Radiotherapy Errors and Human Factors
The distribution of subcategories from the HFACS with respect to their corresponding
error types are presented in Figure 9. Several combinations of error type and subcategories from
the HFACS have either zero or very few instances.
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Figure 9
Human Contributing Factor Prevalence for 14 Error Types
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7
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5
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52
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1
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3

64
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2
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4
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4

1

3

4
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5

1

8

4
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1

1
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24
1

2

2

38
43
15

12

5

4

6

2

93

124
18
10

1
3

1

57
1

1

129
63

1
16

30

4
49

34

11

4

12

5
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Note. There were 564 Five hundred and sixty-four human contributing factors spanning the four
tiers of the HFACS were assigned to 141 SAFRON incident reports. Abbreviations for the
HFACS subcategories can be found in Table 4.
Chi-square tests were performed to uncover predictive associations between radiotherapy
error types and human contributing factors to error (subcategories from the four-tiered HFACS).
The significant associations are presented in Table 7. Significance was defined with p values
less than or equal to .05. For each significant chi-square test, adjusted residuals were analyzed to
determine which of the error types tested had a significant association. Adjusted residual values
greater than 1.96 indicate the presence of those significant associations. Those values are also
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presented in Table 7 and are described in the following paragraphs. There were no more than
two significantly associated error types for any of the HFACS subcategories.
When evaluated in combination with all involved error types from the SAFRON reports,
a significant difference in frequency was found within the subset of reports containing skillbased errors from tier one unsafe acts. In other words, the spread of reported skill-based errors
among the different radiotherapy error types was not the same for all error types [X2 (13, N =
141) = 26.88, p = .01]. Post hoc testing showed that the statistical difference was with treatment
planning errors, which were more frequently associated with skill-based errors than the other
error types. This determination was made based on an evaluation of adjusted residuals. Values
over 1.96 were significantly greater than the expected number of these errors given a
significance level of .05. The adjusted residual for treatment planning errors was 2.1.
Similarly, a significant difference in frequency was found within reported decision-based
errors from tier one unsafe acts [X2 (13, N = 141) = 52.86, p < .01]. Post hoc testing showed that
this difference was with quality assurance errors. The volume of quality assurance errors
reported with the decision error contributing factor was significantly greater than expected with
an adjusted residual of 5.5. Perception errors from tier one unsafe acts were also shown to have a
statistically significant difference among its association with the radiotherapy error types [X2 (13,
N = 141) = 24.67, p = .03]. Post hoc testing showed that the image guidance error type stood out
as being reported significantly more frequently than expected. Its adjusted residual was 2.0.
Environmental factors under tier two preconditions for unsafe acts had a statistically significant
finding within its error type associations [X2 (13, N = 141) = 24.84, p = .02]. Post hoc testing for
this subcategory showed significant associations with both equipment errors and with image
guidance errors. Both error types had adjusted residuals of 2.4. Lastly, a significant finding was
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uncovered within failures to address known problems from the HFACS’ tier three supervision
[X2 (13, N = 141) = 26.67, p = .01]. Post hoc testing showed that both image guidance and
quality assurance errors were significantly more prevalent than expected within this data set. The
adjusted residuals were 2.8 and 2.6, respectively.
Odds ratios were once again calculated and presented (in Table 7) to show the relative
effect size of each finding. The smallest odds ratio was 3.67 and showed that image guidance
errors were 3.67 times as likely to occur when the tier one unsafe acts subcategory of perception
errors was present than when it was not. The largest odds ratio showing a large effect size
involved the tier one unsafe acts subcategory decision errors and the quality assurance error type.
The value of this odds ratio was 25; it was 25 times more likely to have reported a quality
assurance error when erroneous decisions were made than when they were not.
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Table 7
Significant Associations between Error Type and Human Contributing Factors to Error
HFACS Tier and

Χ2

p value

Subfactor Code

Associated

Adjusted

OR

Associated

Adjusted

OR

Error 1

Residual

1

Error 2

Residual

2

1
Tier 1 Unsafe Acts, ES

26.88

.01

Treatment

2

2.1

2.33

planning
Tier 1 Unsafe Acts, ED

52.86

<.01

QA

5.5

25.0

Tier 1 Unsafe Acts, EP

24.67

.03

Image Guidance

2.0

3.67

Tier 2 Preconditions for

24.84

.02

Equipment

2.4

5.81

Unsafe Acts, PE
Tier 3 Supervision, SFP

Image

2.4

5.81

2.6

3.74

Guidance
26.67

.01

Image Guidance

2.8

5.56

QA

Note. Significant relationships between error types and human contributing factors are listed if their chi-square value is significant
with a p value less than .05, with an n greater than 5, and with an adjusted residual greater than 1.96.
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Each of the significant error type and human contributing factor combinations are
presented below as prevalence graphs; for each significant association, graphs show the
percentage of assigned human factors (among the 564 assigned subcategories from the HFACS)
for each radiotherapy error type so that significant differences can be seen graphically. The
graphs are used to aid in the discussion following in Chapter 5. Figure 10 shows the prevalence
distribution of skill based errors (a human contributing subfactor from the HFACS’ tier one
unsafe acts) across all error types. Similarly, Figure 11 shows the prevalence distribution of
decision based errors, and Figure 13 shows the prevalence of perceptual errors. These are
subcategories from the HFACS’ tier one unsafe acts. Figure 14 shows the distribution of
environmental contributing factors (from the HFACS’ tier two preconditions for unsafe acts),
and Figure 15 shows the distribution of unsafe supervision with a failure to address a known
problem (from the HFACS’ tier three supervision). Again, each graph shows the prevalence
distribution of the HFACS subcategory across all error types.
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Figure 10
Prevalence Distribution of Skill Based Errors across All Radiotherapy Error Types
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Note. This graph shows the prevalence rates for skill-based errors. Rates were calculated as a
percentage of the 564 human contributing factors assigned multiplied by 100.
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Figure 11
Prevalence Distribution of Decision Errors across All Radiotherapy Error Types
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Note. This graph shows the prevalence rates for decision based errors. Rates were calculated as a
percentage of the 564 human contributing factors assigned multiplied by 100.
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Figure 12

Prevalence Rate for Perceptual Errors

Prevalence Distribution of Perception Errors across All Radiotherapy Error Types
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Note. This graph shows the prevalence rates for perceptual errors. Rates were calculated as a
percentage of the 564 human contributing factors assigned multiplied by 100.
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Figure 13
Prevalence Distribution of Environmental Contributing Factors across All Radiotherapy Error
Types
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Note. This graph shows the prevalence rates for environmental factors contributing to reported
error. Rates were calculated as a percentage of the 564 human contributing factors assigned
multiplied by 100.
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Figure 14
Prevalence Distribution of Unsafe Supervision with a Failure to Address a Known Problem

Prevalence Rate for Unsafe Supervision
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Note. This graph shows the prevalence rates for unsafe supervision factors with a failure to
address a known problem. Rates were calculated as a percentage of the 564 human contributing
factors assigned multiplied by 100.
Summary
A sample of 141 reports to the SAFRON incident learning system were analyzed in order
to uncover predictive relationships between human factors contributing to error and radiation
therapy error types. Approximately half of these reports contained high quality information,
approximately one third were of medium quality, and the final 18% were of lower quality yet
still met the minimum inclusion criteria and was of value to this study. Each of the SAFRON
reports was assigned a single radiotherapy error type, indicating the nature of the error described
in the report. Descriptive statistics were presented with treatment planning errors being the most
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prominent followed by quality assurance errors. The presence of lower quality reports did not
significantly affect the prevalence distribution among error types.
Each SAFRON report was coded with as many applicable human contributing factors as
were indicated in the report. Human factors assigned were subcategories from the four tiers of
the HFACS. Descriptive statistics of human factor prevalence were presented with the tier three
supervision subcategory called inadequate supervision being the most frequently involved. The
second most frequently involved subcategory from the HFACS was the tier two preconditions
for unsafe acts’ personnel factors.
The HFACS schema contains four tiers, namely tier one unsafe acts, tier two
preconditions for unsafe acts, tier three supervision, and tier four organizational influences. The
concept of tiers in the HFACS represents the degree of remoteness to the erroneous act with tier
one unsafe acts being closest to the error and tier four organizational influence being the most
remote. Each tier contains a number of relevant subcategories. Testing was done to determine
whether there were significant associations between subcategories from higher and lower tiers.
All combinations of subcategories were assessed with the Goodman and Kruskal’s lambda
statistic. Tier three supervision’s inadequate supervision subcategory had a moderate association
with the decision error subcategory from tier one unsafe acts. That moderate association was
determined with 92% confidence (p value of .08) and had an odds ratio of 6.26. Tier three
supervision’s failure to address a known problem subcategory was also found to have a moderate
association with the decision error subcategory from tier one unsafe acts. That determination was
made with 84% confidence (p value of .16) and had an odds ratio of 3.95. The tier three
supervision subcategory failure to address a known problem also had a moderate association
with the environmental factors subcategory from tier two preconditions for unsafe acts. That
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finding had an 84% confidence level (p value of 0.16) and an odds ratio of 2.8. Lastly, the tier
three supervision subcategory failure to address a known problem had a moderate association
with the personnel factors subcategory from tier two preconditions for unsafe acts. That finding
had a 93% confidence level (p value of .07) and an odds ratio of .37.
Human contributing factor subcategories from all four tiers of the HFACS were analyzed
with respect to radiation therapy error types to determine if there were predictive associations.
Chi-square testing with an analysis of adjusted residuals was utilized to make this determination.
It was found that skill-based errors from tier one unsafe acts were associated with treatment
planning errors. It was also determined that decision-based errors from tier one unsafe acts were
associated with quality assurance errors, perceptual errors from tier one unsafe acts were
associated with image guidance errors, and physical or technological environmental factors from
tier two preconditions for unsafe acts were associated with both equipment errors and image
guidance errors. Lastly, failures to address known problems from tier three supervision were
associated with both image guidance and quality assurance errors.
Each of the significant associations between a human contributing factor and a
radiotherapy error type were further explored with graphs. These graphs showed frequency
distributions of the HFACS subcategories across all error types and is referenced for further
discussion in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Introduction to the Chapter
The problem being addressed by this dissertation study is that radiation therapy puts
patients at risk, and the incident learning systems designed to inform safety improvements have
yet to be optimized through a human factors framework. Incident learning, a system through
which mistakes and nearly missed incidents are used as learning opportunities, has been utilized
both within and external to radiation therapy. In high reliability industries, such as aviation,
incident learning work has incorporated a focus on human contributing factors to error. That
human factors framework has not yet been applied to analyze national or international
radiotherapy incident learning databases. The purpose of the dissertation was to apply the
human factors framework with the IAEA’s SAFRON system by uncovering predictive patterns
of human factors contributing to radiation therapy safety events.
The research question addressed was as follows: How are human factors associated with
each other and with error types in radiation therapy? In order to answer this question, a validated
schema for the classification of human factors, the HFACS, was slightly modified for use with
radiation therapy incident learning reports. The system contained 19 human factors describing
potential contributions to error. They were organized as subcategories under a total of four tiers.
Tier one, unsafe acts, included the subcategories that had the closest involvement with the
erroneous acts themselves while tier four organizational influences included the subcategories
that had the most remote or indirect contributions to error. Each of the 141 reports included in
the SAFRON database sample was assessed. For each report, as many of the 19 contributing
factor subcategories were mapped to that report on a data tracking spreadsheet. Additionally,
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each report was assigned an error category; 14 radiation therapy error types were utilized for this
study, and the single most relevant error type was mapped to each report.
In order to better understand the relationship between human contributing factors
(represented by subcategories under the four tiers of the HFACS), a test for proportional
reduction of error was performed. This test was used determined whether there were predictive
associations between higher and lower subcategories of the HFACS. A Goodman and Kruskal’s
lambda test statistic was used to show significant associations. When a human contributing factor
exists and has a known association with a lower tier factor, purposeful and proactive steps can be
taken to protect against error. It was hypothesized that these relationships could be uncovered
through analysis of the SAFRON report data, which was indeed the case. A detailed discussion
of the analysis follows later in this chapter.
Testing for significant associations between human contributing factors and specific
radiation therapy error types was also performed. This test, too, showed predictive patterns that
can be helpful in making strategic safety improvements. It was hypothesized that there would be
an association between a tier three supervision subcategory and errors relating to quality
assurance testing, which was found to be the case for the subcategory failure to address a known
problem. There was an additional predictive association between quality assurance errors and
the tier one unsafe acts subcategory called decision type errors, which had not been included in
the hypothesis.
It was hypothesized that environmental factors under tier two preconditions for unsafe
acts would show a predictive association with image guidance errors and that was found to be the
case. It was additionally determined that image guidance errors were related to perception errors
(which within the HFACS fall under tier one unsafe acts) and were related to failures to address
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known problems (under tier three supervision). Lastly, it was hypothesized that there would be a
predictive association between personnel factors from tier two preconditions for unsafe acts and
documentation errors. While this hypothesis made sense in theory, it was not found to be the
case in these data sample. An analysis of these and findings will be presented in this chapter.
Discussion and Interpretation of Results
Quality Distribution of Reports
Unlike a qualitative study involving interactive interviews, this quantitative dissertation
study utilized data extracted from deidentified incident reports. The reports contained a finite
amount of information and the level of detail offered was variable across the sample. In order to
ensure that the data utilized in this study contained an acceptable amount of relevant information,
inclusion criteria were specified that ultimately reduced the total SAFRON report count from
over 1,600 to 141. The included reports were of at least moderate clinical severity, contained a
free text description of the event, and contained information about factors believed to have
contributed to the event taking place.
A quality rubric was utilized to categorize each of the reports as containing either low,
medium, or high quality information. Given the inclusion criteria applied, however, even the
lower quality reports contained descriptive information about the event and about contributing
factors. The amount of and/or quality of information presented by reports labeled lower quality
was lacking in that important factors could possibly have been excluded. It was important for
this study that the investigator not add her own bias to the human factor classification process;
human contributing factors to reported errors were only assigned if they were specified in the
reports, even for reports labeled lower quality.
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Figure 3 showed that 18% of reports were found to be of lower quality while 82% were
of either medium or high quality. Information submitted through the included SAFRON sample
was, therefore, largely inclusive of rich and detailed information. It is also important to note that
while the data included an international sample of experiences and human contributions to
radiation therapy error, incident learning databases only reflect a very small percentage of actual
safety events. Incident learning, therefore, serves more to direct meaningful and effective safety
improvement strategies rather than to identify universal truths. That value was felt to be realized
through the course of this study.
The data presented in Figure 4 went further to show that the lower quality report
information was similar to the medium and high quality reports in terms of error report
distribution. The data sample with all three levels of quality was compared with the sample with
only medium- and high-quality reports included. The relative report volume distribution among
14 error types was notably similar. Had it not been the case, results would have had a greater bias
due to report quality. If, for example, reports about quality assurance errors had mostly lower
quality reports while other error types had mostly medium- or high-quality reports, conclusions
about quality assurance errors would be more apt to lack reliability and accuracy, which was not
the case, however. The comparison in Figure 4 has given credibility to the findings of this study.
Human Contributing Factor Assignments
Factors thought to contribute to reported errors were described by those who submitted
reports to the IAEA through SAFRON. Not all were human factors, but all events had at least
one contributing factor that was able to be appropriately mapped to a subcategory on the
HFACS. It is important to note that these factors were interpreted as contributors to the reported
safety events as opposed to causes. The report submission form has a prompt that says “describe
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the causes of the incident,” which offers a menu of discrete options. In order to more accurately
represent the true meaning of causation, these selections have been interpreted as contributing
factors. Other contributing factors were described in a free text section of the report submission.
Each of the four tiers of the HFACS represent a different commonality and the
progression of factors from tier one to tier four represents an increase in remoteness relative to
the unsafe act. Tier four organizational influence subcategories were, therefore, the most remote
or indirectly related to the errors. Tier one unsafe act subcategories were the least remote or the
most directly related. Each of the subcategories within a tier were related to one another (as they
were described by the tier heading) but were also unique and distinguishable from one another.
Those distinctions were used for clear and systematic assignments.
Several of the discrete SAFRON contributing factor options closely aligned with specific
subcategories on the HFACS. The assignment of those subcategories was, therefore, able to be
mapped systematically. The detail of those assignments was described in Chapter 4. Other
contributing factors offered in the SAFRON reports, both discrete and in free text format, were
assigned using clear definitions of the HFACS subcategories. These subcategory definitions
were presented in Chapter 4. It was important for the integrity of this study that the assignments
of human contributing factors were clear and systematic such that they could be repeated by a
different investigator.
Even with the variable level of detail offered in the reports, most reports had between two
and four human contributing factors mentioned. The higher quality reports tended to have more
robust descriptions and to offer as many as 11 different factors. The majority of human
contributing factors were assigned to three tiers namely tier one unsafe acts (34%), tier two
preconditions for unsafe acts (29%), and in tier three supervision (33%). Tier four organizational
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influences represented only 4% of the contributing factors submitted. This investigator believes
that the underrepresentation of organizational influences reflects not that organizational culture
and policies do not impact safety events but rather that radiation therapy workers do not
routinely consider their relevance. In fact, the Goodman and Kruskal’s test for association found
that organizational climate (under tier four organizational influences) had a weak association
with physical or technological environmental factors (under tier two preconditions for unsafe
acts) with a p value of .08. The odds ratio showed that physical or technological factors were 8.6
times as likely to occur with the presence of organizational climate factors contributing to error
than they were without. The test also showed a moderately strong association between
organizational climate and inadequate supervision (under tier three supervision) with a p value of
.007. Both of those results were excluded from presentation in Chapter 4 due to having only
seven events with contributing factors regarding organizational climate. These results do
indicate that tier four organizational influences may very well be relevant to safety events in
radiation therapy, which is still unknown and could be a worthy focal area for safety
improvement.
With the understanding that human contributing factors to the 141 SAFRON events were
concentrated in tiers one through three, it is important to evaluate further at the distribution of
subcategories assigned. As was likely true for the lack of reported tier four organizational
influence factors, it is possible that the underrepresentation of a subcategory represents a lack of
consideration by the submitter rather than a lack of relevance. However, when a diverse
international group of submitters share the same or similar trends in data, there is likely a valid
reason. In the case of lacking tier four data, this investigator speculated the reason was that this
catagory is the most remote category relative to the unsafe act and is, therefore, the most likely to
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be overlooked for risk contribution. The other three tiers of the HFACS are closer to the unsafe
act and share relatively similar contributions to the 564 contributing factors mentioned (and
assigned); contributions in each of the first three tiers fell within a 5% spread of one another. It
is, therefore, presumed that volume trends within subcategories of the first three tiers of the
HFACS represent reasonably accurate distributions.
Within tier one unsafe acts it is noteworthy that of 194 contributing factors, there were
only three exceptional violations. As compared with errors, violations are defined by a willful
neglect for the rules. Exceptional violations were those that were atypical and were not
condoned by leaders. It is expected that these violations would be few and far between, yet there
were still three reported in the sample. It is important to acknowledge that with all safety events,
there are far more instances that actually take place than are reported into incident learning
systems. Exceptional violations, therefore, exist and can cause great harm to patients. In all
three circumstances reported in this sample, a complex technical issue (such as a radiation output
calculation) was handled incorrectly and had significant clinical ramifications on a patient
population. When discovered, the issues were buried rather than being corrected. Eventually,
following additional and avoidable patient harm, the issues were shown more publically and
were ultimately corrected. Without enough volume for statistically significant findings, it can be
reasonably well understood from these submissions that disastrous problems likely come with a
perceived threat (by those involved) to the safety and security of those who made the errors.
From Maslow’s hierarchy, there is understanding that people require safety and security to
satisfy their most basic human needs. When those needs come under extreme threat, there is an
enhanced risk that personal protections will be prioritized over more typical goals around patient
safety. For safety strategists, it is important to recognize the human factors at play in these
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scenarios and to promote safety cultures that reduce the security threat to workers. By protecting
the basic needs of providers and staff, the likelihood of transparent communication about errors
is enhanced. If known errors from the three reported exceptional violations had been
transparently communicated when discovered, lives could have been saved and negative clinical
outcomes could have been avoided.
Within tier two preconditions for unsafe acts, there were 162 human contributing factors
assigned. Of those, approximately 40% were due to issues with the physical or technological
environment, half were due to personnel factors (communication, coordination, planning, or
fitness for duty), and about 10% were due to conditions of the operator. Environmental issues
were mostly having to do with the human computer interface and other issues involving
technology and automation. This area is an one that was affected by the large two-decade
timespan through which reports had been submitted; technological advancement has had a
significant impact on both safety provisions and safety challenges over the decades of data
included in this study. There were no reported factors involving clutter, ergonomics, or lighting.
If these issues did increase the risk of safety events, they were not recognized by report
submitters. Communication breakdowns in comparison were widely recognized as contributing
to error. In fact, over the 564 contributing factors assigned in total, 15% fell under this
subcategory (it was the second most popular contributing factor). Current technology has the
opportunity for an increased use of electronic medical records and for the more systematic use of
enhanced communication tools. Using these tools to further improve personnel factors could
reduce the risk of safety events and improve patient care.
One hundred and eighty-seven human contributing factors were assigned to subcategories
under tier three supervision. Half of those were inadequate supervision, which was the most
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highly assigned subcategory in the HFACS. It includes failures with staff training, guidance, and
keeping up with best practice standards. Insufficient equipment and having inadequate standards
were both mentioned frequently in the reports. This category is a broad one as it incorporates an
expected adherence to best practice standards. In that sense, this category had a lower threshold
in that risks contributing to suboptimal care were recognized here (as compared to risks of
catastrophic and life threatening failures).
Incident learning and the more broad commitment to safe and effective radiation therapy
address a number of important safety goals; these goals include an avoidance of catastrophic
error as well as an avoidance of miscommunications and other more minor safety blunders that
chip away at the potential for optimal outcomes. In some instances, a single contributing factor
can lead to an egregious patient error, and in other instances, a contributing factor can lead to
something with more minor impact. The ultimate fate of a more minor latent error is determined
by the environment and which other latent errors have also taken place. It is important,
therefore, to evaluate each of these human contributing factors as potential contributors to all
kinds of error and to recognize the importance of each of them. Inadequate supervision is
important not just because it could contribute to a life threatening error but also because it is the
human factor that may contribute most prominently to a broad array of patient safety events in
radiation therapy.
Another important subcategory under tier three supervision is the failure to address a
known problem. In this data sample, there were 34 instances reported, whereby deficiencies and
failures were known and were purposefully ignored. It is reasonable to assume that people who
work hard to gain the education and skills needed to work in radiation therapy do not intend to
cause patient harm. In fact, they likely work hard to protect against it. When this number of
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instances of failure to address known problems are reported (and again understanding that this is
only a percentage of the issues that actually exist in the field), there is something that warrants
further attention. There were two general trends recognized regarding issues reported under this
subcategory, and both were affected by the investigator’s preception of time pressure. First,
there were a number of reported instances in which a hazard was recognized but due to a
complex set of confounding issues (such as problems with image interpretation), that hazard was
given less attention than was required. Erroneous decisions were then made. The second trend,
which was even more prevalent in the data set, involved historic problems that were relatively
minor in nature. If, when these issues arose, it were plausible to deny the existence of the
recurrent nature, the issue was ignored in order to bring a task or treatment to completion. Again,
there was a time-pressure component to these circumstances. The findings indicate that a
reduction in time pressure, either through more efficient workflows or by some other means, may
reduce these failures to address known problems.
Radiation Therapy Error Type Assignments
Assigning a single error type to each reported event had a requirement for a clear
definition of which error types were intended to describe. Reported events are typically complex
and include a number of errors made by a number of different people. There was variability in
the level of specificity provided, and there is typically no single mistake that by itself results in
an unsafe act. Instead there are a larger number of latent errors and unsafe conditions that
increase risk to the point that an event takes place and is reported. The error types assigned to
each event reflected the best overall label (of the 14 options provided) that described the reported
event. If the reported event had a series of cascading errors, the event type was used to describe
the first one.
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There are several radiation oncology publications that include a similar menu of event
types, and those were reviewed and considered for this study. The investigator’s experience with
optimizing event type options for alignment with reported events (in clinical settings and for a
national database) was utilized to improve upon existing options. That work was done prior to
reading through the study sample. After completing the review of all study data and making the
assignments, the list of event types was found to be appropriate. All event types were assigned
at least once, and the distribution among 141 events was reasonable.
Figure 9 shows the prevalence rate distribution of both error types and human factors
(subcategories from the HFACS) that were assigned to reports. There were 564 human
contributing factors assigned and 141 event types. For each error type, the graph shows the
percentages of total error types assigned as well as the percentage of all human contributing
factors assigned. The most commonly reported event type was treatment planning followed by
quality assurance (QA) type errors. Larger numbers of an event type, such as treatment planning
events, which had more opportunity for human factor assignments; if the same number of human
factor contributors had been assigned to each case, the relative prevalence displayed in Figure 9
would be the same for each error type, which was not the case, however. Treatment planning
events occupied the largest percentage of error type assignments (23.4%) and had nearly the
same percentage of the human contributing factors (22.9%). Quality assurance events, however,
had a relatively larger proportion of human factor assignments; 15.6% of all errors were of the
quality assurance type as well as 22% of all contributing factors assigned. With that
understanding, it will be important to look at quality assurance type events as having a larger
opportunity for safety improvement. None of the other error categories had the same
disproportionality either with excessive or lacking numbers of contributing factors assigned.
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Associations between Tiered Subcategories from the HFACS
In order to uncover predictive associations between human contributing factors and
radiation therapy errors, it was important to understand the relationships between the human
contributing factors themselves. When significant, proportional reductions in error (as expressed
by a lambda value) demonstrated an increased ability to predict the involvement of a lower tiered
HFACS subcategory from a higher tiered one. For example, a significant lambda value of 0.10
between a tier three supervision subcategory and a tier four organizational influence subcategory
indicates a 10% improvement in the ability to predict a supervision problem from an issue with
organizational influence. Prior publications of similar work have used a threshold of 5% when
reporting useful proportional reductions in error (Li et al., 2006). The same requirement was
utilized in the presentation of calculated lambda values in Chapter 4. In addition to these lambda
values, odds ratios were calculated for all relationships in which the lambda value was greater
than 0.05 and the p value was below .20. The p value limit of .20, indicating an 80% confidence
level, was utilized because moderately strong lambda values were uncovered with p values
greater than .05 and up to .16. This study of 141 incident reports was important for uncovering
associations and opportunities for further study; a much larger study would likely result in
findings with lower p values. The confidence levels of 84% to 93% were considered strong
enough for this study to show relevant associations worth consideration for safety improvement.
Inadequate Supervision and Decision Errors. The first relationship presented was
between the tier three supervision inadequate supervision subcategory and the tier one unsafe
acts decision error subcategory. This relationship was a moderately strong relationship with a
lambda value of 0.25, which means there is a 25% increase in the ability to accurately predict
decision errors when information about inadequate supervision is known. There was a 92%
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confidence in this finding, and the odds ratio was 6.26; it is 6.26 times as likely to make a
decision error when inadequate supervision is involved as opposed to when it is not.
Decision errors are those that are made when information, knowledge, or experience is
lacking. They are errors that involved thought as opposed to carelessness or insufficient
attention. The opportunity to decrease the risk for these errors, therefore, lies in strengthening
the knowledge and skills that workers have. Inadequate supervision is a contributing factor that
involves failures of leadership with respect to training, guidance, and keeping up with best
practice standards. It is sensible that these two issues go hand in hand; if department leadership
is not offering training and implementing standards that keep up with best practice standards,
their employees will fall short of having the knowledge and skills to perform at that optimal
level. It is logical that these two human contributing factor subcategories are associated, and
there is credibility with the report data that they do in fact have a significant association.
While the link between these two subcategories seems less than revolutionary, it is an
important distinction to highlight and to show a statistically significant association between
them. If reported errors can be categorized as being decision type errors, risk mitigation
strategies can then be developed around training, education, and the establishment of best
practice standards. Without making such a distinction, these very specific kinds of errors can be
easily lumped into a more generalized category of blunders that is not strategically addressed.
Further, when errors are not recognized as being linked to other latent risks, the shame and blame
culture tends to creep in and safety issues go unaddressed and unreported.
Failure to Address a Known Problem and Decision Errors. A second association
involving decision type errors was also found, which was with the tier three supervision
subcategory of failure to address a known problem. Those supervisory failures result when
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equipment failures or deficiencies in staff knowledge, training, or awareness are known to
leaders but are ignored. This association was also a moderate association and was found with a p
value of .16 or with 84% confidence. The odds ratio was 3.95, so it was roughly four times more
likely for a decision-based error to take place when there was also a known and ignored issue at
the supervisory level.
From a data analysis perspective, it made sense that these two subcategories were related
although with a lower odds ratio than was with inadequate supervision. Some of these
supervision failures involved known deficiencies with staff knowledge and training. The
association between these issues and decision-based errors would follow the same logic as was
discussed above for inadequate supervision errors. This category also involved issues of known
and ignored equipment failures, however, and these issues would be less apt to be associated
with a decision error. The lesson to be learned from this association is that when decision errors
are found to be an issue, human contributing factors at the supervisory level should be evaluated.
Inadequate training and staff knowledge may be problematic and if that is the case, leadership
awareness should also be explored. Conversations with supervisors may show barriers to safety
improvements, such as insufficient time, resources, or a safety culture problem.
Failure to Address a Known Problem and Environmental Factors. A third
association that was uncovered when testing for proportional reductions in error between tiered
subcategories from the HFACS was between the same tier three supervision factor of failure to
address known problems and the tier two preconditions for unsafe acts subcategory of
environmental factors. This environmental factors subcategory includes issues with the physical
or technological environment. In this study sample, it applied mostly to reported issues with
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equipment, automation, networking, and the human-computer interface. There were very few
references to ergonomics, lighting, or clutter.
Over the past several decades, there have been dramatic advancements in the use of
software to improve the safety, accuracy, and precision of radiation therapy. The use of
redundant safety interlocks on linear accelerators to improve the reliability of radiation delivery,
the use of computerized real-time imaging to more accurately align radiation targets, and the use
of electronic record and verify systems to improve the reliability of treatment plan execution are
just three of those more impacting advancements. While these changes had significant gains in
safety and treatment accuracy, they reduced the amount of critical thinking and manual
participation that is routinely involved in patient care. Radiation oncology staff likely became
more reliant on the optimal design and function of computer systems and human-computer
interactions became a new source of safety risk.
Accessing an incorrect patient in the electronic medical record system, misunderstanding
how to properly use a treatment planning system, inadequate testing of a new system, and the
misinterpretation of imaging information used for patient alignment are just a few examples of
equipment and human-computer interface issues that fell in the environmental factor
subcategory. These kinds of issues are not always easy to resolve by supervisors in a radiation
oncology department. The computer systems that drive radiation oncology are purchased from
external vendors and have limited flexibility in their use. They are also extremely costly. If
issues with these systems are known to be problematic, supervisors may feel ill-equipped to do
much about them, which could be one reason that a failure to address known problems is
associated with the environmental factors subcategory from the HFACS. Another reason could
be that these equipment challenges happen so regularly that they are considered standard; when
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human-computer interface challenges occur systematically and frequently, leaders may become
complacent and fail to seek safer alternatives. Lastly, it should also be noted that the complex
nature of these systems may lead to suboptimal commissioning and and customization. That
could further exacerbate the problem.
Failure to Address a Known Problem and Personnel Factors. The final significant
association between higher and lower tier subcategories from the HFACS was between the tier
three supervision subcategory failure to address a known problem and the tier two preconditions
for unsafe acts subcategory describing personnel factors. The tier two subcategory includes
breakdowns in communication between individuals and between different health care
departments. It also includes issues around patient care needs not being adequately anticipated
and planned for. As was the case with the human-computer interface and equipment issues
described above, planning and communication issues are also very common. In fact, most safety
events that are reported have some relevant communication breakdown that contributed to error.
It was for that reason that communication errors were not listed as a separate radiation therapy
error type for this study. There was a moderate association between the two subcategories, and
the p value was .07. The odds ratio for this association was .37, showing that when supervisors
fail to address known problems, communication, coordination, planning, and fitness for duty are
less likely to be reported as a contributing factor. The result may reflect a natural relationship; if
a safety risk is known and transparently ignored, staff are less likely to value communication and
planning breakdowns as relevant contributing factors. In this scenario, the finding seems more
indicative of how radiation therapy staff perceive and report about contributing factors; it is not
likely that failures to address known problems has an actual protective relationship regarding
communication break downs.
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Predictive Associations between Radiotherapy Errors and Human Factors
Associations between human contributing factors to safety events are helpful in
understanding risk environments. Understanding associations between these contributing factors
and specific error types within radiation therapy can also have an important role in mitigating
risk and improving patient safety. Fourteen different error types were used to categorize
reported radiation therapy events. A single error type was assigned to each and represented the
best overall label to describe the nature of the event. There were 141 error types assigned in total.
As described earlier, each event also had a number of human contributing factors assigned to it.
Those assignments were made if and only if they were mentioned as contributing factors by the
submitter of the SAFRON report. There were 564 human contributing factors assigned. After
all assignments were made, the distribution of error types and contributing factors were
evaluated to discover predictive patterns.
Each of the 19 human contributing factor subcategories from the HFACS was tested
against all 14 error types to determine whether or not there was a statistically significant
relationship between any of the variables. The p values less than .05 were considered significant.
When a significant relationship was discovered, adjusted residuals were calculated to determine
which specific error type had that significant relationship. The null hypothesis was that there
were equal numbers of error type and contributing factor combinations (for all error types). An
adjusted residual greater than 1.96 indicated that the null hypothesis could be rejected in favor of
the alternative with 95% confidence (p value of .05). Human contributing factor and error type
combinations with adjusted residuals greater than 1.96 had a significantly greater number of
instances than other combinations. In total, there were seven associations between radiotherapy
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error types and human contributing factors that were found to be statistically significant. Each
are discussed below.
Skill-Based Errors and Treatment Planning. Skill-based errors are unique in that they
are errors made while performing familiar tasks that are routinely done without a great deal of
thought. These are errors that often take place when focus and concentration are somehow
compromised. Treatment planning in radiation therapy is used to determine how a prescribed
radiation dose is to be delivered for a specific patient. It typically involves a computed
tomography (CT) image set and a sophisticated planning system that contains detailed
information about the radiation source and how that radiation will interact with the patient’s
anatomy. A specially trained group of individuals will often spend several days designing the
geometry, technique, and customized plan that will optimally target the patient’s tumor while
sparing their healthy organs and tissues to the greatest extent possible. In this way, the cancer
has the greatest likelihood of being destroyed while the patient is spared harmful radiation side
effects. Treatment planning involves the appropriate set up and use of multiple computer
systems and calculation protocols. There are industry standards for independent and redundant
checks so that errors can be caught and rectified. Still, treatment planning is highly complex and
mistakes often slip by even the most robust safety management systems. Errors involved with
any step of the treatment planning process were considered treatment planning errors in this
study.
Treatment planners, dosimetrists, and physicists spend their time at a computer and work
largely independently. They usually work on multiple patients at a time, and most will run
hundreds of treatment plans per year. While all patients are unique, the process of treatment
planning, calculation, software utilization, and data transfer are somewhat routine. For that
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reason, it was not surprising that an association between treatment planning and skill-based
errors was uncovered. Treatment planning was the error type that had the highest volume among
all reports, and this association was the only statistically significant association that it had with
an error type. Similarly, skill-based errors only showed a statistically significant association
with treatment planning errors. The relationship was found with a chi-square value of .013 and
the adjusted residual was 2.1. With that adjusted residual greater than 1.96 it was understood that
the number of cases in which involving both skill-based errors (human contributing factors) and
treatment planning errors was significantly larger than would be expected if there were no
association. The confidence behind that determination was 95% (significance level of .05) and
the relationship can be seen graphically in Figure 11.
Over the years, radiation therapy treatment plans have become increasingly more
complex. Radiation delivery machines and linear accelerators became capable of reliably
delivering radiation with more customization, with steeper dose gradients, and with increased
modulation. With better precision and with improved accuracy, radiation oncologists were able
to increase doses to tumors while decreasing doses to healthy organs and tissues. These
advances were revolutionary in the field of radiation oncology. In order to make use of the
advancing capability of linear accelerators, radiologist oncologists used treatment planning
systems to be able to design plans that made use of that which became possible in terms of
treatment. Planning algorithms were advanced as were treatment techniques themselves. Part of
the nature of these advancements was an increase in planning automation; the treatment planning
process still required planners to have an awareness of anatomy and the dose tolerances of
individual organs, but the manual design component of treatment planning was partially replaced
by a computer-driven process. Manual calculations were largely replaced by computers as well.
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These changes were great steps forward for patient safety in that they reduced errors that often
came with the more manual processes. It seems logical, however, that the reduced need for
critical thinking and increased need to guide a computer program through a more automated
process caused skill-based errors to increase. The nature of these errors should be considered
when safety improvement strategies are being considered for treatment planning.
Digging deeper into the narratives of events that shared this error type and human
contributing factor was used for a better understanding of the specific kinds of mistakes that
were more prominent. One area that seems to be especially at risk for these kinds of errors is
dose fractionation. Radiation therapy prescriptions specify a dose per fraction, a total number of
fractions, and a total dose. There is variability in those prescriptions between patients and to
some extent between different medical practices. There were several instances reported in which
an incorrect dose was used for calculation. Verbal communication and manual data entry were
two risks that contributed to these errors.
A second commonality with these errors concerned manual processes in general: manual
calculations have been performed incorrectly, data have been entered incorrectly, and specific
steps in the treatment planning process have been performed incorrectly. In many of these
instances, more robust automated checks could have been utilized to catch the mistakes. For
example, one incident involved the unintentional assignment of different isocenters for different
radiation beams within the same plan. As it is not a standard practice, it is something that a
treatment planning system could flag as an error. Enhanced automated checks of more standard
or expected information could help in other areas as well. The needs of typical treatment
planning, such as non-standard treatment distances, were reported and could easily be flagged for
confirmation by a computerized system.
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A third major issue found in this area was the human computer interface. The enhanced
safety that computers and automation have is well documented, yet the potential to optimize that
safety enhancement is limited in part by the human computer interface. Computer systems must
be developed and then improved upon to eliminate safety barriers that are found to be
problematic. The SAFRON events reported in these categories had information about these
barriers. In multiple instances, different layouts or the ordering of discrete data fields being
different in different views (either within the same computer system or in two different software
programs) has led to incorrect data entry. It would seemingly be more problematic when one
view is predominantly utilized; a data entry error in a different view is more likely when
someone is trained to expect the layout of data to be different than it is. Second, dose and
fraction information have been entered incorrectly for a multitude of reasons. An improved
human computer interface could eliminate the need for redundant data entry and could flag likely
errors if an expected data range was referenced.
Lastly, there seems to be a consistent pattern of failure with independent redundancy
checks. It is a standard practice in radiation oncology for dose calculations to have a second
independent check and multiple other checks throughout the course of a patient’s treatment.
This work is done through computer systems and by additional dosimetrists and physicists. On
many occasions, these redundancy checks failed to catch even the more apparent errors reported,
which could be due to a lack of attention, fatigue, rushed or overloaded schedules, or a multitude
of other reasons. These may be the least likely issues to resolve completely, yet communication,
awareness, and responsiveness to identified stressors could lead to safety improvements.
Improvement made at the human-computer interface could also serve to improve efficiency and
reduce time pressures.
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Decision-Based Errors and Quality Assurance. Decision-based errors are dissimilar to
skill-based errors in that they involve a purposeful erroneous decision as opposed to a mindless
error made while distracted. When thoughtful decisions are made erroneously, there is a
knowledge or awareness that is lacking, which can stem from inadequate experience, training, or
from a number of other reasons. Safety improvement strategies to reduce the risk of decision
errors are, therefore, markedly different than those meant to address skill-based errors. The chisquare testing done through this study showed a statistically significant association between
decision-based errors and QA-type errors. The chi-square value was less than 0.001, meaning
that the finding was made with at least 99.9% confidence. The adjusted residual was 5.5, which
shows that decision-based errors of the QA-error type are higher in volume by over three
standard deviations as compared with decision-type errors across all other error types. Figure 12
shows this distribution of decision errors, and it can be seen that the volume of QA errors is
much higher than comparative volumes with other error types. Treatment planning errors show
the second highest volume of decision errors, but they had the highest reported volume of error
types overall and the strength of association with decision errors was not as strong.
QA work is that which is done to ensure the safety and accuracy of patient care. In
radiation oncology, the term is typically used to describe the work done by physicists to make
sure that radiation producing machines, treatment planning systems, imaging systems, and many
other peripheral hardware and software systems work accurately and reliably. Organizations,
such as the American Association of Physicists in Medicine publish protocols and best practice
standards that have been incorporated into the expectations of accreditation and certification
bodies. This kind of work is unique for two main reasons. First, this work is performed by a
relatively small group of individuals as compared with nurses, doctors, therapists, and other
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members of a radiation oncology department. In fact, many departments have only one single
physicist. Even when a department has multiple physicists, quality assurance work is often done
by one person working alone outside of standard treatment hours, which is a necessity because
work done on a linear accelerator or other treatment machines must be performed when there are
no patients occupying the equipment. The second distinguishing characteristic of QA work is
that it is highly complex and technically specialized. That fact further isolates this work from
that which is routinely reviewed by many people.
A review of the SAFRON reports containing QA-type decision errors was performed and
showed multiple commonalities. As knowledge was lacking in each of these cases, education and
training may have helped to prevent the mistake from occurring. It is noteworthy that education
and training have historically been less effective than other safety improvement strategies, such
as automated safeguards (American Society for Radiation Oncology, 2019b). An increasingly
automated process for quality assurance, including calibrations, would likely be highly effective
here as well. Still, the knowledge and skill of trained physicists is important for safety and
ongoing learning and routine knowledge assessments may help mitigate against the deficiencies
uncovered with this association.
Incorrect treatment machine calibrations and treatment planning system commissionings
were the most common mistakes falling into this category. Unlike other more stand-alone kinds
of errors, these errors affect larger groups of patients; when a planning system or treatment
machine has incorrect information and is used to plan and treat a patient population, the entire
population is affected until the error is caught and corrected. The next most frequent issue
reported with this error type and human contributing factor was the inappropriate use of
equipment. The use of a large ionization chamber to measure a small radiation field, for
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example, will result in the collection of bad data and can have catastrophic effects on patient
treatments. These errors would not be apparent to the user unless he or she had the proper
training, knowledge, and experience. Also, as mentioned, radiation therapy physicists often
work alone or in very small groups. This environment lacks an abundance of opportunity for
erroneous practices to be noticed and corrected by those who may be more knowledgeable.
The issue of isolation around QA work has been addressed in many reports. Physicists
were often working alone and were unchecked by others. It is not uncommon for this situation to
be the case, and there are guidance documents drafted especially for solo physicists so that they
can address riskier parts of their job through periodic external reviews and other forms of
redundancy checks (Halvorsen et al., 2003). In some cases, physicians and other staff may step
in to try to cross check a physicist, yet without proper training, this situation has led to
overlooked errors or additional errors. Again, an appropriate knowledge base is critical in this
area.
Department standards and leadership protocols were often lacking in the reported
SAFRON events. In one case, two different and conflicting data tables were being used by staff
within the same department. In another situation, there were conflicting data sets measured by a
consultant physicist (brought in to do a one-time commissioning on a new piece of equipment)
and the on-site physicist. The risk for such interdepartmental conflicts necessitates proper
oversight, which could be accomplished through one designated person responsible for cross
checks of work done by multiple people. In most situations when that oversight was lacking, the
errors were not caught until an external review or independent check of some sort ultimately was
done. In some cases, it took years. These findings show the importance of external audits.
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While it is easy enough to state that independent checks are necessary, they often require
time and expense, which can be challenging as the human contributing factors described in these
narratives often convey a sense of extreme pressure. The pressure could come from senior
leadership, from the staff members themselves, or from any aspect of the clinical work
environment. That which is more consistently expressed and understood is that the commitment
to start and treat patients with high safety and quality standards is stressful for workers; time
pressures are not uncommon. One reported example of the pressure was at a site where a new
treatment machine had been commissioned with independent testing done by an external body.
Unfortunately, clinical treatments began before test results were returned, and the errors that
were uncovered had already affected several patients. Independent verification typically takes
some time as the testing material often needs to be mailed to an off-site location for analysis, and
those results can take several weeks. Another example was when a physician noticed a clinical
outcome difference between his patients at two different oncology centers within the same
organization. Instead of pausing treatment, informing others, and looking into the error, he
adjusted his prescriptions at one center and allowed the root cause of the problem to continue to
affect other physicians’ patients.
The intense pressure felt by radiation oncology workers to continue treating without
calling attention to their failures was also exemplified through reports of staff who went to
extreme measures to mask error. In one case, a physicist falsified records so that an independent
reviewer would not uncover his mistake. In other cases, patients were treated on machines that
had their safety interlocks overridden. By overriding the interlocks, staff prevented any
treatment interruption that would have been required to resolve the machine malfunction. In
hindsight, these actions are understood to be reckless and dangerous to patients, but in the
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moment workers likely felt that the risk taken through their actions was minimal in comparison
with alternatively stressful treatment delays. These priorities are likely not uncommon given the
learned experience of risky behavior with positive outcomes and the rarity of reported treatment
errors. Education and a positive safety culture are necessary to ensure that safer decisions are
made.
While these issues may have been addressed within the individual clinics they were
discovered in, it is critical to safety that these situations also be looked at in aggregate. Striking
commonalities can then be worked into strategic safety planning. It is important to understand
that typical time pressures and workload stresses are exacerbated when new equipment needs to
be commissioned or whenever the workload is higher than normal. Quality assurance work is
often complex so risk mitigation requires time efficient workflows and both the equipment and
education required to support them. As education and training cannot be expected to prevent all
errors, it is even more important that redundancy and independent verification be an integral part
of any quality assurance program. This independent verification must take place prior to the
clinical use of new equipment and prior to any change from existing systems. The time and
expense requirements required for independent verification are high, yet the cost of serious
treatment errors affecting large populations of patients is much higher.
Perceptual Errors and Image Guidance. Perceptual errors are a human contributing
factor on tier one unsafe acts from the HFACS. These errors result when any perceptive ability
(through any of the five senses) is compromised and missing information is subconsciously filled
in. Expectation bias often has a role in these kinds of errors.
One radiotherapy error type with more prominent perceptual errors was image guidance.
Image guidance is a process through which two- and three-dimensional imaging systems are
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utilized to align a patient properly for radiation therapy treatment. The central point in space
thorough which therapeutic radiation is to be directed is called an isocenter and each patient’s
planned isocenter must be aligned to the treatment machine with precision. A high level of
accuracy and precision around patient alignment is used for planned radiation fields to be
minimal in size, which in turn minimizes radiation exposure to healthy organs and tissues.
Image guidance is a critical component of radiation therapy.
In order to perform image guidance on a linear accelerator, a set of reference images is
used to define optimal alignment; the goal of image guidance is to align the patients for treatment
the same way that they were aligned on the reference set of images. Reference images are
typically obtained through a CT scan. Images used for treatment alignment are taken on a linear
accelerator and are compared with the reference set of images as part of that image guidance
workflow. Computer systems are utilized to match the two sets of images together and to
determine the positioning adjustments required. These adjustments fine tune the patients’
alignment so that they are positioned and aligned according to the treatment plan. Patients are
positioned on a motorized treatment couch that is utilized to drive the patient into that proper
position based on the adjustments calculated from the image guidance system. While this image
guidance process is mostly automated, it still requires oversight and some manual operation from
the patient care team. If an image and referenced anatomical location are perceived incorrectly, a
patient could receive treatment to the wrong area.
The association between perceptual errors and image guidance errors was found with a
confidence level of 97% (p value = .03) and an adjusted residual of 2.0; the contribution of
image guidance errors to perceptual errors in radiation therapy is two standard deviations above
other error categories, which can be seen graphically in Figure 13. There was actually a higher
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rate of prevalence with treatment planning errors although the statistical association was not as
strong. The baseline number of reported treatment planning errors was far greater than that for
image guidance but did not have as strong of an association. As image guidance has become a
largely automated process, the use of critical thought and manual analysis has become less
intensive. This change may have lead to a reduced level of skill and may, therefore, have
increased the risk for these perception type errors.
One kind of image guidance error that was reported multiple times was a misaligned
spinal treatment in which the perceived alignment to one targeted vertebral body was actually
aligned to a different vertebral body. Without solid landmarks to anchor a spine image, it can be
difficult to differentiate between certain vertebral bodies. This ambiguity increases the risk for
an error. Prior to being imaged, radiation patients undergoing image guidance are roughly
aligned with external skin markings. Then their treatment images are taken. With an expectation
that the patient will be aligned to the correct vertebral body, a focus on intravertebral alignment
as opposed to intervertebral alignment can lead to perception images. Expectation bias can
similarly affect other kinds of radiation therapy errors when a more typical scenario is presumed
but is not the reality. Examples of this expectation bias include assumptions that a patient has
not received previous courses of radiation therapy and expectations that treatment prescriptions
are for a single fraction of radiation daily (as opposed to one every other day or two per day,
which are sometimes prescribed).
Other perception errors in radiation therapy are at increased risk when multiple software
systems are brought together in a mixed vendor treatment environment. While there are work
groups and efforts underway to specifically protect against the safety risks that can result from
these multi-vendor environments, the risks are still present. In one reported case, two involved
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software systems utilized different coordinate systems. A patient’s entire course of therapy was
delivered to an incorrect area because coordinates from the wrong system were used. This case
involved a perception error because the clinical team took images of the patient’s position daily
and analyzed them. While aware of where the patient was planned to be treated, multiple people
assumed that the positioning shown on the daily images was correct as it was aligned to the
coordinates within the system. These multi-vendor environments must be recognized for their
increased risk to safety, and care must be taken to adequately mitigate against them.
One last commonality found with image guidance and perception errors was the presence
of an atypical high-pressure situation. It is not uncommon in radiation therapy for time pressures
to be felt, but it is noteworthy that in several of these events, the patient was reported to be in
extreme pain. The tables used for patient treatments must be hard due to the need for precise and
reproducible positioning. When patients have bone metastasis or other painful conditions, they
may be in serious pain as they attempt to lie still for their radiation treatment. Being keenly
aware of this situation and sympathetic to patients, radiation therapists can feel pressured to
quickly analyze images, make the required adjustments, and complete the treatment. These tense
situations would amplify the risk for perception-type errors.
More so than in other areas of radiation therapy, image guidance workflows have been
shown to be particularly susceptible to perception-type errors. In order to strategically mitigate
these issues, those involved can be made aware of the increased risk so that they can pace
themselves and make sure they are doing their best to avoid such errors. More importantly,
software vendors can take these issues into account when designing safer systems. Automated
recognition of vertebral body alignment, for example, could be a growth area for image guidance
that would greatly improve these kinds of errors.
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Environmental Contributing Factors and Equipment Errors. An association was
found linking the tier two preconditions for unsafe acts environmental factors subcategory to
equipment related errors. The environmental errors subcategory on the HFACS includes human
contributing factors dealing with either the physical or technical environment. Physical
environment issues would include ergonomic issues, poor visibility, inefficient space layouts,
and other such problems. Those issues were very rarely mentioned in the SAFRON reports. The
focus of more typical environmental factors from the reports was on equipment problems,
networking, and issues with the human-computer interface. The equipment error type includes
issues with radiation therapy hardware, software, connectivity, and networking. Radiation
therapy has the requirement for the use of radiation treatment devices, treatment planning
systems, a multitude of imaging systems, quality assurance equipment, and other highly
specialized pieces of equipment. This equipment is manufactured and supported by a variety of
vendors and often has a requirement for interconnectivity. Due to the sensitive nature of
radiation therapy and the need for high levels of accuracy and precision, equipment errors must
be handled safely, timely, and effectively.
The environmental factors subcategory on the HFACS showed a significant association
with equipment errors. The p value from the association was .02, and the adjusted residual was
2.4. Figure 14 shows the prevalence rates of environmental contributing factors for all error
types. The largest volume of environmental contributing factors was submitted for treatment
planning errors, yet as explained earlier, the large number of reported treatment planning events
does not necessarily translate to a significant association. In this case, the association between
environmental contributing factors and equipment errors was more than two standard deviations
stronger than the association with other error types.
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Information in the SAFRON reports showed that the presence of environmental factors
often having to do with the human computer interface was a good indicator that equipmentrelated errors would also be present. It should be noted that reported equipment errors almost
always included some measure of patient harm or nearly missed patient harm. It is understood
and expected that all equipment will malfunction or be mismanaged at one point or another, but
in a safe environment, those hurdles can typically be managed safely. The SAFRON reports in
this category were largely those that were not handled safely and ultimately increased the safety
risk to patients.
Several reports that have barred this association have described major errors with the
radiation-producing devices used to treat radiotherapy patients, mainly linear accelerators.
Recent decades have brought about major advancements in the area of linear accelerator safety.
Reported events from the earlier years of the study sample include issues in which severe injury
took place, and lives were lost due to machine malfunctions that simply do not exist today.
While technical advances afford protections that we now benefit from, the human contributions
to error are still quite relevant and offer opportunity for growth. One factor described in several
of these reports was that despite ongoing machine malfunctions, patient treatments continued.
Reasons for this factor were not offered, but in the field of radiation oncology, there is a fairly
consistent pressure to continuously provide daily radiation therapy treatments to those needing
care. There is a time sensitivity to the radiation treatment of cancer, and equipment downtime
can threaten the continuity of care. The financial component of treatment would hopefully not
be as much of a driver, yet in some environments, the financial component, too, could have a
factor. Additionally, patients who have cancer and the families who care for those patients are
often eager for treatments to proceed as planned. Coping with a life-threatening illness can be
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challenging, and receiving treatment on schedule is often strongly desired. When equipment
malfunctions occur, therefore, there can be a fair amount of pressure to resolve them quickly and
to proceed with treatments as scheduled. With the knowledge of serious harm can and has come
to patients when health care providers give in to this pressure prematurely, and they can move to
ensure that safety goals dominate in these situations.
With other associations between contributing factors to error and the error types
themselves, the contributing factors typically preceded and increased risk for the error. In this
case, the equipment malfunctions have amplified environmental risk and led to errors, such as
those at the human-computer interface (a form of environmental precondition for unsafe acts
from the HFACS). For example, in cases in which equipment malfunctions were known, staff
moved quickly to implement a work around. A work around was the case in multiple situations
in which linear accelerator engineers implemented non-standard “resolutions” with system
overrides for operational errors. These situations resulted in patient harm as there were no
independent checks or verifications (as would be standard physics protocol today). In a more
recent example, a multi-leaf collimator system, a motorized radiation beam shaping device,
stopped functioning correctly. The complexity and network connectivity involved with this
system made it difficult for the clinic staff to understand whether steps taken to resolve the
problem actually worked. They had not, and patients were harmed. Pressure to resume treatment
quickly may have had a role, and once again had a role. This investigator believes that external
pressures increase the likelihood that workers misinterpret their equipment failures and then fail
at the human-computer interface to rectify those problems. The association uncovered by this
investigator showed that complexities at the human-computer interface challenge people’s
abilities to effectively mitigate the environmental safety risks at hand.

155
Environmental Contributing Factors and Image Guidance. The HFACS subcategory
of environmental factors from the tier two preconditions for unsafe acts was not only
significantly associated with equipment errors but also with image guidance errors. Both the
environmental contributing factor and the image guidance error type were described previously.
Chi-square results had a p value of .02. With these results and an adjusted residual of 2.4, it can
be understood that environmental factors can predictably contribute to errors having to do with
image guidance. Again, the rate of prevalence for environmental contributing factors among all
error types can be seen in Figure 14.
One issue that was discussed previously and was reported with this association was that
of treating the wrong vertebral body. Given the displays and functionality of the computer
systems involved, challenges of identifying the correct vertebral body were noted. From a
human-computer interface perspective, it was noted that the length of the spine and inclusion of
identifiable landmarks were both lacking. Improved contrast, resolution, and scan length
(potentially through scan protocols) would have improved patient safety in these cases. It was
also noted that systems were not equipped with tolerance tables to flag atypical couch positions
when aligning patients on the treatment machines.
Another issue with software systems and image guidance errors occured from the fact
that different vendors utilize different coordinate systems. Even when data transfers were set up
correctly to allow for this situation, the situation was confusing to staff. On more than one
instance, manual corrections were made when those corrections were felt to be necessary. They
were not necessary, however, and resulted in incorrect patient alignment.
One last error that was reported multiple times in this area involved not only the
environmental human-computer interaction and incorrect image guidance, but a reluctance for
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radiation therapy staff members to believe that which they were seeing. When patient
positioning looked incorrect on images or had changed significantly from day to day (which is
not planned or expected), staff were too quick to accept the discrepancies. The reason was
because patients who are in pain or who cannot lie still for other reasons will have an
unavoidable amount of interfraction motion (meaning it is understood that they will set up
slightly differently day by day). When a patient had actually been set up to the wrong site,
however, therapists misinterpreted that which they were seeing as that acceptable interfraction
variability. In multiple reported cases, that discrepancy was actually more significant. This
issue resulted from a combination of expectation bias and a failure of the human-computer
interface to make the error more clear. Challenged human-computer interactions and other
environmental preconditions can lead to error, which is statistically more likely in the area of
image guidance. Safety improvements for image guidance hardware and software would be a
strategically effective area to align resources.
Failure to Address a Known Problem and Image Guidance. The human contributing
factor of failure to address a known problem falls within the HFACS’ tier three supervision. As
discussed earlier, this failure includes deficiencies, either with equipment or staff knowledge
being known and ignored. A significant association was found linking these contributing factors
to image guidance errors. The chi-square result for these findings had a p value of .01 and an
adjusted residual of 2.8. Figure 15 shows the relative prevalence of supervisory failures to
address known problems among all error types. Notably, the prevalence of this contributing
factor is greater with quality assurance errors than with image guidance errors. Still, based on
the number of each error type submitted, the observed number of associated contributing factors
and error types for this association exceeded that expected by over two standard deviations.
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There was also an association with quality assurance errors that are discussed in the next section
of this chapter.
Many of the issues that have been previously discussed in this chapter were relevant to
this association as well. For example, there were reported issues of falsely identifying a
vertebral body and then treating it, and issues of incorrect localization coordinates in an imaging
system. It took reading through descriptions and narratives in these cases to understand why
there would be a link between image guidance errors and failures to address problems once they
were known. In several cases, it took multiple days and multiple treatments for errors to be
addressed. If one were to presume that there was no actual ill intent of the involved staff, it
would be reasonable to conclude that it took that amount of time for staff to think and rethink
situations that did not seem right and to gain confidence in their need to address it. Internal
communications about the issues may have transpired and improved the level of clarity around
these situations, which may potentially have increased the pressure for transparency. Without
access to report submitters to ask follow up questions, this study fell short of offering a deeper
level of certainty for that which drives the hesitation to confront and address these known issues.
The information reported, however, is a pattern of taking several days to rise to that point of
confrontation.
With the issue of incorrect anatomy being treated, especially the repeated false
identification of vertebral bodies, the concept of failure to address known issues is less than
clear. In some of these cases, staff members suspected that the identification was aligned to the
wrong vertebral body, but with other team members more confident that they were aligned
correctly, there was a failure to speak up and express concern. With this issue, there is also a
problem of failure to recognize repeated issues with the same image guidance problem. If
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individual cases are corrected but action is never taken to reduce risk within the workflows and
computer systems, it could also be reported as a failure to address a known problem. This issue
may be improved through retraining or through the establishment of protocols to include specific
landmarks in spine images. It could be, however, that current image guidance systems are not
suitable to support safe workflows for these specific issues. Safety initiatives and substantial
effort by radiation oncology supervisors and staff may just not be enough. The ultimate
approach to safety will likely have multiple prongs and awareness is a critical step towards
improvement.
Failure to Address a Known Problem and Quality Assurance. This next association
that was discovered, a link between QA-type errors and supervisory failures in addressing known
problems, is understandable given the kinds of errors described in the prior sections. The
association found through a chi-square test had a p value of .01 and an adjusted residual of 2.6.
Figure 15 shows a graphical representation of this contributing factor as it relates to all error
types. As previously mentioned, the number of cases in which there were both failures to
address known problems and quality assurance error types was the most prominent for this
contributing factor. There were statistically more associated cases observed than would be
expected by more than two standard deviations.
Events involved in this grouping overlapped to some extent with the decision error
association. Errors were more critical in nature (more severe in terms of patient harm), affecting
large groups of patients. Most reported errors in the study sample affected only a single or small
group of patients, so this distinguishing feature is an example of quality assurance type events.
The increased severity and broader impact is then linked to the gravity and pressure that is felt by
staff. The larger and more catastrophic the event, the more desperate some staff members might
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be to cover it up, which ties back to Maslow’s theory of human need. Protection of one’s job
safety is critical as is the need to protect one’s reputation. In one report, a physicist reported to
his/her department’s physician that a 21% error was discovered in the treatment planning system,
which would have affected many if not all patients treated in the clinic. Instead of accepting the
gravity of the meaning and implementing a correction for moving forward, a decision was made
to ignore the error completely and to continue to treat without change. Assuming there was no
malicious intent, the pressure and ramifications that would be incurred by showing and working
through the error were felt to be worse than ignoring the error completely. That mistake was
eventually discovered by an external source and was reported.
Supervisors may ignore known safety issues for a multitude of reasons, but it was not
surprising that ignoring quality assurance issues would stand out as being uniquely associated. It
was for that reason that this particular association was hypothesized. The technical complexity
and reduced number of people aware of QA errors make this kind of mistake easier to hide. The
gravity of consequence that can be associated with these kinds of errors likely also has a role in
why they are sometimes ignored; the stakes are higher when confronting mistakes that have
affected multiple patients. Lastly these issues may occur and be ignored due to people being
overworked, rushed, or even just lacking the drive to see things through. Awareness of problems
that would take a great deal of time and effort to resolve (such as intercomparisons of equipment
or investigations of suspected issues) may be tempting to put off or disregard completely.
As with other kinds of improvement efforts, these situations call for strong leadership and
clear protocols. Quality assurance programs should be designed with the specificity to address
these issues. When problems do arise and have the requirement for resources and capital to
address, they should be discussed in this frame of reference with those who have the ability to
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make a decision and execute it. Safe patient care is a universal goal in radiation oncology, and
quality assurance work has some unique aspects that put that goal at risk. With appropriate
foresight and recognition of these weaknesses, safety cultures, and quality assurance programs
can be designed to minimize that risk.
Literature Review
Going back to the literature that laid the foundation for this dissertation study and the
relatively recent use of the HFACS in medicine, the usefulness and applicability of the HFACS
for radiation oncology incident learning is now better understood. Use of this classification
system for a more qualitative or mixed methods study involving interviews would have taken
even greater advantage with that which the system has to offer. The upside to this study,
however, was the large number of reported events and perspectives that were incorporated.
Participation from radiation oncology staff around the world was used for a true study of human
factors, which has a commonality that all cultures share. Diller pointed out that a main benefit of
the HFACS is that it strategically directs attention to why incidents and reported events take
place as compared with who and that which was involved with any particular case. Diller also
pointed out that missing information could unknowingly bias results and both of those points
were relevant to this study (Diller et al., 2014).
The usefulness and relevance of the HFACS as compared with previously published
studies is interesting, given the different industries that have made use of this schema. Lui et al.
(2013) noted the prevalence of tier four organizational influences as compared with lower tier
factors, such as tier two preconditions for unsafe acts regarding helicopter accidents. The
opposite was true of the dissertation study; report submitters rarely mentioned the involvement
of organizational influences. The helicopter studies may have involved follow-up and personal
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interviews, which could have intentionally addressed the presence or absence of organizational
influences, whereas the dissertation study did not. It should be understood that the absence of
tier four organizational influences in the results of the dissertation study may be more due to a
lack of focus or awareness of this potential contributing factor. A study of rail accidents was
more in line with the dissertation study in that tier four contributing factors were missing. Tier
three supervision factors were also missing while they were frequently reported in the radiation
therapy incident learning reports (Madigan et al., 2016).
Other health care studies that used the HFACS to evaluate human contributing factors to
safety events focused more on the feasibility of the system rather than the findings themselves.
One rare exception was the study of emergency room safety events, and El Bardissi et at. (2007)
concluded that all four tiers of human contributing factors were involved. In terms of feasibility
for the dissertation study, the HFACS was found to be well suited. Involved limitations and
delimitations are noted later in this chapter, but after a small modification, all four tiers and all
subcategories were utilized over the 141 events (to varying degrees). Shappell and Wiegmann
(1996) found that only 80% of safety events involved human factors in an aviation study
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 1996). It is plausible, however, that in that aviation case, human
contributing factors were indeed involved and were not considered. There is some subjectivity
to this analysis and subsequent conclusion. It is also noteworthy that the classic HFACS was
modified slightly for better alignment with radiation therapy incident reporting.
Prior to analyzing relationships between human contributing factors and radiotherapy
error types, an analysis of the HFACS tiers was done to determine whether or not there were
relationships between subcategories at the different tier levels. Other researchers had performed
similar tests with their own study data. Li and Harris (2006) found associations between the
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different tiers the researchers used this information to confirm Reason’s belief that latent errors
at all four tiers ultimately increase the risk for safety events. Similar associations were found
with the dissertation study. It can be understood that in radiation oncology there are associations
between human contributing factors at different levels of remoteness to the unsafe act.
Specifically, tier three supervision contributing factors were found to be associated with (a) tier
one unsafe acts decision type errors, (b) tier two preconditions for unsafe acts environmental
conditions, and (c) tier two preconditions for unsafe acts events involving personnel factors.
Similar associations with tier three supervision were also found in an aviation study of military
flight safety (Hooper & O’Hare, 2013). As this dissertation study included a finite number of
events with limited information contained in each report, these findings should be considered a
handful of significant relationships among that which is likely a larger set of others. An equally
important takeaway, as Reason pointed out, is that different kinds of contributing factors
contribute to the increased risk of a safety event; contributing factors remain dormant as latent
errors until gaps or holes in safety barriers align in such a way that safety events occur.
Another important finding from the dissertation study was that there was an increased
number of studies in the literature, which demonstrates the importance of human factors
engineering to safety. The dangers associated with suboptimal human-computer interfaces were
noted in several prior publications (Castro, 2014; Palojoki et al., 2017). In the dissertation study,
links between tier two preconditions for unsafe acts environmental factors and both equipment
and image guidance errors showed issues with the human-computer interface. Almost all of the
environmental contributing factors mentioned in the SAFRON report sample involved issues
with human computer interaction. The dangerous side of technological advancement and its
association with error was noted in 2010 along with an acknowledgement that this issue can be
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improved when human factors are considered during software design (Chan et al., 2010). This
issue has also captured the attention of ASTRO and the AAPM; both organizations have noted
the need for improvement in this area and the need for improved interoperability between
software vendors (Hendee & Herman, 2011).
As the dissertation study and other studies advance awareness and understanding of
safety risks and the importance of human factors engineering, it is helpful to re-evaluate the
safety risk and error philosophies proposed by Reason and Dekker. As mentioned above, Reason
proposed a theory that is well-explained by the Swiss cheese model of risk. Latent errors or
safety risks are like the holes in Swiss cheese. When the layers or errors are aligned in such a
way that the holes align, errors make it all the way through to cause safety events before being
caught (Reason, 1990b). If one thinks of the four tiers of the HFACS as different layers of safety
mitigations and the holes in these safety barriers as latent errors, one can be well served by
understanding the relationships between them. The uncovered associations between tier three
supervision risk factors and both tier one unsafe acts and tier two preconditions for unsafe acts,
presents the opportunity to design more robust safety barriers that are less likely to have their
vulnerabilities align.
Sidney Dekker posited that James Reason’s error theory was overly simplified. He felt
that assuming a more linear or causal relationship between contributing factors and safety events
underestimated the complexities that human interaction imposes on these relationships. Dekker
theorized that every human interaction results in an “explosion of new relationships” that must
be accounted for in order for error threats to be neutralized. Human-computer interactions further
complicate these issues by reducing error and increasing complexity (Dekker, 2010). Findings
from this dissertation study specific to the human-computer interface have shed some light on
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specific areas within radiation oncology that offer opportunity for safety improvement.
Examples include the opportunity to decrease perception errors and to improve human-computer
interactions with image guidance. The misidentification of vertebral bodies is one example of an
error that has been repeatedly reported in this area. Treatment planning errors are another focal
area that would be well served by improved software design. The skill-based errors that occur
without thought and purposeful decision may be able to be countered by targeted interface
enhancements. While there is a noteable focus on improving this area and evidence of progress,
the continued reporting of safety events shows that there is still a lot of work that needs to be
done.
Implications
Implications for Practice
The findings from the dissertation study are characterized by the nature of and
associations between human contributing factors and error in radiation oncology. Given a
validated human factors classification system and its applicabitly to every SAFRON report
included in the sample, it is fair to say that human contributing factors have a very real role in
radiotherapy safety issues. There were some significant associations between factors at different
tiers of remoteness to the unsafe act that were shown through this work. The tier three
supervision subcategory failure to address known problems was involved in multiple
associations.
Supervisory factors with failures to address known problems had a significant association
with personnel factors under tier two preconditions for unsafe acts. Personnel factors can be
broad, and communication alone is a factor that is commonly involved in clinical workflows. It
is not surprising, therefore, that it is an issue that often remains unaddressed, despite leadership’s
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awareness of its problematic nature. One aspect of this association that may be better suited for
strategic advancement involves communication and coordination of care between medical
disciplines. Many radiation oncology patients are also patients of medical oncology, and almost
all of them require coordinated care with other specialty practices. The use of electronic medical
records has improved the ability to coordinate multidisciplinary care, but as widespread adoption
of electronic charting is fairly recent, it will likely take several more years for that system to
improve these kinds of reported issues.
Failure to address known problems was also associated with decision errors. The
involved staff is required to knowingly and purposefully make a mistake based on lacking skills
or knowledge with decision errors, which is very different than skill-based errors that occur
when people are simply not paying attention or are rushed. The association shows a need for
improved knowledge and awareness in some key areas. If expanding knowledge and improving
skills are not specifically targeted for improvement and other avenues, such as policy changes or
punitive action are taken instead, the errors will not subside. Safety improvements made through
automation while effective would also not improve decision-type errors. These improvements
could be reasons why decision errors are perceived as being ignored.
The prominence of decision-type errors begs the question of whether maintenance of
certification and ongoing education programs adequately ensure that radiation oncology staff
acquire knowledge with regard to current issues and do not regress with regard to knowledge
gained through initial training and education. Advancements have been made in recent years
requiring self-assessment components of continuing education, which may ultimately lead to
more effective learning although will still likely require further tweaks. Participation in incident
learning is another way for systematic knowledge deficits to be uncovered and addressed.
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Currently, however, participation in RO-ILS and/or SAFRON is not required, and its use is
variable within the field. Another potential reason for decision-type errors is that the field of
radiation oncology has become increasingly more automated. Automation has contributed to
significant advancements in safety, yet it also has the potential to erode skills that would
otherwise be exercised on a regular basis. These trends beg the question of whether additional
effort is needed in order to sharpen the clinical and critical thinking skills that were required of
radiation oncology staff prior to the technical automation advancements.
One specific error type for which failures to address known problems and decision errors
were linked was quality assurance. Quality assurance involves a wide array of activities
performed by radiation therapists, dosimetrists, physicists, nurses, and physicians but most all of
the quality assurance errors reported were with physics testing. Physics quality assurance testing
may be particularly susceptible to decision errors due to the issues noted above regarding
continuing education, awareness of systematic errors throughout the industry, and increased
automation. Additionally, physicists often work in small groups or solo environments that would
challenge the transparency around these safety issues. Even when there are other physicists in an
oncology group, work is often done alone after hours when patients are not scheduled to be in the
clinic. For example, if a physicist were to be using an erroneously large ionization chamber for
small field measurements, it would be harder to catch than an error that was made with other
staff present. The relatively small number of physicists in a department is also problematic
because they have such a unique skill set. If a clinical oversight error were to be made by a
radiation therapist, it is plausible that a nurse or physician or another clinical team member may
catch it. If a physicist makes a calibration calculation error, however, there may be few or no
staff within the department who are capable of discovering that error, which is likely a key
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reason why failures to address known issues are associated with decision errors and with this
error type.
In order to address the issues above, it is incumbent upon department leaders to ensure
that robust education and continued learning are incorporated into job descriptions. Recent
advancements in maintenance of certification programming offered by the American Board of
Radiology may help. Specific areas that are requiring growth and education could be highlighted
through participation in a national or international incident learning program. Intradepartmental
incident learning could be helpful as well. Improvement in automation may help address some
specific areas, such as using automated independent check systems. A strategic focus on areas
with higher numbers of reported errors (such as treatment planning, quality assurance, and image
guidance) would be impactful. It is also important to ensure that networking for physicists
working alone or with very few associates is included in cultures of safety, which could be done
through national and local chapters of radiation oncology organizations, through audits, or
through other professional networks.
A third association that was found with failures to address known problems was with
environmental contributing factors, mostly involving the human-computer interface. Any failure
to address a known problem could occur from pressure to continue treating patients, rushed
timeframes and workflows, or a perceived inability to affect change. The dissertation study
showed more specific findings in this area that have implications for safety improvement efforts.
The field of radiation therapy is reliant on sophisticated technology, including radiationproducing linear accelerators, treatment planning systems, and electronic medical records.
Change and advancement within this technological space has been noteworthy and fast paced
throughout the last decade. Adaptation and an evolution of the human-computer interface is
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required for these changes. As Sidney Dekker pointed out, human contributing factors to error
have a high level of complexity to safety and risk environments. When software and
technological advancements are factored into this already complex environment, it is no wonder
that it is hard to harness and gain control of safety risk and mitigation strategies. A failure to
address known problems may occur from lacking time or focus, but they may also be reported
due to a true failure of ability to address these issues with effective change.
A radiotherapy-specific error type that was associated with failures to address known
problems was that of image guidance. As described earlier, image guidance procedures are used
for patients to be aligned with accuracy and precision based on a comparison of real-time
treatment images and baseline planning images. Image alignment software is complex, so
consistent accurate use has a requirement for human intervention; radiation therapists,
physicians, and physicists must be able to accurately assess patient alignment from both sets of
images and confirm that any automated alignment functions are being performed accurately.
There are several barriers in place that challenge that proficiency. One such reported issue
concerned the correct identification of vertebral bodies. Inadequate image lengths, a lacking
inclusion of anatomical landmarks, and poor image quality are three potential problems that
challenge this image guidance process. This image guidance errors and a multitude of other
image guidance errors are vulnerable to perception issues, and the human-computer interface
involved with these systems has yet to be optimized. Software could be improved to offer
enhanced protections in some key areas. Many of these advancements are already underway.
The value of this finding is in highlighting the need for software companies to stay on top of the
more systematic issues occurring in this space. Once effective software improvements are in
place it is still incumbent on oncology centers to purchase and implement the new technology.
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With an overwhelming amount of new and improved radiotherapy technology available, it takes
time and resources to weed through the most impacting technology. For that reason, an annual
task group working to link systematic issues like those mentioned here with validated and
effective solutions may help to advance safety in this area. Not every center has the bandwidth
to make these kinds of assessments, so publications or tools for making those determinations
may go far to marry safety needs with the most cost effective purchases and the greatest safety
improvement potential.
One last finding from the dissertation study that has implications for radiation oncology
was the significant association between treatment planning and skill-based errors. The nature of
errors involved with treatment planning was not based on lacking knowledge or skills but rather
based on failure to execute routine procedures accurately. It is interesting in that the safety
barrier could be mitigated with either automated solutions or solutions that improve the routine
use of critical thought and mindfulness. Both are important and a balance is truly needed.
Treatment-planning errors had the highest volume of reports among the 14 different error types.
They most frequently involve dosimetrists, physicists, and physicians. Many of the errors
reported in these categories could be addressed through advances in treatment planning software,
through independent verification software, or through other communication tools that enhance
mindfulness. Improving rushed workflows and staffing levels may also help advance safety in
this area although those problems were not significantly associated with the problem as reported
in this data set.
Implications for Further Research
This investigator uncovered several associations between human contributing factors to
error and reported safety issues in radiation oncology. Further research in this area could
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strengthen the backing for these findings and could also add to their specificity. A larger study
of more reported events could aid in that effort as could an in depth qualitative or mixed methods
study that may better allow for information in key areas to be obtained from participants.
The first area warranting further research is that of treatment-planning and skill-based
errors. There was an association here highlighting the fact that errors made during the treatment
planning process are not due to purposeful erroneous decisions but rather to careless errors made
without thought while performing routine duties. There are multiple treatment planning systems
available in the field of radiation therapy and some are more prominently used than others.
Further research into which specific kinds of skill-based errors occur with treatment planning
based on the experience of end users with different systems would be impactful. The results of
such a study could be shared with software vendors so that the best and most validated safety
mechanisms could be implemented more broadly, and the most detrimental aspects of these
systems could be omitted.
A second area warranting further research is that of the human-computer interface.
Through the dissertation study, associations were found between supervisory failures to address
known errors and both image guidance errors and environmental preconditions for unsafe acts.
Image guidance errors were also found to be associated with the environmental preconditions for
unsafe acts. There is an opportunity here, especially in the area of image guidance, for software
interfaces to be improved. In the radiation oncology field, certain issues, such as vertebral
bodies being misidentified, are reported repeatedly and have not successfully been addressed
with automated safety improvements. This opportunity is one of several for the human-computer
interface to be improved to reduce safety risks. Other opportunities exist with electronic medical
records. Reported events are not always the most useful data to use for this kind of work

171
because of the small minority of errors and near misses that are routinely reported. A survey or
series of interviews (for example those that could be carried out at a national meeting) might
serve to uncover more information that could allow for targeted improvements. Vendor-specific
efforts are helpful, but findings should be shared among the radiation oncology community so
that safety benefits can be optimized by all regardless of equipment portfolio.
A third distinct area that warrants further research is that of deficient knowledge and
skills leading to decision-based errors in radiation oncology. Associations were found between
decision-based errors and both supervisory failures to address known problems and inadequate
supervision. More specifically, errors made with quality assurance processes were associated
with both decision-type errors and with failures to address known problems. Increased
automation and a decreased need for critical thinking may have contributed to these decisiontype errors. Ineffective continuing education could also have played a role. The newly
overhauled maintenance of certification program (from the American Board of Radiology) that
are required of board certified radiation oncologists and physicists may reduce the risk of these
kinds of errors. A survey done now and several years into the new program may be helpful in
assessing the value of this educational change. Quality assurance errors were focused mostly on
physics work during calibrations and with complex calculations. Future work to more explicitly
identify the nature of these issues may help with efforts to prevent them. Automated calculation
and verification programs along with collaborative information sharing may help to reduce the
risk of these kinds of errors. As it will be difficult to statistically demonstrate improvement
based on voluntarily reported errors, qualitative or mixed methods research may help point to
directionally accurate improvements.
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One last area recommended for further exploration is that regarding the effects of
organizational factors on radiotherapy error. There were significant associations found between
the organizational climate and physical or technological environmental factors. The number of
involved cases was too low to be reported as a significant finding but with an odds ratio of 8.6
that area seems worthy of additional research. Similarly, an association between organizational
climate and inadequate supervision was found and could be researched further.
Limitations and Delimitations
There were several limitations in the dissertation study that must be accounted for. The
anonymous nature of report data limited this study with regard to understanding the diversity of
contributing institutions. In other words, it was impossible to know if certain radiation therapy
departments contributed a disproportionate share of the data. The dissertation study was also
limited in its ability to understand the geographic spread of where these data came from. If a
certain kind of error was strongly associated with a particular part of the world, for example,
information about culture and communication could have biased the analysis. That depth of
understanding was not able to be ascertained with these data.
The nature of incident learning data is also such that the information provided was finite.
Some reports left the investigator with important questions, yet there was no resource available
to provide any additional information. For these reasons, each report was rated in terms of its
quality and that quality distribution was addressed in the analysis.
One delimitation of this study was the exclusion of incidents with minor or no specified
clinical severity. The majority of incidents in the full SAFRON database were of minor clinical
severity, yet it would have been beyond the scope of this study to carefully read through and
analyze well over 1,000 cases. If the time and manpower were available to include those events,
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the study may have uncovered additional or stronger findings. The study may also have been
able to differentiate between contributing factor patterns leading to minor and more serious
clinical harm.
A second study delimitation was that included incident reports were only those
containing discrete information about potential causes. In order to associate each event with the
radiotherapy and human contributing factor schema, some information about perceived causal
factors was needed. Most reports did contain at least one selection from the available drop-down
list, and for that reason, this data element was part of the inclusion criteria. Additional free text
information about contributing factors was included on approximately half of the reports. It
would be rare but possible for a report to contain a free text description of contributing factors
without a selection from the drop-down menu of options. Such events were not included in the
study. This delimitation was utilized in order to promote both consistency and quality within the
selected sample of reports.
Recommendations
Based on the findings from this dissertation study, there are several recommendations
that would likely improve the safety environment in radiation oncology. Education and
additional research (with increased specificity) should be done around the association between
treatment planning errors and skill-based errors. There are multiple kinds of professional staff
involved with treatment planning, namely radiation oncologists, physicists, and dosimetrists.
Each position has continuing education requirements, and that education should include an
opportunity to learn about the nature and detail of reported error. Radiation oncology software
vendors involved with treatment planning and related quality assurance should also be made
aware of these issues. Validated mechanisms for maintaining mindfulness while performing
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these computer-centered duties should be enhanced and utilized. More common mistakes, such
as manual data entry errors should be caught with enhanced automated checking systems.
Critical thinking skills should be developed and maintained through advancing and more
dominating automation.
Common issues with the human-computer interface should be recognized and addressed
by radiation oncology software vendors and by end users as well. Image-guidance errors are
associated with these kinds of errors, and as radiotherapy staff become more and more dependent
with automation, they may be less likely to catch these errors. While enhanced automation can
be used to eliminate common issues, such as the misidentification of vertebral bodies, radiation
therapy staff should be kept aware of these issues so that they can work towards being more
mindful in their image analysis. Repeated issues should be reported to vendors. The safety
culture in radiation therapy departments is key to advancement in these and any other safety
areas. A “shame and blame” culture works against the transparent communication that can
advance these topics and lead to safety enhancements.
Quality assurance issues in radiation oncology are related to purposeful erroneous
decision making and are often ignored. As physicists who perform many of these tests often
work alone, it is imperative that oversight and communication networks are incorported into safe
operations. As technology continues to advance at a rapid pace, the knowledge and skills needed
for safety change quickly as well. Continuing education programs are one path for growth but
fall short of ensuring safe knowledge and skill development in all areas. Networks with regular
communication should be strongly recommended or mandated. Certain key publications could
also be highlighted for mandatory reading and assessment. Self-assessment has become part of
the maintenance of accreditation process for board certified physicists radiation oncologists
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although there is variable quality and relevance in the offerings for these credits. Lastly,
participation in incident learning could be a mandatory part of maintenance of certification, and
it is currently not. Even if not submitting reports, learning about some of the more prominent
safety risks reported by others can be critical to similar error avoidance. The attention brought to
radiation therapy errors by the New York Times in 2010 launched a historic safety initiative in
this field, and the victims of those unfortunate stories had asked that safety improvements and
continued learning about reported errors be inspired by their fate.
Summary
Radiation therapy is an inherently complex medical field that specializes in the treatment
of cancer patients. While radiotherapy presents life-saving and life-extending care to so many, it
also brings the risk of errors that can lead to intense suffering and even death. For those reasons,
a continuous effort to optimize safety is warranted and has taken shape in many ways throughout
the decades. Lessons learned from errors and accidents inform safety improvement strategy in
many industries, health care being just one. Historically, analysis work done with radiotherapy
errors have neglected to take on a human factors perspective; while extensive work studying
human factor contributions to error has been done in other high reliability industries,
there has been little work done in this area for radiation therapy errors. The HFACS was utilized
in this study to classify 141 reported events. The classified data were then analyzed to uncover
associations between human contributing factors to error and between those factors and specific
radiotherapy error types.
Report data utilized in this study sample contained enough information about the event
itself and about the contributing factors involved to meet a baseline quality level. Eighty-two
percent of reports surpassed that baseline and had either medium- or high-quality information.
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The quality of information submitted was sufficient to provide the level of detail needed to carry
out this study. Each included report, 141 in total, was reviewed and was labeled with a single
radiotherapy-error type.
Each report was assigned as many human contributing factors as were mentioned in the
report. The factors assigned were subcategories from the HFACS, all falling under one of the
four tiers in that classification system. Ninety-six percent of 564 assignments fell within the first
three tiers of the HFACS: tier one unsafe acts, tier two preconditions for unsafe acts, or tier three
supervision. Tier four organizational influences were rarely reported by submitters, which may
be explained by a lack of consideration as opposed to a true lack of association. Organizational
influences are the most remote to unsafe acts within the four-tiered HFACS and are, therefore,
more likely to lack obvious relationships with the reported errors.
The HFACS subcategory that was reported most frequently was the tier three supervision
subcategory called inadequate supervision. That subcategory was clinical in nature (as opposed
to being operational in nature) and did not have any requirement for the issue to be known and
ignored. The more general nature of this subcategory may have contributed to its more frequent
reporting. Another tier three subcategory, failure to address known problems, was reported 34
times and was often reported alongside a real or perceived pressure to continue treating patients.
Clinical needs and other external pressures to keep treating sometimes prevents the interruption
needed to investigate problems. Within tier two preconditions for unsafe acts, the most
frequently reported subcategory was personnel factors. Communication was central to this
subcategory. New and evolving electronic medical records and an increase in multidisciplinary
care challenge safety in this area. Tier one unsafe acts had a strong prevalence of skill error,
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decision error, and perception error subcategories. Each is unique in nature and had unique
associations with higher tier HFACS subcategories and with radiotherapy event types.
Goodman and Kruskal’s lambda testing was performed to see if there were associations
between subcategories at different tiers of the HFACS. There were four associations uncovered
and presented in Chapter 4. Associations with organizational climate were too few in number to
be reported although the tests showed significant associations, indicating that further research in
this area would be warranted.
Tier three inadequate supervision was associated with decision errors from tier one. If
the supervision of structured learning is lacking, staff will eventually fall short of the knowledge
and skill required to make correct decisions. Failures to address known problems were also
associated with decision errors. These data showed that with these reported supervisory failures,
it is 14% to 25% more likely to expect decision-type errors, which underscores the need to
ensure that staff members have the resources needed to maintain an appropriate knowledge base
so that correct decisions can be made. The supervisory failure to address known problems was
also associated with tier two precondition for unsafe act’s subcategory of environmental factors.
These factors relate to either the physical or technological environment. Automation and the
human-computer interface were central to these reports and require further attention in the way
of safety mitigation. The same supervisory failure to address known problems was also related
to the tier two subcategory of personnel factors. It was noted that this category is often reported
to describe communication breakdowns between staff members. The odds ratio for this
relationship was less than one, showing that communication failures are not seen as being
contributing factors to issues that are known and ignored; supervisory failures to address known
problems obfuscate the concept that communication breakdowns are to blame for related errors.
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Radiotherapy-error types were assigned to each event to describe in a very general sense
the information that was being reported. Associations were uncovered between several human
contributing factor subcategories and these error types. Skill-based errors were associated with
treatment planning errors. These are errors that occur due to lack of thought or attentiveness
during routinely performed procedures. In order to address these issues, further work was
recommended to hone in on which specific errors are most common. The issues in this study
included erroneously documented doses and fractionation patterns, erroneous manual
calculations and data entry, issues with independent check systems, and misconceptions at the
human-computer interface. Improved automation may help with some of these error types
although it is contrasted by the fact that increasing automation contributes to mindlessness. In
order to prevent skill-based errors, it is necessary to enhance alertness and critical thinking.
Software developers in the treatment planning space can improve safety by balancing these
issues and making improvements that serve both needs.
Decision-type errors were found to be associated with quality assurance. The physics
work that is often involved is both complex and rapidly advancing, which leaves physicists
susceptible to lagging knowledge and skills. Physics work is also often done in environments
with one or very few people, which makes these errors harder to identify. Supervisory failures to
address known problems were also associated with quality assurance errors. For the same reason
of having one or a few people with the involved skill set, supervisors may feel unable to affect
change in this area, which could be one explanation of why issues are known and are not
addressed.
Perceptual errors were found to be associated with image guidance. When radiotherapy
staff members are tasked with reading images to assess the positioning of patient anatomy, they
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are subject to perception challenges. Reported errors show a lacking understanding of that which
the images actually show. Software enhancements are needed to reduce the risk of common
issues, such as the misidentification of vertebral bodies, which is one example of when there is
opportunity to improve safety at the human-computer interface.
Environmental contributing factors were found to be associated with equipment errors. In
some instances when radiation-producing machines malfunctioned, patients were severely hurt
or even killed. While the safety of linear accelerator operation has grown tremendously over the
decades, the human response to equipment failure is similar. Equipment failures leave people in
less familiar environments and often result in increased stress or time pressures. In these
environments challenges at the human-computer interface are exacerbated and the risk for a
safety event is increased. Findings in this area have highlighted the need for improved clarity and
situation management. Effective safety improvements should be made through a human factors
engineering perspective.
Environmental contributing factors were also associated with image-guidance errors,
which again revolved around perception issues and the human-computer interface. Larger image
detector areas that encompass relevant anatomical landmarks would improve the risk from these
errors, and some equipment on the market today has that advancement. It will take some time
before that improvement becomes widely available to patients. Improved automation, such as
the identification of specific vertebral bodies, could cut back on some of these reported issues.
These same image-guidance issues were also associated with supervisory failures to
address known problems. When resolutions to problems are presumed to require new equipment
and advanced technologies, they may be more likely to be ignored by supervisors. Additional
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training may help, but widespread inexpensive safety upgrades would help to reduce risk in this
area.
Through this study, the HFACS was confirmed to be an appropriate and useful tool for
analyzing human contributing factors to error in the radiotherapy space. As in other published
studies, there were relationships found between multi-tiered subcategories on the HFACS. When
information about higher-tier subcategories, such as supervisory failures to address known error
are known, there is a significantly higher chance of correctly predicting the involvement of lower
tier factors subcategories, such as tier one decision errors. James Reason’s finding is supported
by the understanding that latent errors accumulate to increase risk and when aligned the right
way, they can lead to harm. The importance of the human-computer interface was also noted in
the literature prior to this study. The previously published finding that equipment and image
guidance errors are associated with tier two preconditions for unsafe acts was confirmed in this
study as well. Continued improvements at the human-computer interface are critical to safety
improvements in radiation oncology.
Sidney Dekker’s publications about the complexity of human contributing factors were
relevant to this study. He recognized the need for safety improvement work to be done through a
human-factor lens. The study findings presented have detailed information about how human
contributing factors relate to one another and to specific radiotherapy-error types. These findings
have highlighted appropriate paths to think through effective safety improvement strategies.
Implications for practice and for further research have been described with the uncovered
associations. There were limitations to this research, including an inability to source the reported
data or to follow up and illicit additional information. Delimitations for this work existed as
well. Events with minor or no specified clinical severity were excluded as were events without
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sufficient information about contributing factors. Despite these issues, the study was successful
in showing significant associations between human factors contributing to error and between
those factors and radiotherapy-event types.
Recommendations for future work include further research with larger data samples.
There were significant organizational influence associations found with very small numbers of
cases that were considered inconclusive for this study. Treatment planning software
enhancements are needed to specifically address skill-type errors that are made without thought
while performing routine duties. Human-computer interface issues must be addressed to reduce
perception and other issues with image guidance and to improve safety in situations of
equipment failure. Quality assurance duties have been shown to be particularly risky in that they
are often performed by highly specialized professionals who tend to work alone or in small
groups. Improved education and training may aid with decision-type errors in this area.
Improved automation may also help with some of the reported issues. Lastly, networking and
oversight are needed to prevent quality assurance errors, which are sometimes overlooked and
sometimes known by supervisors but purposefully left unaddressed.
Concluding Remarks
Human contributing factors to error transcend time and geographic location. It is
necessary, therefore, to optimize safety and to reduce risk by learning why errors were made and
approaching safety mitigations strategically. The most frequently reported safety events in
radiation therapy are those involved with treatment planning. The predictable association
between treatment planning and skill-based errors underscores the need to consider the issue of
mindfulness. As the most effective safety improvements are also those involving increased
automation, these advances must be carefully balanced against the preservation of critical
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thought. The practice of quality assurance is also critical to the field of radiation therapy and
often involves physics work done after hours, either solo or in very small groups. Its association
with both decision-type errors and supervisory failures point to where future safety
improvements should be focused. Rapid technological and safety advancements challenge the
maintenance of best-practice knowledge and skills. Further, when mistakes are made, the real or
perceived ability to catch and correct those errors is atypically limited. Access to high-quality
continuing education is critical to safety improvement as is the need for transparent
communication with professional networks. Image-guidance failures are also prevalent with
predictive associations. Perception errors are frequently reported as being associated with a
suboptimal human-computer interface. Software improvements with a strong focus on human
factors engineering would be an effective here. Specific examples, including that of vertebral
body recognition, were given earlier in this chapter.
There is a lot of good work that can be addressed through software development and
automation enhancement, but some of the work must be done within clinical practices. Without
regard to time or geographic location, human factors persist and complicate safety environments.
These factors manifest in a multitude of interactions and safety challenges. They must ultimately
be incorporated into safety improvements. This investigator uncovered some predictive
associations that can help direct future work in that area. Radiation therapy staff members must
have appropriate work environments, resources, supervision, and safety cultures. Pressures,
anxieties, and staff priorities must be balanced against an awareness of safety risk; safety culture
priorities must be familiar and prominent in all clinical departments. Most importantly, there
must be commitment to continuous improvement, knowing that human nature and the
complexity that it brings will always leave opportunity for better safety.
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Appendix A
SAFRON Incident Report
IAEA Nucleus. https://rpop.iaea.org/SAFRON/IncidentReport/IncidentReportList.aspx
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Please choose your preferred dataset in the top right corner of this screen. Based on this selection, you can browse your own or all incident
reports.
All process step for:

What phase in the process is the incident
associated with?
Who discovered the incident?

How was the incident discovered?

Any word in the free text fields:

External beam radiotherapy

SELECT

(or brachytherapy)
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Clinical incident severity:

HELP TEXT

Did the incident reach the patient?
Yes

No

Was any part of the prescribed treatment
delivered incorrectly?
Was anyone affected by the incident?

Describe the causes of the incident (Select one
or several reasons):
Start Date of discovery (YYYY-MM-DD):

End Date of discovery (YYYY-MM-DD):

What safety barrier failed to identify the
incident?

SELECT INCIDENT CAUSES
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What safety barrier identified the incident?

What safety barrier might have identified the
incident?
Is risk assessment complete?
Yes

No

Yes

No

Equipment used:

Treatment method:

First day of treatment:
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Appendix B
Data Entry Options for Data Fields on SAFRON Incident Report
Phase in the process that the incident is associated with
1. Non-clinical phase
1.1. Equipment and software specific activities
1.1.1. New equipment
1.1.1.1. Installation
1.1.1.2. Acceptance tests
1.1.1.3. Customization and configuration of equipment
1.1.1.4. New equipment - Commissioning
1.1.1.5. Data recording
1.1.1.6. Preparation of data files for planning computers
1.1.1.7. Other

1.1.2. Routine machine QA
1.1.2.1. Daily consistency checks
1.1.2.2. Planned QA programme checks
1.1.2.3. Regular preventive maintenance and repair programme
1.1.2.4. Handover of radiotherapy equipment
1.1.2.5. Routine radiation safety checks
1.1.2.6. Other
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1.2. Other
1.2.1. Room design
1.2.1.1. Patient safety
1.2.1.2. Staff and public safety
1.2.1.3. Environmental controls
1.2.1.4. Access control
1.2.1.5. Other

1.2.2. Scientific infrastructure
1.2.2.1. Implementation of codes of practice for radiation dosimetry
1.2.2.2. Development of dosimetry algorithms for local application
1.2.2.3. Development of treatment planning algorithms for local application
1.2.2.4. Other

1.2.3. Booking process (pre-treatment and treatment)
1.2.3.1. Booking of appointment
1.2.3.2. Recording of booked appointment
1.2.3.3. Communication of appointment to patient
1.2.3.4. Other

1.2.4. Processes prior to first appointment
1.2.4.1. New patient registration process
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1.2.4.2. Old patient location of details
1.2.4.3. Availability of reports/imaging required by protocol for treatment
1.2.4.4. Availability of consent documentation
1.2.4.5. Other

2. Pre-treatment phase
2.1. Assessment of patient
2.1.1. Identification of patient
2.1.2. Verification of diagnosis/extent/stage
2.1.3. Other

2.2. Decision to treat
2.2.1. Completion of required information
2.2.2. Recording of patient ID
2.2.3. Recording of previous treatment details
2.2.4. Recording of patient’s specific requirements
2.2.5. Recording of non-standard information/protocol variations
2.2.6. Other

2.3. Prescribing treatment protocol
2.3.1. Choice of dose
2.3.2. Choice of modality
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2.3.3. Choice of energy
2.3.4. Choice of fractionation
2.3.5. Choice of start date
2.3.6. Consideration of patient condition/co-morbidities
2.3.7. Choice of other interventions and their sequencing
2.3.8. Consent process
2.3.9. Other

2.4. Positioning and immobilization (mould room/workshop activities)
2.4.1. Confirmation of ID
2.4.2. Production of immobilization devices
2.4.3. Production of other accessories/personalized beam shaping device
2.4.4. Recording of information in patient record
2.4.5. Instructions to patient
2.4.6. Other

2.5. Simulation, imaging and volume determination
2.5.1. Confirmation of ID
2.5.2. Positioning of patient
2.5.3. Localization of intended volume
2.5.4. Production of images
2.5.5. Labelling of images

202
2.5.6. Saving and recording of data
2.5.7. Other

2.6. Treatment planning
2.6.1. Verification of patient ID
2.6.2. Importing of data from external data sources
2.6.3. Choice of technique
2.6.4. Target and organ at risk delineation
2.6.5. Generation of plan for approval
2.6.6. Authorization of plan
2.6.7. Recording of definitive treatment prescription
2.6.8. Calculation for non-planned treatments
2.6.9. Other

2.7. Treatment information transfer
2.7.1. Choice of data entry method (input vs transcription)
2.7.2. Use of correct data
2.7.3. Other

2.8. Pre-treatment patient preparation
2.8.1. Confirmation of ID
2.8.2. Confirmation of consent
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2.8.3. Confirmation of fertility/pregnancy status
2.8.4. Advice on procedure
2.8.5. Other

2.9. Other

3. Treatment phase
3.1. Treatment setup
3.1.1. Patient setup
3.1.1.1. Patient ID process
3.1.1.2. Patient data ID process
3.1.1.3. Explanation/instructions to patient
3.1.1.4. Patient positioning
3.1.1.5. Use of reference marks
3.1.1.6. Other

3.1.2. Treatment unit setup
3.1.2.1. Setting of treatment machine parameters
3.1.2.2. Setting of collimator angle
3.1.2.3. Setting of jaw position
3.1.2.4. Setting of asymmetry
3.1.2.5. Setting of couch position/angle
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3.1.2.6. Setting of energy
3.1.2.7. Setting of monitor units
3.1.2.8. Other

3.1.3. Use of treatment accessories
3.1.3.1. Use of immobilization devices
3.1.3.2. Use of beam shaping devices
3.1.3.3. Use of beam direction aids/applicators
3.1.3.4. Use of compensators
3.1.3.5. Use of wedges
3.1.3.6. Availability of treatment accessories
3.1.3.7. Other

3.2. Treatment delivery
3.2.1. Treatment
3.2.2. Other
3.2.3. Correct treatment site

3.3. Treatment verification
3.3.1. On-set imaging process
3.3.2. Recording of data
3.3.3. Other
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3.4. Treatment monitoring
3.5. Other

4. Unknown

Who discovered the incident?
•

Radiation oncologist (physician)

•

Medical physicist

•

Radiation therapist/staff at treatment unit treating patients

•

Radiation therapist/staff at simulator and/or in-house CT

•

Staff doing technical maintenance on the radiotherapy equipment

•

No information provided

•

Other, please specify

How was the incident discovered?
•

Chart check

•

In vivo dosimetry

•

Portal imaging

•

Clinical review of patient

•

Quality control of equipment

•

Found at the time of first patient treatment during regular checks
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•

Found at a later stage during patient treatment

•

External audit

•

No information provided

•

Other, please specify

Clinical incident severity
•

Minor incident

•

Potential serious incident

•

Serious incident

•

Potential major incident

•

Major incident

•

Critical incident

•

No information provided

Definitions of clinical incident severity categories
•

•

Minor Incident
o

Dose variation from prescribed total dose of <5%

o

Near miss or unsafe condition which could potentially cause a treatment error

o

Patient complaint

Potential Serious Incident
o

•

A near miss that could have been a serious incident

Serious Incident
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o

Dose variation from prescribed total dose of 5 - 10%

o

Radiation dose or medication error causing side effects requiring minor treatment or
ongoing monitoring and assessment

o
•

Set up variation > 1cm - no critical structures included

Potential Major Incident
o

•

A near miss that could have been a major incident

Major Incident
o

Dose variation from prescribed total dose of 10 - 20%

o

Radiation dose or medication error causing side effects requiring major treatment and
intervention or hospitalization

o

Set up variation that will/could impact on normal tissue (e.g. heart, lung, eyes, kidney
etc.)

•

Critical Incident
o

Radiation dose or medication error causing death or disability

o

Dose variation from prescribed total dose of >20%

o

Completely incorrect volume

Was any part of the prescribed tx delivered incorrectly?
•

No

•

Yes

•

No, but there were unsafe conditions

•

No, but patient could have been affected

•

No information provided
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Was anyone affected by the incident?
•

Yes, more than one patient

•

Yes, one patient

•

Other, e.g. staff

•

No, but someone could have been, potential incident

•

No information provided

Describe the causes of the incident
Job Factors
Standards/Procedures/Practices
1.1 Not developed
1.2 Inadequate standard/procedure/practice
1.3 Standard/Procedure/Practice not followed
1.4 Inadequate communication of procedure
1.5 Inadequate assessment of risk
1.6 Not implemented

Materials/Tools/Equipment
2.1 Availability

209

2.2 Defective
2.3 Inadequate maintenance
2.4 Inspection
2.5 Used incorrectly
2.6 Inadequate assessment of materials/tools/equipment for task

3. Design
3.1 Inadequate hazard assessment
3.2 Inadequate design specification
3.3 Design process not followed
3.4 Inadequate assessment of ergonomic impact
3.5 Inadequate assessment of operational capabilities
3.6 Inadequate programming

Systemic/Management Factors
4. Planning
4.1 Inadequate work planning
4.2 Inadequate management of change
4.3 Conflicting priorities/planning/programming
4.4 Inadequate assessment of needs & risks
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4.5 Inadequate documentation
4.6 Personnel availability

5. Communication
5.1 Unclear roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities
5.2 Lack of communications
5.3 Inadequate direction/information
5.4 Misunderstood communications

6.Knowledge/Skills
6.1 Inadequate training/orientation
6.2 Training needs not identified
6.3 Lack of coaching
6.4 Failure to recognize hazard
6.5 Inadequate assessment of needs and risks

Personal Factors
7. Capabilities
7.1 Physical capabilities (height, strength, weight, etc.)
7.2 Sensory deficiencies (sight, sound, sense of smell, balance, etc.)
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7.3 Substance sensitivities/allergies

8. Judgment
8.1 Failure to address recognized hazard
8.2 Conflicting demands/priorities
8.3 Emotional stress
8.4 Fatigue
8.5 Criminal intent
8.6 Extreme judgment demands
8.7 Substance abuse

Natural Factors
9 Natural Factors
9.1 Fires
9.2 Flood
9.3 Earthquake
9.4 Extreme weather
9.5 Other

What safety barrier failed to identify the incident?
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•

Image based position verification

•

In vivo dosimetry

•

Independent confirmation of dose

•

Independent confirmation of dose calculation

•

Independent review of commissioning

•

Independent verification of source strength

•

Intra-treatment monitoring

•

Physician peer review

•

Post treatment evaluations (evaluation of clinical and process)

•

Post-irradiation survey to confirm removal of sources

•

Post-treatment dosimetry and review

•

Regular clinical patient assessment

•

Regular equipment performance verification

•

Regular external audit

•

Review of treatment plan

•

Time out

•

Use of record and verifying system

•

Verification of correct applicator size

•

Verification of correct transfer tube length

•

Verification of imaging data for planning (CT scan, fusion, imaging modality, correct
data set)

•

Verification of patient ID

•

Verification of treatment accessories
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•

Verification of reference points

•

Verification that pretreatment condition have been taken into account

•

Other, please specify

Equipment used
•

Linear Accelerator

•

Cobolt 60

•

Superficial X-Ray

Treatment method
•

Simple (two dimensional or electrons)

•

3D (three dimensional) conformal

•

IMRT (intensity modulated radiation therapy)

•

Modulated arc therapy

•

Stereotactic radiosurgery (cranial or body)

•

Protons or other particles
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